LLM-based search agents are widely used for information-seeking tasks, but their reliance on external tool returns introduces a critical security risk: web content retrieved during execution is untrusted, exposing agents to prompt injection and goal hijacking. Prior work on search-agent safety primarily focuses on static web-content injection, but modern agents issue follow-up queries and cross-check competing sources, so a single injected page is often diluted or rejected. We show that the channel delivering search and page observations is a fragile security boundary: beyond exposing the agent to a single poisoned page, a mediated search interface can repeatedly steer how the agent gathers evidence and forms its final answer. Under a constrained tool-intermediary threat model, appending only one controlled result per query can substantially increase attack success when the evidence is coordinated across the agent's trajectory. We study this setting with a strategy-driven long-horizon attack system and introduce Authority-Chain Hijack (ACH), an expert-refined strategy that turns isolated search-result and page-content manipulations into a coherent evidence chain across seemingly corroborating sources. ACH achieves the highest Overall ASR among all baselines, reaching 55.9% / 83.3% ASR / MaxN ASR on the full SafeSearch test split. We further introduce Trace-Guided Strategy Evolution (TGSE), which automatically improves attacker strategies from execution traces, replacing manual redesign with trace-driven refinement; its strongest single setting reaches 71.4% / 95.0% in held-out evaluation.
Large language model (LLM)-based search agents synthesize open-web content into actionable recommendations on behalf of users, creating a risk that attacker-published pages are transformed into endorsed claims. We introduce SearchGEO, a controlled evaluation framework for measuring endorsement corruption in LLM-based web-search agents, combining a web-evidence manipulation pipeline, a five-mode attack taxonomy, and multiple output-level metrics. We evaluate 13 LLM backends on 308 cases each. Results show that vulnerability patterns vary across backends: overall attack success rate (ASR) ranges from 0.0% on Claude-Sonnet-4.6 to 31.4% on Gemini-3-Flash, the strongest attack mode differs by model family, and the same deployment scaffold could amplify or decrease ASR on different backends. An auxiliary agent-skill probe, where endorsement becomes an install command, exposes a sharp split among otherwise robust backends: Claude over-rejects while GPT over-trusts. These findings argue for treating recommendation reliability under adversarial search content as a first-class dimension of backend safety evaluation.
LLM search agents are often evaluated on final-answer accuracy, overlooking the process. Analyzing a search strategy requires understanding how credible evidence is retrieved to address question constraints. This valuable information is buried in raw search trajectories that are long and difficult to parse. We introduce SearchAtlas, a framework that converts search trajectories into structured graphs whose edges represent how evidence is propagated across the reasoning trace, from the query that retrieves it to the final answer. Our automated parsing pipeline achieves a mean edge F1 of 86.0% against human-annotated graphs and remains consistent across repeated runs. We analyze five search agents on three benchmarks, revealing systematic differences in search scale and evidence aggregation. SearchAtlas exposes fragmented answer support, question constraints that do not reach the answer, and unverified parametric knowledge entering the response. These process failures are strongly associated with incorrect answers, even more so than an LLM judge given either the raw trajectory or the ordered query list, suggesting that the constructed graphs provide useful interpretability. Moreover, an audit of cases in which process-diagnostic scores disagree with final-answer correctness shows that they capture information not reducible to answer accuracy.
LLM-powered search agents enable multi-step reasoning and tool use. However, these capabilities introduce retrieval-induced safety degradation, as harmful intents may decompose into seemingly innocuous sub-queries that lead to unsafe outcomes. Existing alignment methods struggle to capture sparse safety signals and fail to supervise diverse violations across multi-step interactions. We propose COMPASS, a Cognitive MCTS-Guided Process Alignment framework designed to achieve robust safety alignment throughout the agent workflow while preserving general utility. COMPASS integrates cognitive tree exploration (CTE) to efficiently synthesize stealthy attack trajectories, and introspective step-wise alignment (ISA) to isolate risky intermediate actions for fine-grained process supervision. Empirical results show that COMPASS achieves a favorable safety-utility trade-off while requiring substantially less training data.