Foundation Models for Face Presentation Attack Detection: A Unified Linear-Probing Benchmark

Face presentation attack detection (PAD) aims to reliably detect a wide range of presentation attacks. While PAD methods achieve strong performance within individual datasets, their performance degrades under cross-dataset evaluation. Variations in sensors or lighting conditions can reduce the effectiveness of detectors from near-perfect to nearly random. Foundation models (FMs) have emerged as a promising alternative because typical PAD datasets, such as the MCIO benchmarks (MSU-MFSD, CASIA-FASD, Replay-Attack, and OULU-NPU), are small relative to the scale used for web-based pretraining. However, existing PAD systems primarily focus on CLIP-based foundation models, while overlooking other FMs with different architectures and training procedures. This study addresses this question by systematically evaluating 32 FMs. Zero-shot prompting achieves performance near chance across model families and scales. The vision encoders, when low-rankadapted (LoRA) with fewer than 1% trainable weights, achieve below 2% intra-dataset ACER in most cases, while cross-dataset ACER is substantially higher. LoRA primarily refines the decision boundary within a dataset, suggesting that pretrained representations and the adaptation dataset play a larger role in cross-dataset generalization than the evaluated lightweight adaptation strategy.

Vision foundation models have demonstrated strong transferability across diverse visual recognition tasks and are increasingly considered for biometric applications. Their suitability for iris Presentation Attack Detection (PAD), particularly under realistic open-set operating conditions, remains insufficiently examined. This work presents a systematic failure analysis of general-purpose vision foundation models for open-set iris PAD using periocular imagery. Five representative foundation models are evaluated under three open-set protocols that explicitly separate different sources of distribution shift: unseen Presentation Attack Instruments (PAIs), unseen datasets captured with different sensors and cross-spectral transfer from near-infrared (NIR) to visible spectrum (VIS) imagery. Both frozen feature representations and parameter-efficient task adaptation using Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) are assessed within a unified experimental framework. The results indicate that foundation models can transfer across datasets with similar sensing characteristics, but fail to generalise reliably to unseen attack instruments and degrade sharply under cross-spectral evaluation. While LoRA improves performance in certain cross-dataset settings, it frequently amplifies failure under attack-level and spectral shifts. Additional validation experiments using segmented iris inputs, full backbone fine-tuning, joint cross-dataset and cross-PAI shifts, and reverse VIS to NIR transfer further confirm that these failures are not simply artefacts of periocular input, weak adaptation, or one-directional spectral evaluation. These findings show that strong closed-set or cross-dataset performance should not be treated as evidence of robust open-set security, and highlight the need for PAD representations that maintain sensitivity to presentation artefacts while remaining stable under realistic deployment variation.

Face recognition systems are increasingly deployed in security-critical applications, yet they remain vulnerable to presentation and morph attacks. Presentation attack detection (PAD) and morphing attack detection (MAD) are therefore essential components of trustworthy face biometrics. Despite advancements in PAD and MAD methods, existing detectors suffer from limited generalization and degrade in cross-dataset evaluation. In this paper, we systematically investigate whether general-purpose foundation models (FMs) and multimodal large language models (MLLMs) encode PAD-relevant and MAD-relevant information, and how such models can best be deployed for both tasks. We study five approaches with increasing access to the internal information of the model: (i) zero-shot prompting of off-the-shelf MLLMs; (ii) training a shallow model on the next-token logit probabilities at the output of the MLLM; (iii) parameter-efficient fine-tuning on task-specific question-answer data, yielding two specialized MLLMs, called PADLLM and MADLLM, which additionally provide textual reasoning for their decisions; (iv) linear probing of frozen vision encoders; and (v) fine-tuning of vision encoders of FMs and MLLMs. We benchmark 16 open-weight MLLMs and 30 vision encoder backbones on four PAD datasets (MSU-MFSD, CASIA-FASD, Replay-Attack, and OULU-NPU) and four MAD datasets (FFHQ, FRGC, FRLL, and FERET). Our experiments show that FMs and MLLMs can achieve significant performance for PAD and MAD. In addition, the fine-tuned models achieve state-of-the-art detection performance in cross-dataset evaluation, indicating that general-purpose pretrained representations carry substantial attack-relevant information. Source code of all our experiments will be publicly released.