Authors: David Gamba, Daniel M. Romero, Grant Schoenebeck
Organizations: University of Michigan Ann Arbor, MI, USA
Abstract
Agentic AI promises a more flexible form of digital agency: systems that can act on users' behalf, from filtering content to negotiating prices to selecting services. Whether it will empower users is an open question, and we argue that the answer depends on more than the technology. We conduct a comparative case analysis of four more mature domains where similar forms of agency arose: browser-based ad blockers, platform recommender systems, financial robo-advisors, and email spam governance. Across the cases, decisions about whose interests agents would serve were resolved through technical arrangements: API choices, protocol governance, industry standards, and default configurations. Beyond their technical form, these were political decisions. We identify this as depoliticization, a concept from political theory, here at work in technological systems. Its most consequential effect is that individual outcomes and collective contestation capacity can move in opposite directions: spam inbox quality improved substantially while the organized capacity to contest spam governance collapsed. Where intermediary institutions sustained adversarial challenge, user-aligned agency proved more durable; where proprietary infrastructure and closed standard-setting absorbed contestation, displacement compounded. We apply this to agentic AI, where governance arrangements consolidating around the Model Context Protocol and the Agentic AI Foundation are settling these configurations before the choices that define what agents can do move outside the reach of users and the public.
As AI agent protocols proliferate, the governance structures shaping their interoperability standards remain empirically underexamined. We introduce an LLM-powered comparative pipeline for large-scale governance discourse analysis, integrating automated annotation, neural topic modeling, and multi-layer network analysis to study socio-technical power structures at scale. We validate it on two contrasting standards for agent interoperability: ERC-8004 (permissionless, on-chain) and Google A2A (corporate-led). Analyzing 4,323 governance participation records, we combine LLM-assisted coding, topic modeling, and multi-layer network analysis to examine how institutional design shapes thematic priorities and community structure. We find that while governance form influences substantive focus, both regimes exhibit comparable levels of participation inequality and community fragmentation. Discourse alignment is denser in the permissionless setting, suggesting that open governance may foster greater thematic convergence despite decentralized participation. These findings illustrate how LLM-assisted methods can advance the empirical study of technology governance, with implications for designing more equitable agentic AI standards. All data and code are openly available.
AI systems have long been expected to interact with users, answering questions, generating content, and continuing (social) conversations. Agentic AI, however, breaks from this expectation, as its primary objective is workflow execution on behalf of the users. If a system becomes more agentic, do users need less interaction with the system? Our answer is: less routine back-and-forth, but more communication for oversight and explanation, as agentic AI proactively acts, not just responds. Grounded in a communication perspective, we discuss how users perceive the communicative roles of AI systems (whether as the source of actions or merely a channel), and how this can shape trust. Because agentic AI can play multiple communicative roles, it can complicate this source perception and introduce potential risks. To address this, we propose three types of explanations that agentic AI needs to incorporate (action-process, uncertainty, and coordination), and suggest that customization affordances that allow users to decide when and which explanations they see may be key to preserving human agency as AI autonomy increases.
The proliferation of agentic artificial intelligence has outpaced the conceptual tools needed to characterize agency in computational systems. Prevailing definitions mainly rely on autonomy and goal-directedness. Here, we argue for a minimal notion open to principled inspection given three criteria: intentionality as action grounded in beliefs and desires, rationality as normatively coherent action entailed by a world model, and explainability as action causally traceable to internal states; we subsequently instantiate these as a partially observable Markov decision process under a variational framework wherein posterior beliefs, prior preferences, and the minimization of expected free energy jointly constitute an agentic action chain. Using a canonical T-maze paradigm, we evidence how empowerment, formulated as the channel capacity between actions and anticipated observations, serves as an operational metric that distinguishes zero-, intermediate-, and high-agency phenotypes through structural manipulations of the generative model. We conclude by arguing that as agents engage in epistemic foraging to resolve ambiguity, the governance controls that remain effective must shift systematically from external constraints to the internal modulation of prior preferences, offering a principled, variational bridge from computational phenotyping to AI governance strategy
Philip Wilson, Axel Constant, Mahault Albarracin +4