Diff-DDoS: Realistic Cyber-Physical Attack Synthesis and Robust Detection for 5G-Enabled CPS Using Tabular Diffusion Models
Authors: Bilal Hussain, Xiao Tang, Qinghe Du, Tan Li, Muhammad Azhar, Danista Khan
Organizations: Division of Science, Engineering, and Health Studies, School of Professional Education and Executive Development, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University · School of Information and Communications Engineering, Xi’an Jiaotong University · Department of Computer Science, The Hang Seng University of Hong Kong · Department of Applied Data Science, Hong Kong Shue Yan University · Division of Business and Hospitality Management, School of Professional Education and Executive Development, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Deep learning-based DDoS detectors for 5G-enabled cyber-physical systems face scarce labeled attack data and unrealistic synthetic substitutes, which limit robustness against adaptive adversaries. Detectors trained on hand-crafted attacks with fixed scaling multipliers degrade catastrophically (F1-score drops of about 47 percent to 100 percent, depending on scenario) when confronted with realistic, distribution-preserving samples. We propose Diff-DDoS, a three-phase framework for realistic attack synthesis and robust detection using tabular diffusion models. Phase 1 trains a baseline CNN cell-level detector on spatiotemporal grids from call detail records (CDRs). Phase 2 trains a tabular denoising diffusion probabilistic model (TabDDPM) on normal CDR aggregates to generate realistic attacks and expose detector vulnerabilities. Phase 3 introduces adversarial diffusion training (ADT), using inverse classifier guidance to generate hard yet distribution-preserving samples until the detector converges. On a Milano CDR dataset across SMS-flooding, silent-call, Internet-signaling, and blended scenarios, ResNet50 with ADT recovers F1-scores of 79.62 percent (silent-call), 100 percent (Internet), and 92.79 percent (blended). After validation-based threshold calibration, ADT reaches 100 percent SMS F1 versus 47.3 percent for CTGAN, and matches the strongest gradient-based adversarial-training baseline on silent-call. These results support tabular diffusion models for stress-testing and hardening intrusion detectors in data-scarce 5G cyber-physical deployments.
Figures & tables
Symbol
Meaning
M(⋅;θ) , fθ
Multilabel CNN detector ( 81 sigmoid outputs per grid)
Ξsr , Ξsr,orig , Ξsr,Tab
Metric bundles (Acc, Prec, Rec, F1, FPR) for attack scenario s at ADT round r ; not the detector
θ , θs∗ , θsr
Detector learnable weights
ϵψ , ϕTabDDPM
TabDDPM denoiser network (weights ψ ; distinct from θ )
ϕs:R3→R3
Mild post-sample scenario scaling on 3D CDR aggregates (Phase 2)
MapToGrid(x~,B)
Copy background B , write aggregate x~ into attacked cells C , set Yk=1 on C
TABLE I: Main-text notation summary.
Fig. 1: Overview of the proposed Diff-DDoS framework. Phase 1 trains baseline detectors on multiplier-based attacks, Phase 2 uses TabDDPM to generate realistic attacks from normal CDR aggregates, and Phase 3 applies ADT to generate hard on-manifold samples for iterative retraining.
Mechanism
Phase
Action
Purpose
Fixed multipliers
1
169.5× SMS, −33.1× Call, 43.3× Internet
Stylized baseline
Heuristic steering +ϕs
2
Mild γ ranges on target channel(s)
On-manifold vulnerability test
Inverse classifier guidance
3
Minimize pattack toward ptarget
Hard robust-training samples
TABLE II: Attack-steering mechanisms across Diff-DDoS phases.
Same test as P1; fresh 3-round schedule per method; τ=0.5
Fig. 4 (left)
P3
Locked attack test; τF1max or τY from validation
Fig. 4 (right); Sec. VI-G
P4
Fresh-retrain λ / ptarget sweep; locked test
Table VII
P5
Multiplier test split; τ=0.5
Table V
TABLE III: Reader’s guide to F1 evaluation protocols.
