EchoCoT: Extracting Hidden Chain-of-Thought from Large Reasoning Models

Large language models often answer complex reasoning questions without revealing intermediate steps, raising whether they reason latently or complete patterns. We propose the Hidden CoT Detection Score (HCDS), a comparative behavioral and mechanistic signal measuring whether neutral-prompt behavior aligns more closely with explicit CoT or explicit no- CoT. Here, hidden CoT operationally denotes this neutral-prompt CoT-like alignment; HCDS does not directly observe or prove an unexposed reasoning trace. On GSM8K, HCDS is significantly positive for both Qwen3-4B variants (Thinking $+1.87$, $p = 1.2 \times 10^{-7}$; Instruct $+1.41$, $p = 1.9 \times 10^{-4}$), replicates across a different inference stack and quantization within $0.08$ ($+1.80$ and $+1.45$), and is not significantly positive in seven of eight length-adjusted calibration-control cells. The unadjusted score produces large positive scores on single-step arithmetic and numeric factual lookup. The variants also respond differently to no-CoT instructions: Instruct complies from the prompt alone, whereas Thinking continues reasoning and requires intervention. These findings show stronger, less prompt-conditional CoT-like behavior in the reasoning-tuned model, consistent with but not proof of latent reasoning. HCDS thus investigates latent reasoning without relying on models' self-reported traces.

Leading large language model providers now conceal their models' step-by-step reasoning, or chain-of-thought, to protect intellectual property and limit information leakage. Rather than storing these traces server-side, providers return them to the client as blocks of encrypted text, which the client passes back with each subsequent request. Building on prior research, we identify an architectural vulnerability: these encrypted blocks are fully compatible and interchangeable across different sessions, users, and models within a provider's ecosystem. We exploit this compatibility to develop a scalable decryption jailbreak. By injecting an encrypted reasoning trace from a given model into a weaker, and less safeguarded model from the same provider, we force it to decode and output the trace verbatim in plaintext, without ever jailbreaking the more capable model directly. This vulnerability enables four distinct attack vectors. First, it circumvents anti-distillation mechanisms, allowing adversaries to extract a proprietary model's reasoning, as we demonstrate across Anthropic, OpenAI, and Google. Second, it allows for large-scale private data extraction. Developers frequently share session logs publicly, unaware of contents of the encrypted blocks. By decoding 315,320 reasoning blocks scraped from public repositories, we recovered 367 Personally Identifiable Information (PII) artifacts and 182 credentials. Third, it inadvertently reveals hazardous information hidden within the reasoning process, even in cases where the model's final, visible output safely rejects a malicious request. Fourth, attackers can leverage this flaw to execute invisible prompt injections, embedding malicious payloads entirely within encrypted blocks to poison public agentic rollouts. Following responsible disclosure, we propose concrete cryptographic and system-level mitigations to secure client-side reasoning.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) traces often serve as a proxy for how Large Language Models (LLMs) arrive at their answers. However, growing evidence shows that models' CoT often fails to reflect their internal computations and can be changed without affecting their final answers. In this work, we measure and improve the alignment between the reasoning described in an LLM's CoT and what it computes internally. We propose CoT-Interpretability Alignment (CIA), a metric that measures the agreement between a model's CoT traces and its internal reasoning strategies as detected by interpretability tools. We evaluate CIA on three tasks (two-hop question answering, hint intervention, and integer multiplication) across three LLMs, finding that LLMs exhibit limited alignment across all tasks (44.8-75.9%). We then experiment with improving CIA via post-training, setting both the task accuracy and parametric faithfulness signals as a reward. Experiments show that we can substantially improve CoT parametric faithfulness while maintaining or improving the task accuracy. We provide rich analysis, such as their generalization patterns. Our work provides both a framework for auditing CoT parametric faithfulness and a pathway toward making models' explicit reasoning more trustworthy. Code and data are available at https://github.com/yihuaihong/CIA-minimal-repro.