MemCatalyst: Amplifying Data Auditing on Vision-Language Models via Data Poisoning
Authors: Xukun Luan, Jinyan Liu, Yuhui Gong, Yuanguo Bi, Bing Hu, Xuesong Li, Di Wang
Organizations: School of Computer Science and Technology, Beijing Institute of Technology · School of Computer Science and Engineering, Northeastern University · Engineering Research Center of Security Technology of Complex Network System, Ministry of Education · Faculty of Computer Science, Dalhousie University · PRADA Lab, King Abdullah University of Science and Technology
Vision-Language models (VLMs) achieve outstanding performance largely due to the amount of training data available on the internet. At the same time, data holders (e.g., artists) urgently need to determine whether their data has been used for model training without authorization, which concerns both intellectual property rights and personal privacy. Data auditing, particularly through membership inference (MI), has attracted attention as a direct tool. This work proposes MemCatalyst, a set of data poisoning tools, aiming to amplify the data auditing performance on VLMs. MemCatalyst employs two strategies: Poisoning Text (PT) and Poisoning Image (PI). MemCatalyst forces VLMs to over-learn specific inconsistencies between image features and textual semantics during training, thereby increasing their susceptibility to membership information auditing. Crucially, the transferability of poisoned samples across different VLM architectures is demonstrated to be effective in the black-box setting. Extensive evaluations using five state-of-the-art data audits on two prominent VLMs demonstrate that MemCatalyst markedly enhances MI AUC scores with a minimal budget of poisoned samples, while maintaining a negligible impact on model performance.
Figures & tables
Fig. 1 : Overview of MemCatalyst. The goal of MemCatalyst is to leverage the poisoned samples to amplify data auditing, functioning analogously to a catalyst in chemical reactions.
Fig. 2 : Conceptual illustration of the text decision boundaries of the VLM trained without/with (left/right) MemCatalyst. When trained with complex text decision boundaries, the VLM tends to over-learn and strengthen its memorization of training samples, consequently increasing the data auditing performance.
Fig. 3 : Histogram of MPNet-based embedding similarity scores on MiniGPT-4 under the baseline and MemCatalyst settings. (a) Similarity-score distributions of member and non-member samples before applying MemCatalyst. (b) Corresponding distributions after applying MemCatalyst.
Fig. 4 : The framework of our proposed MemCatalyst-PT.
Fig. 5 : The framework of our proposed MemCatalyst-PI.
Fig. 6 : t-SNE visualization of image features extracted by Shadowcast [ 17 ] (left) and our proposed attack (right).
PT
PI
Non
granularity
similarity_metric
accuracy
recall
precision
accuracy
recall
precision
accuracy
recall
precision
rouge1_f
0.516680
0.53860
0.569490
0.491410
0.55809
0.396514
0.509390
0.54914
0.532316
rouge2_f
0.514303
0.59856
0.568317
0.547255
0.55788
0.553872
0.511225
0.55866
0.515883
rougeL_f
0.510955
0.58660
0.517160
0.506490
0.58771
0.519187
0.490485
0.34491
0.479717
5
embedding_mpn
0.513930
0.63438
0.521136
0.493115
0.59536
0.553085
0.500025
0.53545
0.448410
rouge1_f
0.548740
0.59528
0.593409
0.475170
0.48886
0.389725
0.532705
0.52710
0.547975
TABLE I : Accuracy, Recall, and Precision of Shadow Model Inference against LLaVA with 50 poisoned samples. For each row, the three bolded values indicate the highest scores with respect to their respective metrics.
Fig. 7 : AUC scores of Reference Inference (member) and Reference Inference (non-member) against MiniGPT-4.
Fig. 8 : AUC scores of different MI methods against LLaVA.
