While multimodal retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems increasingly rely on images as external knowledge sources, the introduction of poisoned visual evidence can severely compromise multimodal large language model (MLLM) generation. Unlike prior attacks that rely on altering textual metadata, we introduce Vis-Poison, a novel visual knowledge poisoning attack where the poisoned image itself is the attacker-controlled payload, without manipulating captions, summaries, metadata, or other associated text. Specifically, this attack is instantiated through an automated multi-agent method that constructs visually plausible poisoned images. To assess its impact, we evaluate Vis-Poison across two representative multimodal RAG pipelines, four embedding models, and six generation models. Empirically, Vis-Poison achieves an end-to-end attack success rate of 40.16% to 65.40% against 30k-entry multimodal knowledge bases in black-box settings. Moreover, Vis-Poison remains effective against various MLLMs that can answer correctly from parametric knowledge alone, with an average success rate above 60%. Code and data are available at https://github.com/SWUFE-DB-Group/Vis-Poison.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: A running example of Vis-Poison in a classical multimodal RAG system with text-side safeguards. The attacker edits a query-relevant clean image into a poisoned image and injects it into an external source or knowledge base (Steps 1–2). The system generates a benign caption, which can pass checking and serve as the image’s retrieval index (Steps 3–4). Given the user question, the retriever returns the poisoned image (Steps 5–6), and the generator uses it as visual evidence to produce the attacker-desired answer (Step 7).
Figure 2: Attention gap between captioning and visual query answering in Qwen3-VL-4B. For the same rooster image, the captioning prompt leads the model to attend to global visual content, whereas the query “How many toes does a rooster have?” guides attention to the local foot region.
Figure 3: Cosine distance between clean and poisoned representations under P1 and P2, computed on 180 sampled clean-poisoned pairs.
Mcap
COCO
Flickr30k
1k
10k
30k
1k
10k
30k
Claude Sonnet 4.6
92.8%
85.2%
79.8%
97.9%
91.7%
88.0%
GPT-5.4
89.1%
77.9%
72.0%
96.0%
86.7%
80.2%
Qwen3.6-Plus
91.0%
82.1%
75.3%
97.5%
89.0%
82.5%
Llama 4 Maverick
82.9%
68.9%
60.8%
93.0%
78.0%
69.8%
Kimi-K2.6
92.5%
84.1%
79.1%
97.2%
90.2%
85.8%
Table 1: ASR-R for P1 with different Mcap .
Retriever
COCO
Flickr30k
1k
10k
30k
1k
10k
30k
clip-vit-base-patch16
88.65%
74.60%
66.75%
90.95%
78.97%
70.87%
siglip-large-patch16-256
92.62%
82.14%
76.75%
92.94%
82.38%
75.24%
Qwen3-VL-Embedding-2B
94.60%
88.57%
84.05%
96.90%
91.19%
87.70%
Table 2: ASR-R for P2 with three different retrievers.
Generator
Pipeline
COCO-30k
Flickr30k-30k
Min
Max
Min
Max
Claude Sonnet 4.6
P1
40.71%
55.87%
47.78%
61.98%
P2
46.35%
58.97%
49.60%
61.27%
GPT-5.4
P1
40.95%
56.67%
47.94%
62.62%
P2
47.22%
58.49%
49.60%
60.71%
Qwen3.6-Plus
P1
40.16%
55.71%
47.06%
62.06%
Table 3: End-to-end ASR on 30k knowledge bases.
Generator
Difficulty
ACC
ASR-G
POR
M(qi)
M(qi,{Iic})
M(qi,{Iip})
Claude Sonnet 4.6
Easy
75.4%
94.3%
62.4%
59.4%
Hard
24.8%
77.8%
76.7%
64.7%
Overall
50.1%
86.0%
69.5%
60.7%
GPT-5.4
Easy
83.8%
93.2%
64.3%
62.7%
Hard
27.8%
74.1%
75.9%
71.4%
Table 4: Generation results across difficulties.
Figure 4: Comparison between CHR and PIR. CHR is higher than PIR on easy instances, whereas PIR is higher than CHR on hard instances.
Generator
Color
Person
Layout
Count
Replace
Scene
Shape
Surface
Sign
Average
Claude Sonnet 4.6
85.7%
74.3%
56.4%
54.3%
83.6%
57.9%
56.4%
75.7%
81.4%
69.5%
GPT-5.4
90.7%
75.7%
53.6%
56.4%
81.4%
55.0%
59.3%
79.3%
79.3%
70.1%
Qwen3.6-Plus
80.7%
74.3%
51.4%
65.7%
84.3%
57.1%
60.0%
75.7%
77.1%
69.6%
Kimi-K2.6
92.1%
74.3%
52.9%
67.9%
83.6%
62.9%
65.0%
80.0%
79.3%
73.1%
Llama 4 Maverick
83.6%
72.1%
55.7%
53.6%
84.3%
60.7%
53.6%
78.6%
75.7%
68.7%
Qwen3.5-397B-A17B
88.6%
73.6%
53.6%
50.0%
80.7%
58.6%
60.7%
68.6%
78.6%
68.1%
Table 5: ASR-G across different edit types.
Side
Method
Input
Blocked
Image
TruFor
Iip
3.89%
Text
isValid
cip=Mcap(Iip)
22.78%
Table 6: Blocked rates under image-side and text-side filtering.
Figure 5: Text-side blocked rates across different poisoning attacks.
