Can Legal AI Know When It Is Wrong? And Do Students Know When It Is?

Legal reasoning is not semantic similarity search. A court judgment encodes constrained symbolic reasoning: precedent propagation, procedural state transitions, and statute-bound inference. These are properties that vector-based retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) cannot faithfully represent. Hallucinated precedents, outdated statute citations, and unsupported reasoning chains remain persistent failure modes in LLM-based legal AI, with real consequences for access to justice in high-caseload jurisdictions such as India. This paper presents Falkor-IRAC, a graph-constrained generation framework for Indian legal AI that grounds generation in structured reasoning over an IRAC (Issue, Rule, Analysis, Conclusion) knowledge graph. Judgments from the Supreme Court and High Courts of India are ingested as IRAC node structures enriched with procedural state transitions, precedent relationships, and statutory references, stored in FalkorDB for low-latency agentic traversal. At inference time, LLM-generated answers are accepted only if a valid supporting path can be traced through the graph, a check performed by a falsifiability oracle called the Verifier Agent. The system also detects doctrinal conflicts as a first-class output rather than silently resolving them. Falkor-IRAC is evaluated using graph-native metrics: citation grounding accuracy, path validity rate, hallucinated precedent rate, and conflict detection rate. These metrics are argued to be more appropriate for legal reasoning evaluation than BLEU and ROUGE. On a proof-of-concept corpus of 51 Supreme Court judgments, the Verifier Agent correctly validated citations on completed queries and correctly rejected fabricated citations. Evaluation against vector-only RAG baselines is left for future work. The companion InIRAC dataset, 500+ structured Indian court judgments with IRAC annotations, is released alongside this paper.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to support legal practice, education, and research, yet their reliability in national legal systems outside the United States remains largely undocumented. We introduce an expert-validated benchmark for evaluating LLM reliability on the Colombian legal system. The benchmark comprises 1,042 items spanning ten areas of law and three question formats (closed multiple-choice, semi-open, and open-ended IRAC), built through a human-in-the-loop pipeline with multi-stage expert review. We evaluate 15 contemporary proprietary and open-weight models with format-appropriate metrics. Accuracy on closed questions ranges widely, from 0.905 (Gemini 3.1 Pro) to 0.577, but on free-text legal answers factual correctness never exceeds 0.45 (on a 0-1 scale) for any model. We find a dissociation between answer relevancy and correctness (Spearman rho = -0.46): models reliably sound responsive while frequently being wrong, a pattern of particular concern for non-expert users. Closed-question accuracy and free-text correctness are strongly rank-correlated (rho = 0.94), so cheap multiple-choice screening predicts model ranking but overstates absolute reliability. An independent rubric-based LLM judge and blind human expert scoring both reproduce the free-text ranking (rho >= 0.88). The judge further reveals that only about half of the norms models cite are correct; the rest are wrong or non-existent. Reliability varies systematically by legal area and follows an inverted-U across question complexity. Our results indicate that current LLMs require expert supervision for Colombian legal tasks, and that grounding answers in authoritative sources is a promising path to higher reliability. We release the benchmark construction pipeline to support reproducible evaluation.

In medicine, claims remain valid when supported by empirical evidence grounded in stable biological reality. In law, by contrast, truth is contingent, defined by jurisdiction, temporal validity, and the hierarchy of authoritative sources. The recent success of large language models (LLMs) on medical licensing examinations has encouraged an expectation of comparable legal competence. This analogy, however, obscures a critical distinction between domains. Unlike in medicine, legal performance often depends less on inference than on determining when external authority is applicable, valid, and non-contradictory. We introduce a comparative diagnostic framework evaluating legal reasoning against medical baselines along four axes (knowledge recall, grounding, confidence, and robustness), uncovering a sharp domain asymmetry when applied to a new benchmark that encodes temporal validity and normative relationships. While medical LLMs reliably benefit from verified sources, legal LLMs struggle to assess when retrieved citations are useful or misleading, exhibiting overconfidence in perturbed contexts and sensitivity to superficial formatting cues. Increased model scale amplifies this tendency, revealing that stronger instruction following can coincide with weaker resistance to authoritative perturbations. These findings show that LLMs treat law as unstructured text rather than binding precedent, while revealing a tendency to over-trust authoritative but false information when external references conflict with a model's internal knowledge.