The rise of agentic AI enables LLMs to access diverse user data, raising critical privacy concerns. Prior work on contextual privacy studies whether LLMs regulate information disclosure according to context-dependent norms. However, acceptable disclosure boundaries may vary across users even within the same context. To address this limitation, we introduce personalized privacy, which incorporates user-specific disclosure preferences into privacy control. We further present P3Bench~(Personalized Privacy Preservation Benchmark), a novel benchmark extending contextual privacy policies with personalized disclosure policies. Experiments show that prompt-based policies fail to reliably enforce personalized privacy policies, with Qwen2.5-7B and Gemma3-4B showing average policy ignorance ratios of 51.25% and 74.28%, respectively. Finally, to address this problem, we propose Repair, a robust inference-time attention head intervention method that adjusts disclosure behavior toward policy-consistent responses. Our method significantly improves adherence to user-specific privacy preferences by reducing cases where the model fails to follow the given policy.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Failure of Personalized Privacy Control. LLM agents may ignore the user’s privacy policy and disclose contextually appropriate sensitive information based on their own judgment during task execution.
State z
Task Requirement τ
Personal Policy p
Action a
Disclosure
✓
✓
Answer
Policy-Refusal
✓
✗
Refuse
Base-Refusal
✗
N/A
Refuse
Table 1: Comparison between disclosure states. Each state is distinguished based on the task τ and policy p .
Figure 2: Over-refusal (OR) and over-sharing (OS) rates across models and personal policies.
Figure 3: Policy Ignorance Ratio (PIR) across models and personal policies. High PIR indicates that direct prompting often fails to change the model’s disclosure behavior according to the prompted personal policy.
Figure 4: Average per-field PIR across personal policies. High-PIR fields indicate strong default priors that prompting struggles to override the model’s behavior.
Figure 5: AUROC heatmap for Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct under Preference-Open. Red boxes indicate the top- k=30 policy-relevant heads selected by disclosure-state probing. Full results are shown in figure 11 .
Figure 6: Overview of Repair . We first train head-level linear probes to predict the disclosure state zip , and select the Top- k heads with the highest AUROC scores as policy-relevant heads (§ 4.1 ). For the selected heads, we construct state-specific intervention vectors (§ 4.2 ). At inference time, Repair predicts the disclosure state by majority voting over the selected heads and applies a state-adaptive intervention during generation (§ 4.3 ).
Instruct Model
Method
Privacy-Max
Contact-Open
Health-Open
Preference-Open
OR ↓
OS ↓
PED ↓
OR ↓
OS ↓
PED ↓
OR ↓
OS ↓
PED ↓
OR ↓
OS ↓
PED ↓
Qwen2.5-3B
DP
67.06 ↓
23.65 ↓
71.11
73.53 ↓
25.23 ↓
77.74
57.82 ↓
10.61 ↓
58.79
29.83 ↓
16.86 ↓
34.26
CoT
8.24 ↓
35.12 ↑
36.07
36.97 ↓
37.23 ↑
52.47
30.76 ↓
27.41 ↑
41.20
24.79 ↓
31.90 ↑
40.40
CAST
3.53 ↓
29.35 ↑
29.56
55.04 ↓
30.56 ↑
62.95
36.81 ↓
15.71 ↑
40.02
23.11 ↓
21.32 ↑
31.44
AdaSteer
23.53 ↓
17.23 ↑
34.57
41.69 ↓
33.61 ↑
53.55
22.44 ↓
24.20 ↑
33.01
23.53 ↓
17.23 ↑
29.16
Repair
4.71 ↓
4.87 ↓
6.78
34.45 ↓
3.97 ↓
34.68
30.92 ↓
10.03 ↓
32.51
13.87 ↓
9.07 ↓
16.57
Table 2: Main results on policy-conditioned disclosure control. We report over-refusal ( OR ), over-sharing ( OS ), and Policy Error Distance (PED). Lower is better for all metrics. For OR and OS , arrows indicate changes relative to DP under the same model and policy: blue arrows ( ↓ ) indicate decreases, red arrows ( ↑ ) indicate increases, and gray dashes ( – ) indicate no change. Table 16 provides the 95% Confidence Intervals for each method.
Figure 7: Robustness to random field-level policies. Results are averaged over three policies for each number of accessible fields n . Repair consistently lowers OR, OS, and PED compared to Direct Prompting.
