The Concept of Representation in ML: Beyond Plato and Aristotle

We investigate the Platonic Representation Hypothesis (PRH) through a tripartite statistical framework of representations: signal, bias, and noise. {1) Signal:} We propose that Platonic alignment arises from the universal relationship between objects and attributes, which is encoded linearly in representations according to the Linear Representation Hypothesis (LRH). We provide evidence that LRH helps explain PRH by extracting linear object-attribute features with sparse autoencoders and showing that these sparse representations often exhibit stronger cross-modal alignment than their dense counterparts. {2) Bias:} Models have different implicit biases due to the diverse architectures and training procedures used. We show that this difference can be partially mitigated. Centering and normalization consistently improve cross-model alignment. {3) Noise:} Finite-sample training leads to noise in representations. We provide evidence that representational noise is driven by data scarcity by revealing a strong and consistent positive correlation between word frequency and alignment in LLMs and text embedding models. Synthesizing signal, bias, and noise, we propose a statistical model that refines the Linear Representation Hypothesis and explains further phenomena related to the alignment of representations emerging from diverse modern AI architectures.

Large language models trained under diverse objectives and architectures have been shown to develop increasingly similar internal representations, an observation formalized as the Platonic Representation Hypothesis. Whether this representational convergence extends to the reasoning processes that operate over shared representations remains untested. We evaluate representational similarity across 16 language models from 8 families (1.5B to 72B parameters) on 800 reasoning problems spanning mathematics, science, commonsense, and truthfulness, stratifying by problem difficulty, computational stage, and causal relevance. Our analysis reveals three dissociations: a difficulty inversion, where models converge more on problems they collectively fail (Centered Kernel Alignment [CKA] = 0.897) than on those they solve (CKA = 0.830); a generation gap, where pre-decision representations align (CKA = 0.875) while post-decision representations diverge (CKA = 0.274); and epiphenomenal correctness, where shared information is decodable across models (66% transfer accuracy) but exerts minimal causal influence on predictions (1.5% to 5.5% flip rate across ablation protocols). These results indicate that representational convergence in language models reflects shared input processing constraints rather than shared reasoning strategies, with direct implications for ensemble design, interpretability transfer, and evaluations of model similarity. Code is available at https://github.com/Usama1002/convergence-without-understanding.

The Platonic Representation Hypothesis suggests that neural networks trained on different modalities (e.g., text and images) align and eventually converge toward the same representation of reality. If true, this has significant implications for whether modality choice matters at all. We show that the experimental evidence for this hypothesis is fragile and depends critically on the evaluation regime. Alignment is measured using mutual nearest neighbors on small datasets ($\approx$1K samples) and degrades substantially as the dataset is scaled to millions of samples. The same behavior is observed beyond text-image, for text-audio and text-video alignment. The alignment that remains between model representations reflects coarse semantic overlap rather than consistent fine-grained structure. Moreover, the evaluations in Huh et al. are done in a one-to-one image-caption setting, a constraint that breaks down in realistic many-to-many settings and further reduces measured alignment. We also find that the reported trend of stronger language models increasingly aligning with vision does not appear to hold for newer models. Overall, our findings suggest that the current evidence for cross-modal representational convergence is considerably weaker than subsequent works have taken it to be. Models trained on different modalities may learn equally rich representations of the world, just not the same one.