Evaluation Metrics
rouge1_f
rouge1_p
rouge1_r
rouge2_f
rouge2_p
rouge2_r
cosine_similarity
Non
0.3133
0.3267
0.3972
0.1280
0.1376
0.1570
0.3836
[0pt][0pt] PT
0.3132/ 0.0001
0.3266/ 0.0001
0.3971/ 0.0001
0.1278/ 0.0002
0.1375/ 0.0001
0.1568/ 0.0002
0.3836/ 0.0000
[0pt][0pt] PI
0.3133/ 0.0000
0.3256/ 0.0011
0.3969/ 0.0003
0.1272/ 0.0008
0.1373/ 0.0003
0.1550/ 0.0020
0.3827/ 0.0009
TABLE II : Comparison of model performance across different evaluation metrics on LLaVA. Values highlighted in red indicate a performance degradation compared to Non. PT and PI exhibit a limited impact on model performance, with the observed deviation ranging from 0.0000 to 0.0020.
Evaluation Metrics
rouge1_f
rouge1_p
rouge1_r
rouge2_f
rouge2_p
rouge2_r
cosine_similarity
Non
0.6088
0.5755
0.6850
0.4424
0.4179
0.5122
0.7312
[0pt][0pt] PT
0.6068/ 0.0020
0.5755/ 0.0000
0.6722/ 0.0128
0.4420/ 0.0004
0.4111/ 0.0068
0.4990/ 0.0132
0.7302/ 0.0010
[0pt][0pt] PI
0.5981/ 0.0107
0.5679/ 0.0076
0.6690/ 0.0160
0.4406/ 0.0018
0.4012/ 0.0167
0.4989/ 0.0133
0.7296/ 0.0016
TABLE III : Comparison of model performance across different evaluation metrics on MiniGTP-4. The impact of PT and PI on model performance is limited, with the observed performance difference falling within the range of 0.0000 to 0.0167.
PT
PI
Non
granularity
similarity_metric
accuracy
recall
precision
accuracy
recall
precision
accuracy
recall
precision
rouge1_f
0.516842
0.46431
0.562452
0.499124
0.55189
0.392316
0.509390
0.54914
0.532316
rouge2_f
0.507564
0.56918
0.564987
0.547219
0.55640
0.554424
0.511225
0.55866
0.515883
rougeL_f
0.510235
0.58627
0.517694
0.498902
0.58838
0.520113
0.490485
0.34491
0.479717
5
embedding_mpn
0.504199
0.62224
0.511265
0.483805
0.58401
0.542576
0.500025
0.53545
0.448410
rouge1_f
0.538318
0.58393
0.582093
0.466219
0.47964
0.382483
0.532705
0.52710
0.547975
TABLE IV : Accuracy, recall, and precision of Shadow Model Inference against LLaVA with 25 poisoned samples.
ST
SI
Non
granularity
similarity_metric
accuracy
recall
precision
accuracy
recall
precision
accuracy
recall
precision
rouge1_f
0.505842
0.55217
0.535216
0.507290
0.55234
0.535916
0.509390
0.54914
0.532316
rouge2_f
0.514325
0.55598
0.512983
0.514025
0.55746
0.512583
0.511225
0.55866
0.515883
rougeL_f
0.487235
0.34841
0.475917
0.493085
0.34751
0.476117
0.490485
0.34491
0.479717
5
embedding_mpn
0.496825
0.53895
0.451310
0.497425
0.53805
0.451010
0.500025
0.53545
0.448410
rouge1_f
0.535805
0.52430
0.551475
0.535305
0.52470
0.551575
0.532705
0.52710
0.547975
TABLE V : Accuracy, recall, and precision of Shadow Model Inference against LLaVA with 5 poisoned samples.
target sample size
similarity_metric
PT
PI
Non
100%
rouge1_f
0.7931
0.7757
0.7514
rouge2_f
0.8031
0.7834
0.7619
rougeL_f
0.7941
0.7728
0.7494
embedding_mpn
0.7919
0.7735
0.7697
90%
rouge1_f
0.6927
0.6599
0.6594
rouge2_f
0.7083
0.7027
0.6957
TABLE VI : AUC scores of Target-only Inference against MiniGPT-4 with three sizes of target samples.
