The Dynamic Turn in Paraconsistency

Dynamic epistemic logic represents belief change via model transformations induced by epistemic events. Its standard formulation (Baltag, Moss, Solecki, 1998) provides a natural account of belief expansion through the elimination of possibilities, but it cannot model belief contraction about factual propositions. A classic response enriches Kripke models with plausibility orderings, representing contraction as an update that promotes certain possibilities over others. We show that this approach has expressive limitations. In particular, the approach cannot model belief that violates positive introspection and contraction dynamics in response to a hedged public announcement that phi might be false. Motivated by these considerations, we introduce a mechanism for belief contraction defined directly on standard Kripke models, without any constraints on the doxastic accessibility relation. We show that it satisfies some of the standard properties of belief contraction but not others, study the conditions under which contraction may be unsuccessful, and provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the logic via reduction axioms. We also define a more general dynamic logic that is an extension of standard DEL and accommodates belief contractions due to events such as private or semi-private announcements, and provide a complete and sound axiomatization of the general logic.

In his 1996 doctoral thesis, Maurice Pagnucco created the first AGM-like abductive expansion operation. Taking his operation as a basis, as well as a taxonomy -- inspired by Atocha Aliseda -- responsible for highlighting and formalizing the main components of abductive reasoning, the main aim of this paper is to present a new paraconsistent AGM-like abductive expansion operation -- capable of assimilating contradictory explanatory hypotheses without trivialization and the consequent absurd epistemic state -- with its postulates and its transitively relational partial meet construction. To a large extent, the formal development presented in this paper was only made possible by the recent creation of the paraconsistent logic RCbr, an LFI (Logics of Formal Inconsistencies) that establishes properties especially relevant to belief revision contexts, in particular, the ability to be self-extensional -- i.e., to satisfy the replacement property. This is the first of two papers: the paraconsistent abductive expansion operation announced here -- which is part of a new system called AGMpabd -- despite bringing many interesting features, does not assign any relevant epistemic role to the paraconsistent operators of negation and consistency. Only in a second paper will an analogous paraconsistent abductive expansion operation -- which is part of another new system, AGMcircabd -- be enhanced in this direction. Nevertheless, to the best of my knowledge, the operation developed in this paper is the first of its kind in the AGM literature.

Belief revision is a process in which an agent begins to believe in something she previously did not. I begin the paper by presenting, based on (Gärdenfors, 1998; Hansson, 1999), postulates for belief revision that constitute the basis of the AGM theory. I will then briefly show the semantics of a modal logic introduced in (van Ditmarsch, 2005), which I call $P$'. This logic formalizes static epistemic states and has greater expressive power than AGM in doing so because it captures the quantitative notion of "degrees of conviction". The third step is to introduce revision operators on $P$ and, mostly following (van Ditmarsch, 2005), obtain the Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) I call $P*$'. It models processes of belief revision in several ways. Original results are presented in the following two sections. The first one of these sections revolves around a formalization of AGM postulates within $P*$ by proving some theorems related to the satisfaction of those postulates by revisions defined in $P*$. The last section features an analysis of $P*$'s revisions that go beyond the mere satisfaction of postulates. I compare their formal behavior with respect to some philosophical criteria. At last, I conclude that the functions presented in (van Ditmarsch, 2005) are not good formalizations of the philosophical intuition behind AGM. Instead, it is captured by the function $*^0$ originally defined in this paper (but highly inspired by (van Benthem, 2007)). An implementation of this function is also provided.