One Gate Is Not Enough: Composing Stateful Pre-Action Controls for Agentic AI
Organizations: Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
Abstract
Agentic AI systems take consequential actions governed by more than one pre-action control at once: authority, resource, and evidence gates that can admit, degrade, or remediate an action before it executes. This paper's central object is remediation-induced control coupling: a remediation applied by one control can change the action, evidence, or context another control evaluates, invalidating that control's earlier judgment. We formalize this coupling and give a remediate-and-regate protocol that restores per-action soundness in the current bounded, idempotent setting under its stated assumptions. We further show that the two implemented remediation operators (evidence substitution and resource-budget downroute) do not commute -- a finite-model checker finds concrete counterexample instances -- making remediation order part of the control-plane semantics rather than an implementation detail. A governed evidence buffer that trusts its own most recent admitted write is a further instance of the same problem at the level of state -- current admissibility does not imply future reference trustworthiness -- and is vulnerable to poisoning from declared-uncovered defect classes; two mitigations reduce, not eliminate, that exposure. Supporting results establish the exact condition under which positive-weight linear aggregation of gate outcomes can compensate a member veto, a unified cross-control Evidence Set, and that composition manufactures no new detection coverage, reported honestly. Empirically, on a deterministic open-data artifact composing three published engines unmodified, CH1-CH5 meet their registered decision rules across all 30 pre-registered seeds; CH6 does so under W1 but not under the smaller W2 workflow, reported as such. This is a mechanism demonstration on open payload data with a synthetic metadata layer, not a claim about production prevalence.
Figures & tables
| Scenario | Decisions | Executed | Held | DQ Vetoes | SARC Vetoes | Green Vetoes | Winner-gate distribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| S1 | 10164 | 9592 | 572 | 572 | 0 | 0 | dq=572, none=9592 |
| S2 | 10164 | 3417 | 6747 | 572 | 0 | 6531 | dq=445, green=6302, none=3417 |
| S3 | 10164 | 4501 | 5663 | 573 | 5368 | 0 | dq=563, none=4501, sarc=5100 |
| S4 | 10164 | 9353 | 811 | 572 | 239 | 0 | dq=572, none=9353, sarc=239 |
| Defect class | dq detection rate | sarc detection rate | green detection rate | winner-gate counts |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| stale_master_data | 1.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | none=227 |
| superseded_golden_record | 1.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | none=212 |
| cross_source_contradiction | 1.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | dq=211 |
| schema_drift | 1.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | dq=183 |
| missing_mandatory_field | 1.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | dq=178 |
| lineage_missing | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | none=185 |
| decision_id | rtr | single_pass | V_pre | V_post | kappa |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 56 | escalate | substitute | 31.06 | 40.02 | 35.54 |
| 76 | admit | substitute | 12.75 | 12.75 | 12.75 |
| 162 | escalate | substitute | 29.07 | 52.53 | 40.80 |
| 236 | escalate | substitute | 20.13 | 31.68 | 25.91 |
| 266 | admit | substitute | 26.52 | 26.52 | 26.52 |
| 279 | admit | substitute | 64.90 | 64.90 | 64.90 |
| Scenario | Executed count | Executed order value | Held count | Held clean value foregone |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S1 | 9592 | 759883.87 | 572 | 42015.00 |
| S2 | 3417 | 104496.60 | 6747 | 655889.68 |
| S3 | 4501 | 142929.10 | 5663 | 617891.44 |
| S4 | 9353 | 739224.74 | 811 | 60347.60 |
| Metric | Mean (95% CI, n=30 seeds) |
|---|---|
| ch2_divergent_decisions | 207.5 (95% CI [201.3, 213.7], n=30) |
| label_only_differences | 191.3 (95% CI [186.5, 196.1], n=30) |
| ch3_false_hold | 0.000000 (95% CI [0.000000, 0.000000], n=30) |
| Formal max compensated response profiles: 48 / 98 | exhaustive discrete grid, not seed-sampled |
| Empirical max compensated held decision instances, pooled S1-S4 | 13775.1 (95% CI [13753.5, 13796.6], n=30) |
| Workflow | Strategy | Poisoned substitutions (mean, 95% CI) | Mean abs value delta (95% CI) |