Scenario
Ph. 1
Ph. 2
Ph. 3 F1
Acc
Rec
F1
F1
R1
R2
R3
SMS (SC)
99.96
99.85
99.93
0
9.09
9.09
9.09
SMS (R50) a
100
100
100
0
6.98
9.74
9.58
Call (SC) b
99.85
99.40
99.70
52.63
38.44
12.87
9.71
Call (R50)
99.83
99.32
99.66
7.56
77.22
81.52
79.62
Internet (SC)
100
100
100
0
89.14
96.78
96.62
TABLE IV: Detector performance across phases (protocol P1; all values in %; deployment-default τ=0.5 ). Ph. 1: multiplier-based test attacks (Acc, Rec, F1); precision is 100% for all rows (omitted). Ph. 2: TabDDPM-generated attacks without retraining. Ph. 3: ADT rounds R1–R3. SC: SimpleCNN; R50: ResNet50.
Fig. 2: Dual-axis realism summary on test attack grids ( 168 per scenario). Bars (left axis) show target-channel mean absolute z -score, and lines (right axis) show joint (3D) MMD 2 to normal, for TabDDPM and multiplier attacks across scenarios. Lower values indicate closer alignment with normal CDR aggregates (higher realism/stealth).
Scenario
Phase 1 (pre-ADT)
ADT round 3
SMS
100.00
100.00
Call
99.66
100.00
Internet
99.60
66.80
Blended
100.00
100.00
TABLE V: Retention on fixed-multiplier attacks (protocol P5; ResNet50): F1 (%) on the locked multiplier test split at τ=0.5 , before ADT (Phase 1) and after ADT round 3.
Fig. 3: Cell-level accuracy heatmaps for the Blended scenario before and after ADT.
Fig. 4: Baseline comparison on the locked TabDDPM test set (ResNet50, round 3). Left (P2): F1 at deployment-default τ=0.5 (FGSM, PGD, and CTGAN each follow the identical 3-round schedule used for ADT). Right (P3): F1 at τF1max (validation-selected; Sec. VI-G ). Compare methods within each panel; each panel applies a single threshold rule. Numeric values appear in Supplementary Table SIII.
Method
Train (s)
Aug. 100
FGSM / PGD
—
≲0.01
CTGAN
62.5
0.007
TabDDPM
1296.0
—
ADT round
—
21.7
TABLE VI: Offline generative and augmentation cost (RTX 4090).
Protocol
λ
pt
Blended
SMS
Internet
Operational default
1.0
0.3
92.8
9.6
100.0
Fresh-retrain sweep
1.0
0.3
66.8
100.0
66.8
2.0
0.3
66.8
100.0
100.0
1.0
0.1
100.0
100.0
65.9
TABLE VII: Inverse-guidance sensitivity summary (ResNet50, round-3 F1 %). The operational default row reports P1 (cumulative Phase-3 ADT on the full 335 -grid TabDDPM test, Table IV ); sweep rows report a fresh-retrain, locked-test one-at-a-time sweep. The full grid is in Supplementary Table SII.
Arch.
Mean (ms)
p95 (ms)
Grids/s
SimpleCNN
35.7
49.5
28.1
ResNet50
42.7
60.4
23.4
TABLE VIII: Online single-grid inference latency for Phase 3 (ADT) detectors (batch =1 , scenario-averaged; RTX 4090, 500 iterations after 50 warmup). The per-scenario and batch- =32 breakdown is in Supplementary Table SVIII.
Fig. 5: ROC curves for the Blended scenario on TabDDPM-generated attacks. Left: Phase 2 comparison of SimpleCNN and ResNet50. Right: ResNet50 before and after ADT in Phase 3.
Fig. 6: Locked-test F1 at the default threshold versus validation-calibrated thresholds ( τF1max , τY ) for the SMS and silent-call scenarios.
Fig. 7: Grad-CAM overlays for TabDDPM silent-call attacks (SimpleCNN): Call-channel input (left) and saliency maps for Phase 2 (trained on multiplier attacks, tested on TabDDPM silent-call grids) vs. Phase 3 ADT (same backbone after retraining). Boxed cells mark ground-truth attacked locations (green on the input panel, white on the overlays). Subplot titles report the mean predicted attack score on attacked cells ( p^ ) and the fraction of Grad-CAM saliency mass on those cells ( attn ).
Fig. 8: Quantitative Grad-CAM summary for SimpleCNN before vs. after ADT on attacked cells. Left: mean predicted attack score on attacked cells for TabDDPM and multiplier attack sets. Right: Grad-CAM saliency mass on attacked cells for the same sets. Bars compare Phase 2 and Phase 3 (ADT); error bars denote ±1 sample standard deviation over N=40 test grids per condition.
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