As AI systems proliferate in consumer facing applications, questions about liability for AI related harms remain unresolved. This working paper examines whether India's Consumer Protection Act, 2019, adequately addresses harm caused by defective AI products and services, and whether it proportionately allocates liability across the AI value chain. The Act's broad definitions of product liability, harm, and deficiency appear technology agnostic and potentially applicable to AI related incidents including personal injury, psychological harm, biased outputs, and loss of control. However, significant gaps remain. Proving causation between AI defects and consumer harm presents a technical challenge, as AI failures often stem from design choices rather than discrete defects. Additionally, the Act's framework assumes distinct roles for manufacturers, sellers, and service providers, yet the AI value chain involves overlapping responsibilities among data providers, model developers, deployers, and users that do not neatly map to these categories. Current liability frameworks lack proportionate mechanisms to effectively address complex, multistakeholder AI harms. While the Act may cover AI entities, enforcement requires clarification on sector specific overlaps.
Agentic AI systems can plan over multiple steps, use tools, and execute tasks over time. When such systems cause harm, tort law struggles to allocate responsibility because the harmful path may be neither fully chosen by the user nor specifically foreseen by the developer. This paper proposes an interaction-based framework for agentic torts, drawing on Michael Bratman's planning theory and on the common law's treatment of human-human concerted action. We distinguish three interaction types: autonomous drift, pure tool use, and collaborative planning. Pure tool cases remain governed by ordinary product-defect and warning doctrines; collaborative planning cases map onto the independent contractor control test, professional malpractice, and negligent misrepresentation; autonomous drift maps onto frolic and detour under respondeat superior and strict product liability. The framework treats the stateful interaction log as the primary evidentiary trace, allowing courts to infer where the human-AI trajectory departed from the authorized undertaking and where liability should attach. We resolve four incident-anchored cases, situate the account alongside strict-liability and insurance-based proposals, note its relationship to regulatory oversight, and propose a ``Reasonable Agent'' standard built around constraint verification, epistemic transparency, runtime grounding, and forensic logging.
Recent incidents involving Artificial Intelligence (AI) agents, which were reported escaping their containment `unintentionally' to gain unauthorized access, pose looming questions about who or what should be held legally responsible for resultant criminal or negligent damage. As the independent capabilities of agents expand, Promise Theory suggests a systematic method to resolve these questions, based on the Downstream Principle for causal influence. Responsibility can easily be expanded to include AI agents where tracing responsibility becomes impactical, and agents' freedoms to act can be limtied by policy choices.
The increasing deployment of autonomous, agentic AI systems challenges traditional accountability mechanisms. Existing research predominantly frames AI accountability gaps as barriers that can be overcome through better standards, transparency, and institutional reform. We argue that this framing is insufficient: certain configurations of actors, systems, and institutions render AI accountability conceptually unachievable regardless of effort. We introduce the concept of constitutive AI unaccountability to capture these configurations. Through a three-stage qualitative study comprising a concept-centric literature analysis, a secondary analysis of 27 expert interviews with AI professionals from technical, legal, and sociotechnical backgrounds, and an illustrative framework application to the open-source agentic AI system OpenClaw, we identify nine categories and 20 themes of constitutive AI unaccountability. These are organized across structural, technological, and normative clusters and reinforce one another through eight directed interdependencies. Our framework is operationalized as a diagnostic instrument of 20 questions, which detected 17 of 20 conditions when applied to OpenClaw, including an inverted anthropomorphism configuration in which the AI agent was the only identifiable actor. We contribute a reframing of AI unaccountability as a constitutive property of sociotechnical systems, an extension of the four barriers to accountability, and a practical instrument for identifying accountability voids in specific AI deployments.