Beyond Heavy Log Curation: Perplexity-Based APT Detection via Unsupervised, Context-Augmented Language Models

Detecting anomalies in large-scale system logs is critical for the reliability and security of modern computing infrastructure. We present LogNEO, a log anomaly detector built on EleutherAI's GPT-Neo (1.3B parameters) and fine-tuned with a novel partial-credit, exponentially decaying position-aware reward scheme combined with cross-entropy regularisation via Proximal Policy Optimisation (PPO). The position-aware reward explicitly models prediction difficulty: early positions receive higher rewards for correct predictions, while later positions incur stronger penalties for errors. LogNEO attains F1-scores of 0.927, 0.913, and 0.984 on the HDFS, BGL, and Thunderbird benchmarks, improving recall by up to 6 percentage points over the prior state-of-the-art LogGPT while maintaining comparable precision. A production microservice deployment over Apache Kafka, Redis, and TensorRT-accelerated inference demonstrates 45 ms end-to-end latency at 15,000 events per second.

System-generated logs underpin security monitoring, yet their rigid template-based format hinders both automated analysis and human comprehension. We present NLLog (Natural-Language Log), a lightweight pipeline that deterministically rewrites parsed templates into WHO-WHAT-SEVERITY sentences, pools them with term-frequency-inverse-document-frequency weighting, classifies sessions with tree ensembles, and back-projects evidence with TreeSHAP for analyst review. On Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) and Blue Gene/L (BGL) corpora, NLLog exceeds two reproduced matched-protocol baselines; across HDFS, BGL, and the AIT Alert Data Set, it sustains low false-positive rates with commodity-hardware latency suitable for security operations center triage. Coverage, sparse-versus-dense, faithfulness, and adversarial ablations show that fallback sufficiency is corpus-dependent, that an enrollment-time coverage check can surface refinement requirements before deployment, and that an auditable deterministic rewrite combined with lightweight dense encoding provides a measurable representation layer for log-anomaly detection and triage.

Early attribution of Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) activity can help defenders prioritise investigation, select countermeasures, and reduce the impact of an intrusion. Malware provides useful attribution evidence, but automated APT malware attribution remains difficult in practice. Existing approaches are typically trained and evaluated as closed-set classifiers over a limited number of known APT groups. In operational environments, however, classifiers are likely to encounter samples from groups not represented during training. Closed-set classifiers are then forced to assign such samples to known groups, producing unsupported and potentially misleading attributions. We present a high-precision APT malware attribution method based on ranked binary classifiers with explicit abstention. Rather than training a single multi-class classifier, our approach trains and tunes two binary classifiers per APT group, ranks the classifiers by validation performance, and applies them sequentially. A sample is attributed only when a classifier provides sufficient evidence; otherwise, it abstains. We evaluate the method on the APT Malware dataset and on a larger combined dataset designed to stress-test out-of-scope behaviour. On the APT Malware dataset, the method achieves higher precision than previously published results on the same dataset. In the most challenging setting, where 87% of test samples came from 60 APT groups excluded from training, the method abstained on 94% of out-of-scope samples while maintaining 92% precision and 95% selective accuracy on the samples it classified.