Voting Method Synthesis on an Infinite Domain: A Possibility Theorem for Positive Involvement

Approval-based committee voting has received significant attention in the social choice community. Among the studied rules, Thiele rules, and especially Proportional Approval Voting (PAV), stand out for desirable properties such as proportional representation, Pareto optimality, and support monotonicity. Their main drawback is that computing a Thiele outcome is NP-hard in general. A glimpse of hope comes from the fact that Thiele rules are better behaved under structured preferences. On the candidate interval (CI) domain, they are computable in polynomial time via a linear program (LP) that has a totally unimodular constraint matrix. Surprisingly, this approach fails for the related voter interval (VI) domain, and the complexity of the problem has repeatedly been posed as an open question. Our main result resolves this question: although the relevant matrix is not totally unimodular, the ``standard'' LP still admits at least one optimal integral solution, and we provide a fast algorithm for finding it. Our technique naturally extends to the voter-candidate interval (VCI) domain, also known as the 1-dimensional voter-candidate range (1D-VCR) domain, and to the linearly consistent (LC) domain, both of which generalize the candidate and voter interval domains. Although both the VCI and LC domains have been studied in social choice, their relationship was unknown. We show, through connections to graph theory, that LC strictly contains VCI. We also provide an alternative definition of LC that is closer in spirit to VCI and has a natural interpretation in approval elections; this equivalence may be of independent interest. Finally, we study an alternative tree-based generalization of VCI and show that Thiele rules become NP-hard to compute on this domain.

In an election where $n$ voters rank $m$ candidates, a Condorcet winning set is a committee of $k$ candidates such that for any outside candidate, a majority of voters prefer some committee member. Condorcet's paradox shows that some elections admit no Condorcet winning sets with a single candidate (i.e., $k=1$), and the same can be shown for $k=2$. On the other hand, recent work proves that a set of size $k=5$ exists for every election. This leaves an important theoretical gap between the best known lower bound $(k\geq 3)$ and upper bound $(k \leq 5)$ for the number of candidates needed to guarantee existence. We aim to close the gap between the existence guarantees and impossibility results for Condorcet winning sets. We explore an automated reasoning approach to tighten these bounds. We design a mixed-integer linear program (MILP) to search for elections that would serve as counter-examples to conjectured bounds. We employ a number of optimizations, such as symmetry breaking, subsampling, and constraint generation, to enhance the search and model effectively infinite electorates. Furthermore, we analyze the dual of the linear programming relaxation as a path towards obtaining a new upper bound. Despite extensive search on moderate-sized elections, we fail to find any election requiring a committee larger than size 3. Motivated by our experimental results in this direction, we simplify the dual linear program and formulate a conjecture which, if true, implies that a winning set of size 4 always exists. Our automated reasoning results provide strong empirical evidence that the Condorcet dimension of any election may be smaller than currently known upper bounds, at least for small instances. We offer a general-purpose framework for searching elections in ranked voting and a new, concrete analytical path via duality toward proving that smaller committees suffice.

This theoretical note studies the finite axiomatizability of strict majority reasoning in finite social decision frames. Moss and Pedersen (2026) <doi: 10.48550/arXiv.2606.23853> introduce a coherence criterion that characterizes exactly when qualitative majority judgments are representable by a finitely additive measure. The question addressed here is whether that coherence criterion can be replaced, in the finite setting, by any bounded finite fragment. We prove that it cannot. For every $k\ge 1$, we construct a maximal standard frame whose shortest coherence violation has length exactly $2k+2$. Hence there is no uniform finite bound on the incoherence index of social decision frames, resolving Conjecture 5.7 stated by Moss and Pedersen (2026). The construction is geometric, in the sense that it proceeds via orthogonality and dimension in rational vector spaces, and self-contained: it isolates a symmetric family of half-sized voting blocs and extends it to a maximal frame in which every shorter balanced obstruction is excluded. Along the explicit infinite sequence of universe sizes obtained in the construction, this also establishes the middle-layer family predicted by Conjecture B.25 by Moss and Pedersen (2026). Together with the soundness and completeness theorem for the Moss-Pedersen minimal logic for strict majorities, this establishes that measurable social decision frames are not finitely axiomatizable in that language.