Certified in Theory, Broken in Practice: Assumption Gaps in Cryptographic Model Certification
Authors: Carter Luck, Olive Franzese-McLaughlin, Elisaweta Masserova, Akira Takahashi, Antigoni Polychroniadou, Nicolas Papernot
Organizations: University of Massachusetts Amherst · Vector Institute · University of Toronto · Carnegie Mellon University · J.P.Morgan AI Research · AlgoCRYPT CoE
Privacy-preserving machine learning auditing protocols allow auditors to assess models for properties such as accuracy or fairness, without revealing their internals or training data. This makes them especially attractive for auditing models deployed in sensitive domains such as healthcare or finance. For these protocols to be meaningful in real-world audit settings, though, their guarantees must reflect how the model will behave once deployed, rather than merely certifying its behavior during an audit. Existing security definitions often miss this mark: most certify model behavior only on a fixed audit dataset, without ensuring that the same guarantees generalize to other datasets drawn from the same distribution. As we show, this gap allows a model provider to attack many cryptographic model certification (CMC) schemes built on secure zero knowledge proofs (ZKP) by carefully engineering training data, resulting in models that exhibit benign behavior during an audit, but pathological behavior in practice. For example, we empirically demonstrate that an attacker can certify that a model achieves over 99% accuracy on an audit dataset, but less than 30% accuracy on fresh samples from the same distribution. To address this gap, we formalize rigorous cryptographic security notions tailored to CMC frameworks, introduce a generic protocol template, and prove that it satisfies these requirements. Our results thus offer both cautionary evidence about existing approaches and constructive guidance for designing secure, privacy-preserving ML auditing protocols.
The removal of learned data from Machine Learning models through Machine Unlearning (MU) has been widely studied; however, there has yet to be an agreed-upon scheme for auditing MU. Existing work has shown that a dishonest model owner can falsify evidence to avoid executing MU, while curious auditors (and adversaries) can infer the privacy-sensitive properties of the model and its training data even with limited access. Yet auditing of MU under mutual distrust between the model owner and the auditor remains unexplored. We provide an information-theoretic proof for this scenario: for convex ML models, a generic audit scheme that relies solely on querying the model for \textit{behavioral} signals cannot identify insufficiently unlearned models without revealing membership information of the retained set. Therefore, auditing MU under the assumption of a dishonest model owner and an honest-but-curious auditor faces an inherent privacy-audit tradeoff. Our empirical results on convex models strongly supports this result, while further experiments demonstrate that this privacy-audit tension persists in non-convex models. Our results call for a more careful consideration of the privacy-audit tension under a realistic auditor threat model, and serve as a foundation for more scrutiny of designs of privacy-preserving audit schemes for the MU pipeline. We also release our code implementation at https://github.com/LiouTang/Behavioral-Unlearn-Audit.
In machine learning, model certification has been identified as an important method for gaining assurance about a model's trustworthiness and quality. A model's quality is largely determined by its ability to generalize, i.e., to perform well on data beyond what it was trained on. It is not possible to certify generalization directly, however, as it depends on unknown data and is not directly measurable. Proxies such as test accuracy can be misleading when the training process is perturbed (intentionally or accidentally), and metrics such as sharpness -- which has an empirically supported link to generalization -- are computationally expensive and can also serve as unreliable signals when training deviates from a prescribed procedure. In this work, we propose directional sharpness, a metric designed to efficiently and reliably indicate generalization despite potential training deviations. We provide empirical and analytical evidence that directional sharpness (1) correlates more strongly with generalization than existing metrics and (2) identifies models with poor generalization more reliably than existing metrics. Furthermore, directional sharpness is efficiently computable in model auditing settings, where the verifier has access to training data, and via zero-knowledge proofs that certify quality without revealing training data.
Modern machine learning (ML) increasingly relies on complex models whose behavior is difficult to characterize beyond empirical performance metrics. Across a wide range of tasks, including prediction, generation, and decision-making, models with similar empirical performance can exhibit markedly different properties in terms of their transparency, interpretability, robustness, fairness, privacy, and certifiability. This survey highlights how optimization- and certification-oriented reasoning can provide a useful framework for reasoning about such differences, supporting tasks ranging from model training and selection to auditing and certification. We review and synthesize recent advances at the intersection of combinatorial optimization (CO) and trustworthy ML, covering both training and post-training tasks, including interpretable model learning, explanation generation, robustness analysis, fairness auditing, model compression, and privacy attacks and protections. Across these domains, CO formulations offer additional capabilities over purely heuristic approaches, e.g., gradient-based ones, notably global guarantees, formal certificates, and explicit treatment of trade-offs. While scalability remains an important challenge, continued progress in solvers and hybrid algorithms suggests a growing role for CO in the design and deployment of trustworthy ML systems.