Thinking Under Uncertainty: Evidence Use and Information-Seeking in Language Models
Authors: Hua-Dong Xiong, Xinyuan Yan, Ji-An Li, Jingming Xue, Marcelo G. Mattar, Robert C. Wilson
Organizations: School of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Georgia Tech · Department of Neurosurgery, Baylor College of Medicine · Department of Psychology, New York University · Center of Excellence for Computational Cognition, Georgia Tech
Abstract
Inference-time thinking improves the performance of large language models, but aggregate outcomes do not reveal whether models use available evidence more effectively or seek information that could improve future decisions. We distinguish these responses by measuring action preference, thinking length, and reported confidence under matched uncertainty. Ten open-weight models completed matched horizon-style two-armed bandit trials in thinking and non-thinking modes. A cognitive model separated value-guided action and uncertainty-independent choice noise from two behavioral signatures of exploration: a UCB-like preference for the less-known arm and Thompson-like choice variability that increases with total uncertainty. On average, thinking strengthened value-guided action and reduced uncertainty-independent choice noise, without producing UCB-like exploration or strengthening Thompson-like exploration. Outside action, the information-imbalanced history condition, which also displayed more observations than the matched balanced condition, was associated with greater thinking length. Reported confidence became more sensitive to decision difficulty and more strongly associated with chosen task evidence. We interpret these thinking-length and reported-confidence patterns as consistent with metacognitive control and metacognitive monitoring, respectively, without establishing either process. Decoder sweeps, especially temperature, altered choice noise and thinking length but did not reproduce the joint cross-output pattern. In this controlled decision setting, thinking improved how models acted on current evidence, while neither measured signature supported a shift toward a more information-seeking policy.
Chain-of-thought (CoT) improves large language models' performance in math and symbolic reasoning. But on planning, contested ethics, and tasks where the model cannot check itself, more reasoning makes things worse. Both effects are documented; what has been missing is a principled account of which property decides the outcome. We argue it is meta-uncertainty: how unsure the model is about the reliability of its own evidence. When that uncertainty is high, extra reasoning stops adding signal and starts manufacturing false confidence. We prove that the policy minimizing expected free energy under uncertain precision stops integrating cues after a finite number of high-validity ones when the precision prior is heavy-tailed (Theorem 2.6.1), and under a Descending Dominance condition, is sample-wise identical to take-the-best (Theorem 2.7.4). Fast-and-frugal heuristics and active inference are, then, two descriptions of the same computation. The prediction is that on high-meta-uncertainty items, longer CoT should degrade accuracy. We score the regime per item (simulate-and-recover rho > 0.96), build FEH-79, a benchmark of Knightian frames with matched controls, and run a pre-registered study across seven models (five open-weight 3B-32B, two frontier), five CoT lengths, and 7,875 responses. The gate, fixed before any data, required a negative interaction with posterior probability above 0.95 and an accuracy drop of more than 6 points. It held. The high-regime drop is 17.3 points (95% CI [7.7, 25.5]); matched items with definite answers show no cost. The effect is regime-dependent: decisive in capable mid-to-large models, directional in the two frontier systems, absent-to-reversed in the weakest. The framework answers when CoT helps and unifies the Bayesian and fast-and-frugal traditions: less-is-more effects are evidence about the meta-uncertainty regime, not against Bayesian cognition.
Computational cognitive models discovered using large language models have so far relied solely on behavioral data. However, it is well-known that models produced from the behavioral trajectory alone are typically under-determined. In this work, we explore the use of Think Aloud traces as an additional form of data constraint during automated model discovery. When applied to the domain of risky decision-making, we find that the models discovered with think-aloud achieve significantly improved predictive performance on held-out data. Additionally, we find that the discovered models belong to different structural classes than those discovered from behavior alone for the majority of participants (69.4%), specifically, it shifts from Explicit comparator towards Integrated utility. These results suggest that process-level language data not only improve model fit, but also systematically reshape the structure of the discovered cognitive models, enabling the identification of mechanisms that are not recoverable from behavior alone.
Language model (LM) "reasoning", commonly described as Chain-of-Thought or test-time scaling, often improves benchmark performance, but the dynamics underlying this process remain poorly understood. We study these dynamics through the lens of uncertainty quantification by treating the "reasoning" traces, the intermediate token sequences generated by LMs, as evolving model states. We summarize each trace by an uncertainty trace profile: a small set of features describing the shape of the uncertainty signal over its trace, such as its slope and linearity. We find that across five LMs evaluated on GSM8K and ProntoQA, these profiles predict whether a trace yields a correct final answer with AUROC up to 0.807, improving markedly on recent related work. We reach AUROC 0.801 using only the first few hundred tokens of full traces, suggesting that errors can be detected early in the generation. A detailed comparison of correct and incorrect traces further reveals qualitatively distinct uncertainty profiles, with correct traces showing a steeper and less linear decline in uncertainty. Together, the results suggest that our method, grounded in decision-making under uncertainty, provides a principled lens for studying the generative process underlying LM "reasoning".