cs.AIAug 16, 2026

Propaganda Forensics: Recovering the Generation Pipeline of an AI-Driven Influence Campaign

Authors: Benjamin Icard, Elouan Vuichard, Louis Lefebvre, Lila Sainero, Thomas Girault, Alice Breton, Tanguy Launay, Gauvain Bourgne, +7 more

Organizations: LIP6, Sorbonne University, CNRS · IRL Crossing, CNRS · AIRBUS · SIPA Ouest-France · IRISA, CNRS

Abstract

We present a forensic analysis of the generation pipeline behind a recent AI-driven influence campaign. We introduce PROPAGIA, a corpus of 2,646 propagandist French articles from the Storm-1516/CopyCop campaign disclosed by VIGINUM and INSIKT GROUP in 2025. For comparison, we rely on SIPA, a corpus of human-written French mainstream press from the same period. Using topic modeling, vagueness and sentiment analysis, we first isolate persuasion techniques characteristic of propaganda, with PROPAGIA far exceeding SIPA in vagueness, subjectivity and negativity, and citing fewer sources. We then find prompt instruction leaks on 50 of the 84 PROPAGIA websites, including a verbatim ten-point editorial specification accounting for several of these differences, together with high cross-article redundancy. Finally, we show that rewriting-based detection supports INSIKT GROUP's attribution to the Llama 3 family, but also suggests the involvement of Mistral-family models.

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