Transcoders for Investigating Deception in Language Models

Research and news coverage of language-model deception increasingly attributes human-like mental-state concepts to language models. Such claims can blur the distinction between behavior that looks deceptive and a mechanism that is actually deceptive. We introduce a causal taxonomy separating prior commitment from retrospective report, model preference from realized output, false preference from sensitivity to the utility of misleading a recipient, and deceptive behavior from the provenance of the objective or strategy producing it. We test these distinctions in two open-weight model families. Across controlled guessing-game and stock-trading experiments, we find that deceptive-looking behavior can arise without the corresponding proposed mechanism, while other interventions provide direct evidence that recipient information state can causally affect deceptive preference. These results show that deceptive behavior can provide evidence for a deceptive mechanism. But even evidence for such a mechanism does not establish model agency in the deception.

As LLMs acquire stronger reasoning capabilities, deceptive behavior becomes an increasingly serious safety concern. Existing deception monitors either score visible transcripts or derive scalar probe scores from representation vectors, leaving little inspectable evidence about why a response is suspicious. We introduce STATEWITNESS, an activation explainer for deception auditing. A separate decoder reads a target model's hidden states, then answers natural-language queries or emits structured reports about them. We evaluate STATEWITNESS on two target reasoning LLMs across seven deception datasets. STATEWITNESS reaches 0.916 mean AUROC, a relative gain of 11.6% over the best black-box text monitor and 25.0% over the best activation-probe baseline under the same evaluation protocol. When combined with existing monitors, STATEWITNESS reduces missed deceptive examples in simple threshold ensembles. Beyond scalar detection, the decoder returns query-level answers, schema reports, and token- or sentence-level evidence traces for human inspection. We view this interface as a potential building block for broader interpretability and alignment tools.

Existing deception datasets label completed outputs as honest or deceptive, treating deception as a property of the final response rather than a function of the model's reasoning trace. This obscures a more fundamental question: when does a language model become committed to deception? We introduce counterfactual localization: for each sentence prefix in a reasoning trace, we fix the prefix, resample continuations, and estimate the probability of a deceptive outcome. To scale this, we construct five environments (spanning strategic bluffing, maze guidance, financial advice, used-car sales, and offer negotiation) in which deception is never prompted but emerges from strategic incentives and labels follow mechanically from environment state rather than subjective human judgment. The resulting corpus localizes $\sim$1.46M sentences across four reasoning models, drawn from over 94.1M sampled continuations, 91.5B generated tokens, and over 100K scenarios. Sentence-level human evaluation confirms that detected commitment points correspond to interpretable shifts in decision state. Using this resource, we show that lexical cues for commitment prediction transfer poorly across environments, whereas attention-based transition features generalize out of distribution, suggesting that deceptive commitment is reflected in reusable changes in reasoning dynamics rather than surface form. We further identify compact attention-head sets (under 10% of heads) that, selected on one environment, causally suppress deceptive commitment across held-out environments. We release the corpus as a substrate for studying deception, and more broadly commitment, in language-model reasoning.