pretrained LLMs
similarity_metric
PT
PI
Non
Vicuna 7B
rouge1_f
0.7954
0.8025
0.7713
rouge2_f
0.8139
0.8221
0.7855
rougeL_f
0.7973
0.8131
0.7667
embedding_mpn
0.7824
0.7478
0.7730
Vicuna 13B
rouge1_f
0.7799
0.7777
0.7520
rouge2_f
0.7868
0.7796
0.7657
TABLE VII : AUC scores of Target-only Inference against MiniGPT-4 with three pretrained LLM weights.
similarity_metric
LLaVA → LLaVA
MiniGPT-4 → LLaVA
MiniGPT-4 → MiniGPT-4
LLaVA → MiniGPT-4
rouge1_f
0.7973
0.7927/ −0.0046
0.9963
0.9872/ −0.0091
rouge2_f
0.6348
0.6301/ −0.0047
0.9989
0.9901/ −0.0088
rougeL_f
0.6318
0.6272/ −0.0046
0.9965
0.9881/ −0.0084
embedding_mpn
0.5754
0.5753/ −0.0001
0.9777
0.9595/ −0.0182
TABLE VIII : AUC scores of Image-only Inference ( T =0.2) for the cross-architectural transfer experiment. Despite a minor overall performance degradation (0.0001-0.0182, indicated by red values), PI nevertheless preserves its effectiveness.
similarity_metric
LLaVA → LLaVA
MiniGPT-4 → LLaVA
MiniGPT-4 → MiniGPT-4
LLaVA → MiniGPT-4
rouge1_f
0.8343
0.8331/ −0.0012
0.9680
0.9675/ −0.0005
rouge2_f
0.7253
0.7249/ −0.0004
0.9883
0.9873/ −0.0010
rougeL_f
0.7613
0.7607/ −0.0006
0.9727
0.9720/ −0.0007
embedding_mpn
0.3936
0.3935/ −0.0001
0.9229
0.9156/ −0.0073
TABLE IX : AUC scores of Image-only Inference ( T =1.2) for the cross-architectural transfer experiment.
similarity_metric
LLaVA → LLaVA
MiniGPT-4 → LLaVA
MiniGPT-4 → MiniGPT-4
LLaVA → MiniGPT-4
rouge1_f
0.8551
0.8477/ −0.0074
0.8025
0.7959/ −0.0066
rouge2_f
0.9586
0.9552/ −0.0034
0.8221
0.8134/ −0.0087
rougeL_f
0.9279
0.9275/ −0.0004
0.8131
0.8103/ −0.0028
embedding_mpn
0.5327
0.5310/ −0.0017
0.7478
0.7333/ −0.0145
TABLE X : AUC scores of Target-only Inference for the cross-architectural transfer experiment.
temperature
similarity_metric
PT
PI
Non
0.05
rouge1_f
0.9959
0.9950
0.9856
rouge2_f
0.9993
0.9989
0.9963
rougeL_f
0.9969
0.9961
0.9887
embedding_mpn
0.9727
0.9777
0.9480
0.1
rouge1_f
0.9957
0.9957
0.9885
rouge2_f
0.9995
0.9989
0.9963
TABLE XII : AUC scores of Image-only Inference against MiniGPT-4 with varying temperature settings.
Fig. 9 : Samples of Poisoning Image (PI). We selected 50 samples spanning a wide range of data categories, including humans, animals, plants, landscapes, and so on. This demonstrates that PI imposes minimal requirements on the preliminary dataset, highlighting its robustness and thereby posing a more substantial threat in practical scenarios. These samples adhere to the constraint of an ϵ -bounded perturbation to ensure imperceptibility.
TABLE XIII : Some samples of Poisoning Text (PT). The original and poisoned texts are denoted by blue and red colors, respectively, to facilitate manual assessment. It can be observed that the red portions maintain semantic alignment with the image while preserving textual plausibility, due to individual differences in human understanding.
