Authors: Andrés Buxó-Lugo, Aniello De Santo, Morgan Grobol, Ryan J. Hubbard, Cassandra L. Jacobs
Organizations: University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY, USA · University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USA · Université Paris Nanterre, Paris, France · University at Albany, Albany, NY, USA
Abstract
Surprisal Theory is often characterized as a computational-level explanation per (Marr, 1982). We argue in this work that, even though a computational level narrative has been used to support "representation-agnostic research" within computational psycholinguistics, the movement toward black box systems embodied by large language models (LLMs) does not exempt modelers using the surprisal metric from the representational decisions required by computational-level characterizations. In fact, we argue that the uncritical use of LLM-surprisal obfuscates the representational and algorithmic-level commitments of different models. In three analyses, we show that the choice of algorithm and model architecture play significant roles in the computation of language model probabilities. We advise that researchers who wish to test Surprisal Theory re-evaluate the practice of treating large language model probabilities as interchangeable
Surprisal theory holds that the human processing difficulty of a linguistic unit in context is an affine function of its surprisal under some language model. I argue this claim is a tautology without further constraint: for any non-negative difficulty measure over units in context, there exists a language model whose surprisal is an affine function of it under mild technical conditions. Therefore, because any pattern of difficulty is consistent with some language model, without an additional constraint on the language model, surprisal theory makes no falsifiable predictions. The tautology was long obscured by an assumption implicit in two decades of psycholinguistic work---that the relevant language model is the distribution that generated the training corpus, so that improving corpus fit improves predictions of human behavior. Recent empirical work has undermined this assumption, demonstrating that better corpus models can be worse predictors of processing difficulty. I conclude that breaking the tautology requires a rationalist intervention, i.e., the relevant language model must be derived from a non-empirically motivated model of the comprehender, which could be based on, for instance, memory constraints or processing goals, and that, thus, does not depend on the behavioral data surprisal theory is meant to explain.
Surprisal theory links human processing effort to the predictability of an upcoming linguistic unit, but empirical work often leaves the notion of a unit underspecified. In practice, experimental stimuli are segmented into linguistically motivated units (e.g., words), while pretrained language models assign probability mass to a fixed token alphabet that typically does not align with those units. As a result, surprisal-based predictors depend implicitly on ad hoc procedures that conflate two distinct modeling choices: the definition of the unit of analysis and the choice of regions of interest over which predictions are evaluated. In this paper, we disentangle these choices and give a unified framework for reasoning about surprisal over arbitrary unit inventories. We argue that surprisal-based analyses should make these choices explicit and treat tokenization as an implementation detail rather than a scientific primitive.
Samuel Kiegeland, Vésteinn Snæbjarnarson, Tim Vieira +1
Surprisal theory hypothesizes that the difficulty of human sentence processing increases linearly with surprisal, the negative log-probability of a word given its context. Computational psycholinguistics has tested this hypothesis using language models (LMs) as proxies for human prediction. While surprisal derived from recent neural LMs generally captures human processing difficulty on naturalistic corpora that predominantly consist of simple sentences, it severely underestimates processing difficulty on sentences that require syntactic disambiguation (garden-path effects). This leads to the claim that the processing difficulty of such sentences cannot be reduced to surprisal, although it remains possible that neural LMs simply differ from humans in next-word prediction. In this paper, we investigate whether it is truly impossible to construct a neural LM that can explain garden-path effects via surprisal. Specifically, instead of evaluating off-the-shelf neural LMs, we fine-tune these LMs on garden-path sentences so as to better align surprisal-based reading-time estimates with actual human reading times. Our results show that fine-tuned LMs do not overfit and successfully capture human reading slowdowns on held-out garden-path items; they even improve predictive power for human reading times on naturalistic corpora and preserve their general LM capabilities. These results provide an existence proof for a neural LM that can explain both garden-path effects and naturalistic reading times via surprisal, but also raise a theoretical question: what kind of evidence can truly falsify surprisal theory?