Equality, Equity, and Causality in Fairness Research: A Commentary on Cheng (2026)

Machine learning algorithms are being used in high-stakes decisions, including those in criminal justice, healthcare, credit, and employment. The research community has responded with two largely independent research fields: \emph{algorithmic fairness}, which targets equitable outcomes, and \emph{explainable AI} (XAI), which targets interpretable reasoning. This survey identifies and maps a novel blind spot at their intersection, which is a model that can satisfy every standard fairness criterion in its outputs while being profoundly unfair in its \emph{reasoning process}. We refer to this as the procedural bias, and mitigating it requires treating the fairness of explanations as a distinct object of scientific study. To our knowledge, we provide the first unified theoretical and literature review of this emerging field and elucidate the drawbacks of post-hoc explainers in certifying explanation fairness. Our central contribution is a \emph{conditional invariance framework} formalizing explanation fairness as the requirement that explanations should be indifferent regardless of the protected attributes $P(E(X) \in \cdot \mid X_\text{rel} = x_\text{rel},\, A = a) = P(E(X) \in \cdot \mid X_\text{rel} = x_\text{rel},\, A = b)$ for all task-relevant $x$, a single principle from which all existing explanation fairness metrics emerge as partial operationalizations. We introduce a seven-dimensional taxonomy, identify three generative mechanisms of explanation inequity (representation-driven, explanation-model mismatch, actionability-driven), and propose a canonical six-step evaluation workflow for operationalizing explanation fairness audits in practice.

Machine learning algorithms in socially sensitive domains (e.g., credit decisions) often focus on equalizing predictive outcomes. However, satisfying these metrics does not guarantee that models use the same reasoning for different groups. We show that existing outcome-fair models can still apply fundamentally different reasoning to individuals, a hidden procedural bias'' missed by standard fairness metrics and algorithms. We propose Counterfactual Explanation Consistency (CEC), a framework that detects and mitigates this bias by aligning feature attributions between individuals and their counterfactual counterparts. Key contributions include a nearest-neighbor counterfactual generation method, a modified baseline for integrated gradient comparisons, an individual-level procedural fairness metric, and a corresponding training loss. We introduce a taxonomy identifying Regime B'' (same outcome, different reasoning) as a critical blind spot. Experiments on synthetic data, German Credit, Adult Income, and HMDA mortgage data demonstrate that outcome-fair baselines exhibit substantial hidden bias, while CEC substantially reduces it with modest utility cost.

Fairness impossibility results often look like distinct scalar incompatibility statements. We show that several share one RKHS geometry: fairness criteria are linear constraints on conditional mean embeddings, and unequal base rates make the law of total expectation overdetermine those constraints. This view yields four results. The Kleinberg--Mullainathan--Raghavan dichotomy needs only group-conditional unbiasedness, not full calibration. The \emph{Pokémon theorem} shows that a distinct group pair satisfying any finite collection of linear mean-fairness criteria leaves a residual violation witnessed by the MMD, decaying at the Kolmogorov $m$-width rate under spectral regularity. The same tools prove an impossibility for fair feature learning: parity and class-conditional separation in representation space force class collapse under unequal base rates. The approximate relaxations yield signal and error frontiers, allowing a trade-off between real-world estimators and fairness goals. Experiments on standard fairness benchmarks are consistent with our bounds.