Pragmatic language use requires reasoning about alternatives: the alternative expressions a speaker might have chosen, or the alternative interpretations a listener might entertain. Formal and computational models of pragmatics must therefore specify the sets of alternatives that interlocutors reason over, which is often done through manual specification. Here we propose a framework, ScAffolded Generative models for Explanation (SAGE), that combines the explanatory transparency of cognitive models with the generative flexibility of language models (LMs). SAGE decomposes a pragmatic process into three kinds of modules: proposers, which use LMs to generate an open-ended space of candidate alternatives; evaluators, which assess those alternatives (e.g., their semantics, complexity, or typicality); and selectors, which implement the rule-based computational steps of a cognitively motivated task analysis. We assess SAGE in three case studies spanning pragmatic generation and interpretation-referential expression generation, manner (M-)implicatures, and Gricean conversational implicatures. SAGE models are evaluated critically using established methods from computational cognitive modeling, including ablations, baseline comparisons, and quantitative fit to human data. Across studies, SAGE models achieved high accuracy and often outperformed baselines, but component-level analyses reveal an asymmetry: LM proposers reliably generated alternatives well-suited to pragmatic modeling, whereas LM evaluators are better at providing intuitive judgements rather than judgements of theoretical or formal measures. We discuss the promise and the limitations of neuro-symbolic models as candidate explanatory accounts of human pragmatic language use.
Human conversation relies heavily on conversational implicature, in which speakers convey meanings that are suggested rather than explicitly stated. Although recent large language models exhibit strong conversational fluency, they remain unreliable when interpretation depends on reasoning that integrates social and contextual cues, a process rarely articulated in text. We introduce DRinQ, a benchmark for evaluating pragmatic reasoning about conversational implicature in question utterances, designed to isolate pragmatic variation while holding each question's surface form fixed. To support scalable evaluation, we propose a semi-automated pipeline that produces question-context-interpretation instances with systematic variation. Across evaluations, we find a consistent generation-inference asymmetry: while state-of-the-art models can generate plausible pragmatic scenarios when guided, they often fail to recover the intended implication at inference time. For smaller models, structured prompting improves alignment with human judgments. A comparative writing study further reveals complementary strengths: human authors tend to produce safer, predictable contexts, whereas models generate varied scenarios with interpretations that sometimes exceed contextual support. These findings highlight persistent challenges in modeling conversational implicature and motivate more context-sensitive evaluation frameworks.
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly studied as repositories of linguistic knowledge. In this line of work, models are commonly evaluated both as generators of language and as judges of linguistic output, yet these two roles are rarely examined in direct relation to one another. As a result, it remains unclear whether success in one role aligns with success in the other. In this paper, we address this question for pragmatic competence by comparing LLMs' performance as pragmatic listeners, judging the appropriateness of linguistic outputs, and as pragmatic speakers, generating pragmatically appropriate language. We evaluate multiple open-weight and proprietary LLMs across three pragmatic settings. We find a robust asymmetry between pragmatic evaluation and pragmatic generation: many models perform substantially better as listeners than as speakers. Our results suggest that pragmatic judging and pragmatic generation are only weakly aligned in current LLMs, calling for more integrated evaluation practices.
Humans effortlessly go beyond literal meanings: If you mow the lawn, I will give you fifty dollars, is typically understood as implying that the speaker will pay only if the lawn is mowed, whereas If you are hungry, there is pizza in the oven implies that pizza is available regardless of the hearers hunger. Large Language Models - LLMs - show human-like performance on many tasks, yet it remains unclear whether they reason like humans. To address this, we conducted a population-matching experiment assessing how twentyfive LLMs compute conditional inferences across four languages, compared to an equal number of humans per language. We find that humans enrich logical reasoning through pragmatic inferences across languages. Model behavior is more variable. Some LLMs perfectly follow the truth-table of conditionals but they ignore pragmatic inferences, while others deviate from the truth-table, adhering to a single interpretation across the board, thus reflecting accurate rule-based processing but not human-like reasoning. Overall, LLMs are accurate semantic operators, but fail to capture the pragmatic enrichments characteristic of human reasoning. Crucially, LLM accuracy is neither predicted nor boosted by open vs. closed status, training orientation, or architecture type, suggesting that pragmatic reasoning is still an emerging ability in the cognitive toolkit of artificial systems.
Paolo Morosi, Nikoleta Pantelidou, Fritz Günther +2