Generator
Top-1
Top-3
Δ ASR-G
Claude Sonnet 4.6
71.7%
63.3%
-8.3%
GPT-5.4
70.6%
60.0%
-10.6%
Qwen3.6-Plus
68.9%
63.9%
-5.0%
Kimi-K2.6
73.3%
67.2%
-6.1%
Llama 4 Maverick
71.7%
60.6%
-11.1%
Qwen3.5-397B-A17B
67.2%
63.9%
-3.3%
Table 7: ASR-G with top-1 vs. top-3 retrieved images.
Appendix figures & tables5 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Variant
Verifier Pass Rate
Full
134/180 (74.4%)
w/o Planner
105/180 (58.3%)
Appendix
Table 8: Planner ablation.
Variant
Samples
ASR-G
GPT-5.4
Qwen3.6-Plus
Full
134
73.9%
73.1%
w/o Verifier
180
60.0%
61.1%
Appendix
Table 9: Verifier ablation.
Type
Easy
Hard
Total
Percent
Color
367
672
1039
23.5%
Person
82
80
162
3.7%
Layout
72
103
175
4.0%
Count
375
446
821
18.6%
Replace
313
505
818
18.5%
Scene
120
101
221
5.0%
Appendix
Table 10: Statistics of the constructed poisoned image dataset across edit types.
Type
Description
Color
Changes the color of an object, region, or visual attribute.
Person
Modifies person-related attributes, such as pose, action, appearance, or identity cues.
Layout
Changes object position, orientation, or spatial arrangement.
Count
Changes the presence or number of objects or local details.
Replace
Substitutes one object, part, region, or entity with another.
Scene
Changes scene-level context, background, environment, or atmosphere.
Appendix
Table 11: Edit types for poisoned image construction.
Judgment Task
Sample Size
Cohen’s κ
Mverify(qi,aiadv,Iip)
100
0.73
M(qi)∼ai
120
0.90
M(qi,{Iic})∼ai
120
0.89
M(qi,{Iip})∼aiadv
120
0.89
Appendix
Table 12: Human agreement for automatic judgments.
Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has emerged as a powerful paradigm for enhancing multimodal large language models by grounding their responses in external, factual knowledge and thus mitigating hallucinations. However, the integration of externally sourced knowledge bases introduces a critical attack surface. Adversaries can inject malicious multimodal content capable of influencing both retrieval and downstream generation. In this work, we present MM-MEPA, a multimodal poisoning attack that targets the metadata components of image-text entries while leaving the associated visual content unaltered. By only manipulating the metadata, MM-MEPA can still steer multimodal retrieval and induce attacker-desired model responses. We evaluate the attack across multiple benchmark settings and demonstrate its severity. MM-MEPA achieves an attack success rate of up to 91% consistently disrupting system behaviors across four retrievers and two multimodal generators. Additionally, we assess representative defense strategies and find them largely ineffective against this form of metadata-only poisoning. Our findings expose a critical vulnerability in multimodal RAG and underscore the urgent need for more robust, defense-aware retrieval and knowledge integration methods.
Kennedy Edemacu, Mohammad Mahdi Shokri
The City University of New York, CSI, Staten Island, NY 10314, USA · The City University of New York, Graduate Center, New York, NY 10016, USA
Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) is a widely adopted paradigm for enhancing LLMs in medical applications by incorporating expert multimodal knowledge during generation. However, the underlying retrieval databases may naturally contain, or be intentionally injected with, adversarial knowledge, which can perturb model outputs and undermine system reliability. To investigate this risk, prior studies have explored knowledge poisoning attacks in medical RAG systems. Nevertheless, most of them rely on the strong assumption that adversaries possess prior knowledge of user queries, which is unrealistic in deployments and substantially limits their practical applicability. In this paper, we propose M\textsuperscript{3}Att, a knowledge-poisoning framework designed for medical multimodal RAG systems, assuming only limited distribution knowledge of the underlying database. Our core idea is to inject covert misinformation into textual data while using paired visual data as a query-agnostic trigger to promote retrieval. We first propose a unified framework that introduces imperceptible perturbations to visual inputs to manipulate retrieval probabilities. Besides, due to the prior medical knowledge in LLMs, naively poisoned medical content with explicit factual errors can be corrected during generation. Thus, we leverage the inherent ambiguity of medical diagnosis and design a covert misinformation injection strategy that degrades diagnostic accuracy while evading model self-correction. Experiments on five LLMs and datasets demonstrate that M\textsuperscript{3}Att consistently produces clinically plausible yet incorrect generations. Codes: https://github.com/ypr17/M3Att.
Peiru Yang, Haoran Zheng, Tong Ju +6
1Tsinghua University · 2Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications · 3Northwestern Polytechnical University +1
Multimodal agentic retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems expand the attack surface beyond prompt injection to include text poisoning, image injection, direct-query attacks, and orchestrator-level tool manipulation. Existing red-teaming approaches are typically surface-specific and often recycle known attack templates; on text-poisoning benchmarks we measure 73-84% exact duplication. We present MIRROR, a unified cross-surface framework that performs memory-guided Monte Carlo tree search while conditioning candidate generation on retrieved context under an explicit novelty constraint. A deterministic Novelty Gate rejects any candidate matching the retrieval set under normalized comparison, allowing retrieval to inform search priors without enabling prompt copying. Across four attack surfaces on a multimodal agentic RAG target, MIRROR attains 76% ASR on image poisoning compared with 52% for baselines, 97% ASR on orchestrator attacks at half the query cost, and the lowest cross-surface variance (coefficient of variation 0.47). In contrast, specialized baselines collapse across surfaces: suffix optimization reaches 79% ASR on text poisoning but 1% on direct queries. We release ART-SafeBench with 41,815 in-package records and runtime adapters yielding 41,991+ total records across four surfaces.