Adaptive Ad Load Design for Sponsored Search Markets: Evidence, Theory, and Deployment

Existing auto-bidding algorithms in digital advertising often treat the value of an ad opportunity as the revenue obtained when an ad is shown and/or clicked, and bid accordingly. This can lead to wasteful spending because the true value is the marginal gain from paid exposure: even without winning a sponsored slot, an advertiser may still earn revenue via an organic search result (e.g., on Google or Amazon). Motivated by recent work, we model ad value as a treatment effect--the outcome difference between winning and losing the auction--and study online learning for bidding in second-price (Vickrey) auctions under this causal perspective. We develop algorithms that attain rate-optimal regret under several feedback models. A key ingredient exploits the information revealed by the second-price payment rule, which strictly improves regret relative to analogous learning problems in first-price auctions.

Treatment allocation under budget constraints is a central challenge in digital advertising: advertisers must decide which users to show ads to while spending a limited budget wisely. The standard approach follows a two-stage offline pipeline - first collect historical data to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects (HTE), then solve a constrained optimization to allocate the budget. This works well with abundant data, but fails in cold-start settings such as new campaigns, new markets, or new customer segments where little historical data exists. We propose Budget-Constrained Causal Bandits (BCCB), an online framework that learns which users respond to ads while simultaneously spending the budget, making treatment decisions one user at a time. BCCB unifies three components into a single sequential process: learning individual-level ad effectiveness, exploring users whose response is uncertain, and pacing the budget over time. We evaluated on the Criteo Uplift dataset, a large-scale advertising dataset from a real randomized controlled trial. Our key finding is a data-efficiency crossover: offline methods require approximately 10,000 historical observations to produce reliable results, while BCCB operates effectively from the very first user. Furthermore, BCCB exhibits 3-5x lower performance variance between runs, making it more practical for real campaign planning. Among purely online methods, BCCB consistently outperforms standard Thompson Sampling, budgeted Thompson Sampling, and greedy HTE estimation across all budget levels tested.

LLM-native advertising embeds sponsored content directly into model-generated responses, shifting the unit of sale from a fixed slot to a moment within an evolving conversation. Existing LLM ad-auction mechanisms primarily operate within a single response, settling the winner but not the timing. The extension is nontrivial: with one native insertion opportunity per session, the stopping time depends on bids, coupling timing with allocation, so static truthfulness arguments no longer apply. We propose the LLM-based Optimal Stopping Dynamic Auction (LLM-OSDA), a dynamic cost-per-click auction that integrates Bellman optimal stopping, winner allocation, and envelope pricing. A bid-independent LLM layer estimates contextual click quality and seamlessly renders the winning ad, while bids enter only the committed auction mechanism. Under an exact Bellman oracle, the expected discounted-click allocation is monotone in each advertiser's bid, and the corresponding envelope payment makes truthful bidding weakly dominant in expectation. For practical deployment, a learned StopNet approximates the Bellman action values. We show that its decisions differ from the optimal policy only near the stopping boundary and bound the resulting incentive loss in terms of its approximation error. Experiments on a simulated conversational advertising corpus show that LLM-OSDA improves net revenue by 11 percent over the strongest fixed-timing baseline while maintaining comparable user retention. Code is at https://github.com/2025Fang2025/llm-osda.