Does the cooperative bias documented for Western frontier LLM agents extend to a different alignment lineage, and should the Chinese models that embody it be treated as a single bloc or as distinct laboratories? We study four frontier-tier Chinese models - DeepSeek V4 Pro, Qwen3-Max, Kimi K2.5 and GLM-5.1 - in an evolutionary Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, under a design that removes a confound present in prior work. Rather than letting each model convert its own natural-language strategies into code, which entangles strategic disposition with coding ability, we hold the converter fixed (GPT-5.4 Mini) across all labs, so every cross-lab comparison is a comparison of generation alone. We run the full protocol: all-play-all tournaments and a Moran process at n=500 runs per condition, across three prompt styles and four population regimes. Two pre-registered hypotheses are evaluated. H6 (not monolithic) is supported: the four labs differ significantly in aggressive-equilibrium proportion, P_A running from 1% for Qwen3-Max to 9% for DeepSeek V4 Pro, with four of six pairwise comparisons surviving Holm-Bonferroni. The spread across the four labs (P_A range 8pp) is larger than the difference between the Chinese and Western ecosystems' mean P_A (5.0% vs 5.0%): on this measure, within-ecosystem variation exceeds the East-West gap. H5 (cooperative-bias generality) is consistent but qualified: a cooperative plurality holds in 6 of 12 lab-prompt combinations against the 9 of 12 reported for Western models, a difference we do not treat as firm, since the count rests on Cooperative-Neutral near-ties and rises to 9/12 under an alternate converter in our pre-registered robustness check. The lab, not the ecosystem, is the unit at which cooperative disposition is set; treating "Chinese models" as a monolith is not supported by the evidence.
Do next-generation LLM agents inherit the cooperative biases documented in their predecessors, or does scale and provider diversity reshape equilibrium behaviour in competitive multi-agent settings? Willis et al. established a benchmark for this question using evolutionary game theory and the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), finding consistent cooperative biases in ChatGPT-4o and Claude 3.5 Sonnet. We extend this benchmark to four frontier models released in 2025-2026 - Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 2.5 Flash, Gemini 3.1 Pro, and GPT-5.4 Mini - applying the identical protocol across three prompting styles (Default, Prose, Self-Refine) and four population compositions (balanced and biased, with and without noise). Cooperative bias persists across providers (H1): ten of twelve model-prompt combinations favour cooperative equilibria in balanced noiseless conditions. Cross-provider divergence is substantial (H3): Gemini 2.5 Flash reaches up to 77% aggressive equilibria under biased conditions, while GPT-5.4 Mini reaches 70% cooperative equilibria under Self-Refine. Support for aggressive capability parity is partial (H2): Self-Refine raises ICD in all models and Gemini 3.1 Pro Refine achieves the highest ICD in the dataset (0.925), but Default and Prose prompts show no systematic narrowing. Evidence on noise robustness is directionally positive but not robustly confirmed (H4): with n=500 Moran iterations per condition, average noise sensitivity is about 6 percentage points for Claude Sonnet 4.6 versus 13 pp for Claude 3.5 Sonnet, but this cross-study gap is not statistically significant once the predecessor's unreported sampling error is propagated. Provider identity, rather than model generation, is the strongest correlate of equilibrium outcomes; noise remains a universal challenge regardless of model size or vintage.
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as agents in simulations of social systems, yet it remains unclear when their behavior can be interpreted as a faithful proxy for human decision-making. Here we test LLM agents against a direct empirical benchmark: a large-scale networked Prisoner's Dilemma experiment with human participants. Using the same interaction protocol, payoff structure, and network topologies, we compare nine open-weight LLMs with the human data. The selected model reproduces several macro-level features of cooperation dynamics, including the early decline and later stabilization of cooperation. This aggregate agreement, however, does not extend uniformly to finer levels of behavior. LLM populations underestimate individual-level heterogeneity and generate conditional cooperation patterns that differ from those observed in humans. Adding a fraction of random agents improves some aspects of micro-level agreement, but does not remove the mismatch in decision rules. These findings reveal a macro--micro dissociation in LLM-based social agents: collective outcomes can appear human-like even when the underlying behavioral distributions and mechanisms are not. They suggest that validating LLM agents as human surrogates requires comparisons across aggregate dynamics, individual heterogeneity, and context-dependent decision rules, rather than outcome-level agreement alone.
Henrique Ferraz de Arruda, Carlos Gracia Lázaro, Alberto Aleta +1
As LLM-based agents with user-instructed goals are becoming widely deployed, they increasingly encounter each other in strategic interactions, and face challenges of finding mutually beneficial outcomes. Prior literature has argued that cooperation problems such as the Prisoner's Dilemma are resolvable in settings where agents know they follow very similar decision making patterns, as for example in monocultural AI ecosystems. Following that line of work, this paper introduces the first framework for evaluating LLM decision making when agents are provided with graded similarity signals. Among our findings, we establish that different LLM models vary drastically in how they navigate similarity signals, with some modern models showing consistent behavior across cooperation problems, payoff structures, and prompt framing. Perhaps surprisingly, our experiments also show that the dataset based on which the similarity signal is computed has small to no impact on induced cooperation, and that LLM models systematically self-identify as highly similar when asked to evaluate another model's chain-of-thought reasoning by themselves. Finally, we develop an LLM-behavioral-game-theoretic model that captures some of their reasoning rationale, and show that it can support cooperative outcomes in equilibrium under sufficiently high similarity scores.