Deal Me Maybe: The Role of Emotions in Multi-Agent Negotiation

Post-trained LLMs are often optimized to produce helpful, polite, and accommodating responses. In adversarial negotiation, however, such behavior can become a vulnerability: emotionally framed language may influence an agent's bargaining decisions in ways that conflict with its user's objectives. We therefore introduce EmoDistill, an offline framework for distilling emotional negotiation skills from LLM-LLM interactions into smaller language-model agents. Here, an emotional negotiation skill is a state-conditioned behavior that determines which explicit emotion to invoke in a bargaining state and how to realize that emotion as an effective negotiation utterance. EmoDistill learns these two components separately: an Implicit Q-Learning (IQL) selector learns which emotion to express in each bargaining state, while a LoRA-adapted 7B policy learns emotion-conditioned expression through Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Judge Policy Optimization (JPO). Across four emotion-sensitive negotiation domains, the full EmoDistill policy achieves competitive utility and improves over vanilla and IQL-only baselines in most settings. Emotion-free ablations show that removing the explicit emotion channel substantially reduces overall negotiation utility, while transfer experiments reveal partial, domain-dependent transfer and robustness to unseen LLM counterparties.

Negotiation is a central mechanism of economic exchange, shaping markets, procurement, labor agreements, and resource allocation. It is also a canonical testbed for agentic language models, requiring multi-turn interaction under hidden preferences, strategic communication, and binding constraints. These properties make negotiation hard to evaluate: unlike math or code, it has no intrinsic verifier. Existing LLM negotiation evaluations rely on LLM-vs.-LLM interaction or aggregate outcomes such as deal rate, leaving failures opaque. We introduce Terms-Bench, short for Testbed for Economic Reasoning in Multi-turn Strategy, a Bayesian-game framework that makes the environment itself the verifier by specifying the counterpart's latent type, policy, and payoff structure. We instantiate it in bilateral price negotiation, where the counterpart's private state and simulator policy are hidden from the agent but observable to the evaluator. This turns the counterpart from a black-box opponent into a diagnostic instrument, enabling agent-attributable failure analysis and oracle-reference optimality gaps. Evaluating 13 LLM agents spanning frontier systems from major providers, Terms-Bench turns negotiation evaluation from aggregate ranking into actionable diagnosis: where agents fail, why they fail, and what to strengthen. Empirically, frontier models saturate deal rate yet diverge in surplus extraction, cue use, belief calibration, and compliance, revealing agent-specific bargaining bottlenecks masked by prior benchmarks.

Personalized pricing negotiations are a challenging testbed for LLM agents because successful interaction does not guarantee profitable decision making. A seller may produce valid actions and close many deals while still pricing poorly when buyer willingness to pay and bargaining traits remain hidden. This paper presents PrefBench, a simulator-based benchmark for hidden-preference personalized pricing negotiations. Each episode pairs a simulated buyer with a fixed vehicle-customization bundle; the seller observes public persona descriptors, bundle information, and negotiation history, while latent buyer variables govern valuation, patience, counter-offer behavior, and walkaway decisions. PrefBench evaluates this setting through an LLM-facing state-summary protocol that constrains agents to return strict JSON actions under a fixed hidden-information boundary. We evaluate zero-shot LLM sellers against heuristic references over 7,500 episodes. The tested LLMs follow the protocol reliably and achieve deal rates above 0.99, but their seller-profit outcomes remain weak: the best LLM average profit is only slightly above the random baseline and far below a simple concession heuristic under the same episode stream. These results show that structured action compliance and agreement-seeking behavior can coexist with weak profit-sensitive bargaining. PrefBench provides a controlled benchmark for evaluating pricing-agent behavior under hidden buyer preferences.