Policy
Method
OR ↓
OS ↓
PED ↓
Privacy-Max
DP
74.12
2.35
74.16
Random
56.47
2.81
56.54
AUROC-based
32.94
1.45
32.97
Contact-Open
DP
75.63
3.09
75.69
Random
54.20
4.15
54.36
AUROC-based
18.91
1.76
18.99
Table 3: Effect of policy-relevant head selection on Qwen2.5-7B . Lower PED across all policies indicates that AUROC-based heads are meaningful intervention targets for controlling disclosure behavior.
Figure 8: Functional roles of policy-relevant heads on Qwen2.5-3B . Top- k heads are categorized into four roles based on whether their disclosure and refusal detection rates exceed the corresponding mean rates ( δdis and δref ) computed across the top- k heads. The figure shows diverse head roles across policies, suggesting that personalized disclosure control relies on complementary head-level signals.
Policy
Method
OR ↓
OS ↓
PED ↓
Privacy-Max
Repair
4.71
4.87
6.78
Repair-G
4.71
1.25
4.87
Contact-Open
Repair
34.45
3.97
34.68
Repair-G
20.17
2.94
20.38
Health-Open
Repair
30.92
10.03
32.51
Repair-G
24.37
9.69
26.23
Table 4: Policy-agnostic calibration on Qwen2.5-3B. Repair-G calibrates policy-relevant heads using examples from multiple policies and remains competitive with policy-specific Repair .
Appendix figures & tables20 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Table 5: System prompt used in our personal privacy policy setting. The model is instructed to prioritize the user’s personal privacy policy over all other considerations and to output either the requested field value or the exact refusal string.
Table 6: User prompt template consisting of the task domain, scenario, privacy directive, and user question. The placeholders are instantiated for each example.
Model
Match (%)
Cohen’s κ
MCC
Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct
97.09
0.778
0.790
Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct
99.57
0.962
0.962
Gemma-3-4B-it
97.89
0.899
0.900
Appendix
Table 7: Agreement between the rule-based output classifier and an LLM judge, macro-averaged across the four policy conditions for each model.
Field
Privacy-Max
Contact-Open
Health-Open
Preference-Open
name
✓
✓
✓
✓
phone_number
✗
✓
✗
✗
email
✗
✓
✗
✗
age
✗
✗
✓
✗
current_physical_health_conditions
✗
✗
✓
✗
current_mental_health_conditions
✗
✗
✓
✗
Appendix
Table 8: Field-level accessibility for the four personal privacy policies used in our experiments. ✓ indicates accessibility and ✗ indicates denial. Row colors denote field categories: privacy (red), contact (blue), health (green), preference (purple), and vulnerable data (gray).
Table 9: LLM-based judge prompt used for disclosure evaluation. The judge determines whether the assistant response discloses the requested personal field either explicitly or implicitly.
Figure 9: Effect of the number of intervention heads k . Varying k changes the balance between OR and OS ; broader intervention is not always better for policy-conditioned disclosure control.
Figure 10: Effect of disclosure steering strength α . PED varies across steering coefficients, showing that the optimal steering strength depends on the model and personal privacy policy.
Figure 11: Full AUROC heatmaps for policy-relevant attention heads. AUROC scores are computed from head-level probes for each model-policy pair, and red boxes mark the top- k heads selected for intervention.
Model
Policy
α
k
Qwen2.5-3B
Privacy-Max
5.0
20
Contact-Open
2.0
30
Health-Open
5.0
50
Preference-Open
1.5
50
Qwen2.5-7B
Privacy-Max
10
10
Contact-Open
5.0
30
Appendix
Table 10: Hyperparameter settings used for each model and personal privacy policy. α denotes the steering coefficient, and k denotes the number of selected attention heads used for intervention.
Method
P.M
C.O
H.O
P.O
Avg.
DP
73.90
75.70
73.20
74.30
74.28
CoT
46.92
42.33
31.59
51.28
43.03
CAST
75.34
76.47
70.32
75.24
74.34
AdaSteer
70.19
70.12
66.36
64.53
67.80
Repair
47.40
29.00
30.75
44.60
37.94
Appendix
Table 11: Policy Ignorance Ratio (PIR) on Gemma-3-4B across different methods. P.M, C.O, H.O, and P.O denote Privacy-Max, Contact-Open, Health-Open, and Preference-Open, respectively. Repair also substantially reduces PIR relative to DP, supporting our claim that policy-ignorant behavior can be mitigated by alignment-oriented intervention methods.
