The Machine's Internal Clock: Do LLMs Share Human Temporal Illusions?

Temporal reasoning is widely assumed to decompose into two modes: temporal arithmetic (date and time calculations), and temporal semantics (understanding temporal and causal relations). This dichotomy shapes how benchmarks are designed, how models are trained, and how progress is measured, yet its empirical validity has never been directly tested. We provide two lines of evidence that challenge it. First, we test whether tasks labelled as arithmetic or semantic by the benchmarks support transferable gains within their purported mode. Finetuning on these subsets yields predominantly dataset-specific gains ($+6.8$ to $+23.1$ percentage points), while transfer to a different dataset in the same mode ranges from $-3.2$ to $+1.1$ percentage points. Across the two benchmark families used in the transfer analysis, this pattern provides little evidence of coherent, transferable temporal abilities. Second, using cognitive-demand-based model evaluation, we examine which capabilities actually drive performance on these benchmarks. We find that quantitative and logical reasoning, the assumed proxies for temporal arithmetic and temporal semantics, are not the primary drivers; knowledge is. Together, these findings show that current temporal reasoning benchmarks do not cleanly realise the arithmetic-semantics distinction and instead largely reward models for remembering how time typically works.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in daily applications, from content generation to code writing, where each interaction treats the model as stateless, generating responses independently without memory. Yet human writing is inherently longitudinal: authors' styles and cognitive states evolve across months and years. This raises a central question: can LLMs reproduce such temporal structure across extended time periods? We construct and publicly release a longitudinal dataset of 412 human authors and 6,086 documents spanning 2012--2024 across three domains (academic abstracts, blogs, news) and compare them to trajectories generated by three representative LLMs under standard and history-conditioned generation settings. Using drift and variance-based metrics over semantic, lexical, and cognitive-emotional representations, we find temporal flattening in LLM-generated text. LLMs produce greater lexical diversity but exhibit substantially reduced semantic and cognitive-emotional drift relative to humans. These differences are highly predictive: temporal variability patterns alone achieve 94% accuracy and 98% ROC-AUC in distinguishing human from LLM trajectories. Our results demonstrate that temporal flattening persists regardless of whether LLMs generate independently or with access to incremental history, revealing a fundamental property of current deployment paradigms. This gap has direct implications for applications requiring authentic temporal structure, such as synthetic training data and longitudinal text modeling.

Understanding a narrative means knowing how every event relates in time to every other, yet large language models (LLMs) are mostly tested on isolated event pairs or coarse labels. We ask five LLMs to reconstruct the complete network of Allen's 13 interval relations for 360 English narratives whose events are placed relative to one another rather than by dates, and evaluate the outputs under a pre-registered protocol for agreement with our gold annotations, converse consistency and logical satisfiability. End to end, the best model clearly beats trivial baselines on macro-F1, our primary metric, yet under our pre-registered parser no model matches the accuracy of always answering "before", which the skewed labels inflate. Most of that accuracy gap is a parsing artifact: formatting errors in large matrices cost whole rows, and a post hoc parser that recovers the determined cells of malformed rows raises coverage from 0.60 to 0.84 and closes the gap to the baseline for the best model. On the cells they do answer, models recover precedence and containment but rarely overlap, and they fail most on flashbacks, where both the narration and the event list present the later event first. Logical consistency varies widely yet says little about agreement with gold: enforcing it raises accuracy mainly by filling empty cells, and is beaten there by the trivial control of guessing the majority label. Reliable structured output and robust handling of relative time are prerequisites for temporal reasoning over whole narratives.