|---|---|---|---|
| W1 | plain | 14.70 (95% CI [13.21, 16.19], n=30) | 2.210 (95% CI [2.024, 2.395], n=30) |
| W1 | quarantine | 0.20 (95% CI [-0.01, 0.41], n=30) | 0.000 (95% CI [0.000, 0.000], n=30) |
| W1 | median_of_3 | 1.83 (95% CI [1.35, 2.31], n=30) | 2.019 (95% CI [1.294, 2.744], n=30) |
| W2 | plain | 1.83 (95% CI [1.34, 2.32], n=30) | 1.687 (95% CI [1.324, 2.050], n=30) |
| W2 | quarantine | 0.07 (95% CI [-0.03, 0.16], n=30) | 0.000 (95% CI [0.000, 0.000], n=30) |
| W2 | median_of_3 | 0.13 (95% CI [0.00, 0.26], n=30) | 0.313 (95% CI [-0.006, 0.632], n=30) |
| Hypothesis | Robust across all 30 seeds (x both workflows for CH6) |
|---|---|
| CH1 (veto soundness) | True |
| CH2 (single-pass unsoundness, new semantics) | True |
| CH3 (deterministic selectivity) | True |
| CH4 (coverage honesty) | True |
| CH5 (compensation unsafe) | True |
| CH6 (buffer contamination + mitigation) | False |
| # | Claim | Evidence source | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| C1 | Linear-family compensation lemma (tau L*) for arbitrary n; universal claim retracted per independent review F1; general lemma retagged pending-human-review, finite n=3 encoding split into Corollary 2 per independent review R2-N2 | Lemma (linear family) + Corollary 2, Appendix A | Lemma pending-human-review; Corollary 2 machine-checked, 1,064 cases (n=3 declared grid + 200 HEAD-derived probes) |
| C2 | Join composition order-invariant absent remediation | Proposition 2, Appendix A | machine-checked |
| C3 | Single-pass unsound under substitution, scoped to the implemented construction (independent review classification: checked-scope-only) | Proposition 3 + Table 3 | checked-scope-only (REVIEW.md); generated |
| C4 | Remediate-regate sound (Theorem 1, general statement retagged checked-scope-only, finite response-lattice encoding split into Corollary 3, per independent review R2-N2); single-pass sound under gate invariance, sufficiency only, necessity retracted per independent review F3 (Corollary 1, retagged checked-scope-only per independent review round two); Lemma 1 scoped to the current one-shot composition branch (checked-scope-only) | Lemma 1, Theorem 1, Corollary 1, Corollary 3, Appendix A | Theorem 1 checked-scope-only (REVIEW.md); Corollary 3 machine-checked, 17,151 cases; Lemma 1 checked-scope-only (REVIEW.md); Corollary 1 checked-scope-only (REVIEW.md) |
| C5 | Evidence Set gives identity commitment + integrity relative to a content-addressed store (not byte reconstruction; retracted per independent review F2); retagged checked-scope-only per independent review round two (R2-N2: schema field presence and hash commitments are checker-adjacent unit tests, not an exhaustive finite-model checker) | Proposition 4, schema v2, Appendix A | checked-scope-only (REVIEW.md) |
| C6 | No manufactured coverage | Proposition 5 + CH4, Appendix A | machine-checked (tautology) + generated |
| The paper claims | The paper does not claim |
|---|---|
| Single-pass can be unsound after remediation | All single-pass systems are unsound |
| The implemented remediators are non-commutative | All remediation operators are non-commutative |
| Remediate-regate is sound in the current one-shot setting | General convergence of arbitrary remediator systems |
| Buffer poisoning exists in the demonstrated mechanism | Production prevalence |
| Composition preserves only member-control coverage | Composition guarantees complete safety |
| Evidence Sets preserve identity commitments | Hashes alone reconstruct source bytes |
| Existing concept | Established literature | What this paper adds |
|---|---|---|
| Runtime enforcement | Security/edit automata | Heterogeneous enterprise pre-action controls |
| Enforcement composition | Compositional runtime enforcement | Cross-control invalidation caused by action/evidence remediation |
| Deny-overrides / veto | XACML / policy algebra / MCDA | Not claimed as novelty; used as hard-feasibility semantics |
| Rewrite ordering | Rewriting / confluence theory | Concrete order-sensitive governance remediators |
| Stateful enforcement | History/state-based policy | Promotion of uncovered-but-admitted evidence into future remediation state |
| Audit provenance | Existing provenance mechanisms | One cross-control Evidence Set binding pre/post-remediation decisions |
AI Agent Governance
AI agent governance studies how to authorize, constrain, monitor, and hold autonomous and multi-agent systems accountable.
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