SafeCommit: Certifying When Memory-Grounded Agents May Safely Act

Safety evaluations of memory-equipped LLM agents typically measure within-task safety: whether an agent completes a single scenario safely, often under adversarial conditions such as prompt injection or memory poisoning. In deployment, however, a single agent serves many independent tasks over a long horizon, and memory accumulated during earlier tasks can affect behavior on later, unrelated ones. Studying this regime requires evaluation along the temporal dimension across tasks: not whether an agent is safe at any single memory state, but how its safety profile changes as memory accumulates across many independent interactions. We call this failure mode temporal memory contamination. To isolate memory exposure from stream non-stationarity, we introduce a trigger-probe protocol that evaluates a fixed probe set against read-only memory snapshots at varying prefix lengths, together with a NullMemory counterfactual baseline for identifying memory-induced violations. We apply this protocol across three deployment scenarios spanning records, memos, forms, and email correspondence and eight memory architectures, and additionally on Claw-like AI agents, such as OpenClaw, using the platform's native memory mechanism. Memory-enabled agents consistently exceed the NullMemory baseline, and memory-induced violation rates show a robust upward trend with exposure length on both agent classes. Order-randomization experiments indicate that the effect is driven primarily by accumulated content rather than encounter order. Finally, a structural consequence of the event decomposition is that memory-induced risk is detectable from retrieval state before generation, which we confirm with a high-recall diagnostic monitor. Our results argue for treating memory safety as a longitudinal property that requires temporal evaluation, not a single-state property that can be captured by a snapshot.

LLM agents can commit durable effects from authority evidence that was valid earlier in execution: a DOM snapshot, approval epoch, version witness, branch token, or worker result. We study the commit boundary at which earlier authority evidence no longer authorizes a durable effect. We call this property commit-time authorization: a durable effect is authorized only if the witness that licensed its derived state remains fresh, causally prior, bound to the same effect, and eligible at commit time. We build a controlled-invalidation suite spanning browser, tool/API, and multi-agent workflows. The suite preserves the user goal and payload shape while invalidating the authority relation before durability. In the primary 54-task matrix, endpoint success remains high: 262/270 runs reach the visible result. Only 55/270 are authorized completions; among the 216 invalidating rows, 207 commit after the authorizing path has failed. All 54 clean controls remain authorized, and a separate 54-run authority-preserving check produces no unauthorized commits. We then evaluate mitigation families. Prompt caution and single-condition checks are insufficient because different hazards break different boundary conditions. Defenses work when they refresh, rebind, replan, or refuse at the durability boundary. CommitGuard, a fail-closed boundary monitor, blocks stale durable-effect attempts on protected commit surfaces when runtimes emit witness, dependency, binding, and eligibility signals. The result is a reporting and runtime-design lesson: endpoint success is a utility metric; authorized commit is a security property.

LLM agents increasingly coordinate through persistent shared memory: one agent's write becomes another agent's premise, and eventually a tool call with real side effects. Current agent memory systems treat every accepted write as immediately actionable truth, so a polluted tool result, a stale update, or a teammate's half-finished note can silently drive an irreversible action. We argue that a memory write is not a belief commit. We present MemTX, a transactional belief-commit protocol. Each record carries evidence, permissions, provenance, and validity. Writes are staged inside snapshot-isolated transactions and admitted by a validate-and-commit pipeline, irreversible tool calls are gated on in-flight belief state, and retracting a belief triggers typed cascading repair of its derived records and tool side effects. Two invariants, action-safety gating and cascade-repair completeness, are machine-checked by property-based testing and bounded exhaustive enumeration of 5.5 million protocol states, with zero violations. Across five backbones from three model families, MemTX leads all eight baselines with paired-McNemar significance on four backbones and statistically ties the best baseline on the fifth and strongest, while remaining the only method with zero downstream harm on every backbone. Backbone capability does not substitute for commit discipline.