Fig. 10 : AUC scores of Image-only Inference against LLaVA.
Fig. 11 : AUC scores of Reference Inference (member) against LLaVA.
Fig. 12 : AUC scores of Reference Inference (non-member) against LLaVA.
Fig. 13 : AUC scores of Target-only Inference against LLaVA.
Vision-language models (VLMs) are trained on large-scale image-text corpora that may contain private, copyrighted, or otherwise sensitive data, motivating membership inference as a tool for training-data auditing. This is especially challenging for deployed VLMs, where auditors typically observe only generated textual responses. Existing VLM membership inference attacks either rely on probability-level signals unavailable in such settings, or use mask-based semantic prediction tasks whose effectiveness depends on object-centric visual assumptions. To address these limitations, we propose DistractMIA, an output-only black-box framework based on semantic distraction. Rather than removing visual evidence, DistractMIA preserves the original image, inserts a known semantic distractor, and measures how generated responses change. This design is motivated by the intuition that member samples remain more anchored to the original image semantics, while non-member samples are more easily redirected toward the distractor. To make this signal reliable, DistractMIA calibrates distractor configurations on a reference set and derives membership scores from repeated textual generations, capturing response stability and distractor uptake without accessing logits, probabilities, or hidden states. Experiments across multiple VLMs and benchmarks show that DistractMIA consistently outperforms both output-only and stronger-access baselines. Its performance on a medical benchmark further demonstrates applicability beyond object-centric natural images.
Hongyi Tang, Zhihao Zhu, Yi Yang
The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have achieved remarkable success, yet their reliance on massive datasets and unintended memorization of training data raise significant data security risk. Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs) aim to assess these risks by determining whether a data sample was included in a model's training set. However, existing MIA methods against VLMs face critical bottlenecks: gray-box method relies on internal logits that are typically restricted in real-world Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), while black-box method depends on large-scale statistical distributions, which struggle in single-sample scenarios. To this end, we investigate MIAs from the perspective of cross-modal semantic alignment, and observe that member images exhibit significantly stronger image-caption alignment due to training memorization, whereas generated captions for non-members may deviate from the original visual content. Leveraging this insight, we propose a novel MIA framework designed for strict black-box and single-sample setting that quantifies such alignment within a joint embedding space, thereby bypassing these unrealistic assumptions. We conducted extensive experiments on three open-source and two closed-source VLMs. On the VL-MIA/Flicker dataset, our method achieves an AUC of 0.821 against LLaVA-1.5, significantly outperforming existing baselines. Furthermore, it remains robust under diverse image perturbations, highlighting its practicality.
Vision-Language Large Models (VLLMs) trained on massive crawled corpora raise pressing copyright and data-provenance concerns. These concerns are particularly acute in healthcare, where patient medical images paired with clinical reports demand rigorous privacy safeguards. However, existing training data detection methods either fail in cross-modal scenarios or rely on superficial output signals with insufficient discriminative power. We introduce GradAudit, a gradient-based auditing framework that examines internal optimization dynamics rather than treating VLLMs as black boxes. Our approach builds on a key observation: model parameters converge to regions where gradients on training samples become stable and well-aligned, whereas gradients on non-training samples remain noisy and inconsistent. By analyzing these gradient signatures, GradAudit achieves strong separability and detects genuine image-text associations learned during training, not merely individual modality membership. Empirically, across both medical and general-domain datasets, GradAudit substantially outperforms state-of-the-art baselines in both pretraining and fine-tuning VLLMs. In a case study employing copyrighted content, we show that existing training data detection methods not only underestimate the extent of unauthorized data usage, but that this underestimation becomes more pronounced as models become more recent and more advanced.
Zhihao Zhu, Hongyi Tang, Yi Yang +1
Department of Information Systems, Business Statistics and Operations Management (ISOM), Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China. · Department of IT, Analytics, and Operations, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana, USA.