Tool-Guided Retrieval-Augmented Repair for Securing LLM-Generated C Code

Large language models (LLMs) are widely used for code generation, but their security reliability remains inconsistent across languages and prompting strategies. Existing prompt engineering improves functional correctness but rarely ensures consistent security outcomes. We introduce the \textit{Mitigation-Aware Chain-of-Thought (MA-CoT)} framework, which embeds task-specific CWE mitigation guidance and language-aware safeguards to reduce recurring vulnerabilities in generated code. We evaluate MA-CoT across three LLMs (gpt-5, claude-4.5, gemini-2.5), three programming languages (C, Java, Python), and four prompting strategies (Vanilla, Zero-shot, CoT, MA-CoT) on a 200-task primary dataset, with external validation on LLMSecEval. Using static analysis with expert validation, MA-CoT reduces total security findings from 92 to 39 (57.6%) on the primary dataset and from 73 to 4 (94.5%) on LLMSecEval. High-severity findings (Blocker + Critical) drop from 90 to 39 (56.7%) and from 45 to 2 (95.6%), respectively. Across both datasets, MA-CoT is the only strategy that consistently improves security reliability; Zero-shot and CoT are less reliable and may increase vulnerability, especially in C. We further introduce a strict layered attribution of vulnerability drivers (language-core vs. stack layers) and show that residual risk concentrates in hardening-oriented patterns (e.g., OS- and toolchain-dependent), motivating secure-by-construction primitives alongside prompting.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can generate plausible code patches, but plausibility is not enough for automated repair: a patch must compile, pass tests, and remove the target vulnerability. We present SynthFix, a neuro-symbolic repair framework that combines supervised repair learning with compiler-informed feedback. During training, a lightweight router selects between Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) for common repair patterns and Reward Fine-Tuning (RFT) for examples that benefit from symbolic feedback. The reward combines static structure, lint/compile checks, security scanning, and public execution tests where available; at inference time, the same evidence guides best-of-K candidate selection under a greedy floor. Across five code LLMs (1.3B-7B) on pyrepair, CodeFlaws, and SVEN, SynthFix improves deployable repair metrics over SFT-only and RFT-only baselines, with relative gains up to 54 percent in functional correctness and 14 percent in security clearance. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/CoderDoge1108/SynthFix.

LLM coding agents now generate code at an unprecedented scale, yet LLM-generated code introduces cybersecurity vulnerabilities into codebases without human involvement. Even when frontier models are explicitly asked to write secure production code with relevant weaknesses to avoid in context, we find that they still produce verifiable vulnerabilities on average 23% of the time across a corpus of 250 benign coding prompts. We introduce SecureForge, an automated pipeline that both audits security risks of frontier models and produces auditing-informed secure system prompts that reduce output security vulnerabilities while maintaining unit test performance. SecureForge first identifies benign prompts that produce statically detectable vulnerabilities, and then amplifies them into a large synthetic prompt corpus of diverse scenarios using a Markovian sampling technique to jointly maintain error rates and prompt diversity. This corpus is then used to iteratively optimize the system prompts to reduce output security vulnerabilities. On frontier models, SecureForge yields a statistically significant Pareto improvement in both unit test success and output security, with output vulnerabilities reduced by up to 48%. The resulting system prompts transfer zero-shot to in-the-wild coding agent prompts, without any exposure to real user prompt distributions during optimization.