Revisiting Classic Thought Experiments to Measure Consciousness for Artificial Intelligence Safety

The question of AI consciousness is one of the most urgent pre-emptive problems in philosophy and computer science, yet progress is hampered by a cacophony of competing theories that often talk past each other. Separating the hard problem from the mapping problem allows the deepest metaphysical disagreements to be set aside: granting that experience supervenes on a system's organisation, the tractable question becomes at which grain of description that supervenience base sits. We extend Marr's three levels of analysis into a five-level hierarchy of functional descriptions (behavioural, computational, intrinsic causal-structural, organismic, and organism-environment) grounded in supervenience, coarse-graining, and multiple realisability. The major theories of consciousness are positioned within this hierarchy according to which level they take to be critical, and for each level we develop operationalisable indicators and assess current AI systems against them. A Bayesian model then combines theoretical credences with indicator evidence into an overall credence in a system's capacity for consciousness. In illustrative assessments, the verdict for current LLMs is driven as much by where theoretical credence is placed as by how the evidence is read: under different stipulated readings and credence distributions, assessments range from below 0.01 to roughly 0.8, showing sensitivity to assumptions. Finally, the consciousness indicators at each level closely overlap with the architectural features needed for general intelligence, suggesting that increasingly capable AI may become a stronger candidate for consciousness. The framework supports a structured agnosticism, in which theoretical commitments are made explicit, credences are updated as evidence accumulates, and assessments take the form of aggregated probabilities rather than verdicts.

Despite remarkable advances, today's AI systems remain narrow in scope, falling short of the flexible, adaptive, and multisensory intelligence that characterizes human capabilities. This gap has fueled longstanding debates about whether AI might one day achieve human-like generality or even consciousness, and whether theories of consciousness can inspire new architectures for AI. This paper presents an early blueprint for implementing a general AI system, CTM-AI, combining the Conscious Turing Machine (CTM), a formal machine model of consciousness, with today's foundation models. CTM-AI contains an enormous number of powerful processors ranging from specialized experts (e.g., vision-language models and APIs) to unspecialized general-purpose learners poised to develop their own expertise. Crucially, for whatever problem must be dealt with, information from many processors is selected, integrated, and exchanged appropriately to solve the task. CTM-AI achieves state-of-the-art accuracy on MUStARD (72.28) and UR-FUNNY (72.13), outperforming multimodal and multi-agent frameworks. On tool-using and agentic tasks, CTM-AI achieves 10+ points of improvement on StableToolBench and WebArena-Lite. Overall, CTM-AI offers a principled, testable blueprint for general AI inspired by a model of consciousness.

Who or what is conscious? Because subjective experience is directly accessible only in the first person, judgments about consciousness in other entities depend partly on analogy. Historically, such inferences have focused on nonhuman animals, but advances in artificial intelligence have raised the possibility of conscious AI. Here we develop a causal framework for evaluating such evidential analogies. The key distinction is between similarities in factors plausibly involved in generating consciousness and similarities in downstream behavioural or cognitive effects. Our framework weights source-target similarity by causal relevance while allowing for unknown causes, disabling differences and alternative routes to consciousness. Applied to biological systems, it explains why analogical support generally weakens with increasing causal distance from humans. Applied to contemporary AI, it suggests that behavioural similarity provides only limited evidence for consciousness because relevant causal correspondences remain poorly established. The framework also clarifies what evidence would strengthen claims of artificial consciousness.