Joint Communication-Control Strategy Optimization with Partially Nested Information Structures: The Linear-Quadratic Case
Authors: Haoyi You, Kaiqing Zhang
Organizations: University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA, 20742.
Abstract
In this paper, we formalize a joint communication-control strategy optimization (JCCO) problem in multi-agent linear systems with quadratic costs, under the common-information-based (CIB) framework from decentralized stochastic control. For computational tractability, we focus on such JCCO problems with partially nested (PN) information structures (ISs). In particular, with a baseline communication protocol that leads to a PN IS, we establish a series of conditions under which the partial nestedness is preserved under the (additional) communication strategies to be optimized, while violating them may cause nonlinearity of the optimal strategies in general, with open-loop communication strategies. We then develop a dynamic-programming-based approach to compute the optimal control strategies of JCCO with open-loop communication strategies, which yields a set of closed-form Riccati Equations. As a byproduct of independent interest, such an approach also offers a way to solve decentralized linear-quadratic control with PN ISs and output feedback, under the CIB framework. Finally, we extend such an approach to JCCOs with closed-loop communication strategies, yielding a more tractable dynamic program than an infinite-dimensional CIB-belief-based one.
We study finite-horizon linear-quadratic regulation of a scalar linear system with intermittent state feedback under an average communication-rate constraint. In this setting, the scheduling policy and controller are generally coupled through the dual effect: transmission decisions shape future estimation errors, while control actions influence the information available for scheduling. Existing treatments often recover tractability by restricting attention to symmetric scheduling policies, but the optimality of this restriction has remained unclear. We show that, for i.i.d. zero-mean disturbances, symmetric policies are optimal. Consequently, the communication-constrained LQR problem admits a separation structure. The optimal controller is a linear feedback law independent of the scheduling policy, while the optimal scheduler is obtained from a dynamic program. We further show that the optimal scheduling rule is a symmetric threshold policy in the accumulated disturbance since the most recent update.
In many multi-agent applications, tasks yield rewards only when executed by a coalition meeting an unknown size threshold; otherwise, feedback is fully censored. This censorship creates an identifiability problem: agents cannot distinguish stochastic failure from insufficient coordination. We formalize this setting as the Threshold-Activated Cooperative Multi-Armed Bandit (TAC-MAB) and analyze it under both centralized and decentralized coordination. We show that a centralized algorithm (C-TAC) achieves cumulative regret O(log T), decomposed into a structural-search term that captures the cost of resolving feasibility under censored feedback and a statistical-monitoring term for value estimation. We then introduce D-TAC, a decentralized event-triggered protocol in which agents synchronize only when their structural beliefs change. Empirically, D-TAC achieves a 23x reduction in communication relative to the centralized baseline while preserving feasibility alignment under conservative belief fusion. These results characterize the coordination cost of learning under censored feedback and show that near-centralized communication efficiency is achievable without continuous synchronization.
This work considers multi-agent coordination with arbitrary information networks among the agents using a game-theoretic approach. A system designer aims to assign local utility functions to the agents to guide their actions toward a desired system objective. The performance of the assigned local utilities is measured by the well known pure price of anarchy (pPoA) metric that equals the ratio of the system objective at the worst pure Nash equilibrium of the corresponding game to the optimal system objective. Our aim is to derive the utility functions which optimize the pPoA-based performance guarantees for any given information network and system objective. We develop a linear program that derives the optimal pPoA for any arbitrary information network and arbitrary system objective. Our work is the first to solve optimal utility design for arbitrary networks; our techniques generalize previous approaches which considered only the full-information setting. For supermodular objective functions, we prove that counterintuitively, a fully communication-denied utility design is optimal irrespective of the original information network. For submodular system objectives, an exhaustive numerical analysis suggests that the optimal utility design is robust to communication failures even for this case. When the system objective is weighted maximum coverage, the marginal contribution utility design provably optimizes the pPoA for a wide variety of information networks of interest.