Advances in speech synthesis have made deepfake audio highly realistic. Earlier studies reported 70-80% human detection accuracy, but relied primarily on older synthesizers. We compare human detection for three selected voice synthesis tools released in 2019, 2022, and 2024 with 82 IT professionals, and benchmark humans against six pretrained detectors on the same material. For fully synthetic speech (full spoofs), the F1 score drops from about 90% for RTVC and YourTTS to 48% for ElevenLabs, although listeners were explicitly warned that deepfakes were present. For partial spoofing, where only one sentence of an utterance is altered, strict accuracy falls to 9%, and listeners classify the synthetic sentence as bona fide 77% of the time. Humans and detectors fail in complementary ways, and neither reliably localizes short manipulations. Additionally, listeners increasingly mislabel bona fide speech as fake, eroding trust in unmanipulated audio. These findings show that human perception alone is unreliable for the selected modern and partial-spoof conditions and motivate procedural verification, provenance, watermarking, and segment-level detection.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Structure of one of the nine speaker test sets. Each recording comprises four sentence-level segments that participants judged independently as bona fide or synthetic.
Training data
Front-end
Back-end
EER
ASVspoof 2019 LA
XLS-R
AASIST
0.68%
MHFA
0.57%
ASVspoof 5
XLS-R
AASIST
4.16%
MHFA
5.34%
WavLM
AASIST
4.06%
MHFA
5.26%
Table 1: Automated detector baselines. EER is reported on the respective source benchmark used for training (eval subset of ASVspoof 2019 LA or ASVspoof 5), not on our study material.
Condition
Items
Judgments
α
All sentence-level judgments
252
17,233
0.631
Full spoof
108
7,392
0.502
Partial spoof
108
7,429
0.528
Full spoof, YourTTS
36
2,569
0.035
Full spoof, RTVC
36
2,514
0.011
Full spoof, ElevenLabs
36
2,309
0.155
Table 2: Inter-rater agreement for sentence-level authenticity judgments. Uncertain and missing responses were excluded before computing Krippendorff’s α . Items denote unique sentence-level segments.
Figure 2: Human detection performance (mean F1) for full and partial spoofs from the three selected synthesizers. Detection remains high for RTVC and YourTTS and is substantially lower for ElevenLabs. The dotted line marks an F1 reference value of 0.5.
Figure 3: Human detection per speaker for (a,b) full-spoof and (c,d) partial-spoof recordings (the prefix “mix” marks one synthetically replaced sentence). Rows: recording source (bona fide Original, RTVC 2019, YourTTS 2022, ElevenLabs 2024); columns: speaker initials (AD = Adele, CB = Cate Blanchett, JB = Jeff Bridges, JA = Jennifer Aniston, MC = Miley Cyrus, MF = Morgan Freeman, SG = Selena Gomez, TH = Tom Holland, LN = Liam Neeson), with the final Mean column. Green = reliably detected, red = deceptive. Lower scores on the Original row reflect false positives (bona fide speech judged synthetic); the mixElevenLabs rows (c,d) show the partial-spoof collapse.
Figure 4: Humans versus six pretrained automated detectors (mean F1) on the same recordings, grouped by synthesizer. On ElevenLabs, detectors (0.09) fall below humans (0.48) on full spoofs (panel a), whereas on partial spoofs (panel b) detectors (0.40) exceed humans (0.29), though their strict All OK localization rate is 0.00. Detector scores are averaged across all six detectors.
Model
Deepfake part (%)
bona fide part (%)
mixRTVC
90.95
88.07
mixYourTTS
94.26
90.13
mixElevenLabs
22.65
88.59
Table 3: Human accuracy of identifying individual sentences based on their type for partial spoof recordings.
Audio deepfakes have improved rapidly recently, yet their effect on human trust in real speech remains unstudied. We present the largest listening study on audio deepfake perception to date, collecting 35,532 judgments from 1,768 participants across 138 text-to-speech and voice conversion systems. Our central finding is a skepticism shift: compared to a 2021 baseline, human accuracy on fake samples barely changed (72.9% to 71.2%), but accuracy on real samples dropped from 72.7% to 64.1%. Participants are not worse at detecting synthesis artifacts; rather, they increasingly distrust authentic speech. Samples generated by commercial and autoregressive language model systems proved hardest to detect (61.3 - 65.9%), while those from traditional seq2seq and flow-matching models remain easier to spot (75.4 - 76.8%). An ML detector that served as a reference point maintained over 94.5% accuracy across all conditions. Our results suggest that the primary threat posed by modern deepfakes may not be mere deception, but the erosion of trust in genuine audio.
Nicolas M. Müller, Wei Herng Choong
Fraunhofer AISEC & Resemble AI · Germany · Fraunhofer AISEC
Provenance watermarking is increasingly treated as a safeguard for synthetic speech, whether built directly into speech-generation models such as Chatterbox, provided through dedicated techniques such as AudioSeal, or deployed by commercial platforms such as ElevenLabs. We identify a previously uncharacterized liability: when synthetic speech is watermarked and human speech is not, detectors trained alongside latch onto the watermark as a spurious "watermark => fake" shortcut. This single feature yields three coupled failures: generalization degradation (model performance deteriorates on unseen data), strip-to-evade (a watermarked fake escapes once unwatermarked), and mark-to-frame (watermarking a real voice flags it as fake). In a controlled white-box experiment, a watermark-trained detector shows all three (for example, mark-to-frame lifts Equal Error Rate from 16% to 75%). In a black-box test of a commercial API, we show that adding a watermark to real speech disguises it as fake. However, this shortcut is fixable: retraining with the watermark on both classes decorrelates it and restores clean behavior. We release experiment data as a paired clean-versus-watermarked corpus (WASP).
Automatic deepfake detection has received considerable research attention, yet the socio-technical environment in which humans actually encounter synthetic speech remains poorly understood. We investigate voice deepfake detection as a perceptual and contextual process, presenting a localization task in which 47 participants marked suspected synthetic segments across authentic, fully synthetic, and partially synthetic utterances under three manipulated trust cues: instructional framing, affective priming, and provenance labeling. Participants provided quality ratings on mechanicalness, expressiveness, intelligibility, clarity, calmness, and confidence of evaluation. Utterance class was the primary determinant of detection accuracy and perceptual quality; trust cues produced no main effects but motivated detection behavior. Fully synthetic speech was detected at below-chance levels. Quality ratings tracked utterance type, indicating implicit discrimination where overt detection failed.
Lelia Erscoi, Tomi Kinnunen
Computational Speech Group, University of Eastern Finland · Computational Speech Group, University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu, Finland