Figure 12: Average field-wise PED across policies on Gemma-3-4B. Prompt-based baselines exhibit strong field-dependent variation, indicating that models often follow field-specific default disclosure/refusal tendencies rather than the user-specific policy. In contrast, Repair achieves consistently lower PED across most fields, suggesting more reliable policy-conditioned disclosure control.
Policy
Qwen2.5-3B
Qwen2.5-7B
State Acc
Behavior Acc
State Acc
Behavior Acc
Privacy-Max
98.70
95.56
99.60
98.01
Contact-Open
95.93
93.78
97.29
97.09
Health-Open
86.54
92.61
91.06
94.75
Preference-Open
91.20
98.91
92.93
98.45
Appendix
Table 12: State classification and disclosure behavior under Repair . High State Acc and Behavior Acc show that Repair reliably predicts disclosure states and translates them into policy-aligned behavior.
Field
n=4
n=8
n=16
0
1
2
0
1
2
0
1
2
name
✓
✗
✗
✗
✗
✓
✗
✓
✓
phone_number
✗
✗
✗
✗
✗
✓
✓
✗
✗
email
✓
✓
✗
✓
✗
✗
✗
✗
✓
age
✗
✗
✓
✗
✓
✗
✓
✗
✓
current_physical_health_conditions
✗
✗
✗
✗
✓
✗
✗
✗
✗
Appendix
Table 13: Field-level accessibility for randomly mixed personal privacy policies. Each group corresponds to the number of accessible fields n , and columns 0–2 denote random seeds. Unlike the predefined policies, accessible fields are intentionally sampled across diverse field categories, resulting in heterogeneous policy compositions. ✓ indicates accessibility and ✗ indicates denial. Row colors follow the same field categories as Table 8 .
Policy
Method
OR ↓
OS ↓
PED ↓
Privacy-Max
residual
65.88
8.32
66.40
mlp
63.53
16.4
65.61
attn-head
48.24
14.89
50.48
Contact-Open
residual
75.21
7.94
75.63
mlp
68.12
22.8
71.83
attn-head
55.46
1.46
55.48
Appendix
Table 14: Module-level comparison under an equal edited-dimensionality budget. Attention-head intervention consistently achieves the lowest PED, supporting sparse head-level control for personalized privacy.
Policy
Design
OR
OS
PED
Contact-Open
steering
70.59
16.65
72.52
patching
65.55
4.55
65.70
refuse-only
76.05
4.64
76.19
disclose-only
34.45
26.56
43.50
Repair
34.45
3.97
34.68
Health-Open
steering
31.09
13.06
33.72
Appendix
Table 15: Ablation on state-specific intervention design. Using patching for refusal states and steering for the Disclose state yields better policy-control behavior than using a single operator or intervening on only one side of the answer/refuse decision.
Instruct Model
Method
Privacy-Max
Contact-Open
Health-Open
Preference-Open
OR ↓
OS ↓
PED ↓
OR ↓
OS ↓
PED ↓
OR ↓
OS ↓
PED ↓
OR ↓
OS ↓
PED ↓
Qwen2.5-3B
DP
[57.07, 77.05]
[22.23, 25.06]
[61.67, 80.54]
[67.92, 79.13]
[23.75, 26.71]
[72.41, 83.06]
[53.85, 61.78]
[9.50, 11.72]
[54.87, 62.69]
[24.02, 35.64]
[15.58, 18.14]
[29.17, 39.37]
CoT
[2.39, 14.08]
[33.53, 36.71]
[34.03, 38.12]
[30.84, 43.11]
[35.58, 38.88]
[48.00, 56.95]
[27.05, 34.46]
[25.79, 29.02]
[38.23, 44.16]
[19.30, 30.28]
[30.31, 33.49]
[36.81, 43.99]
CAST
[0.00, 7.45]
[27.83, 30.87]
[27.99, 31.14]
[48.72, 61.36]
[28.99, 32.14]
[57.38, 68.54]
[32.93, 40.68]
[14.39, 17.02]
[36.42, 43.62]
[17.75, 28.46]
[19.92, 22.71]
[27.39, 35.49]
Repair
[0.20, 9.21]
[4.15, 5.59]
[3.60, 9.94]
[28.42, 40.49]
[3.31, 4.64]
[28.68, 40.68]
[27.21, 34.64]
[8.94, 11.12]
[28.96, 36.06]
[9.47, 18.26]
[8.09, 10.05]
[12.85, 20.28]
Qwen2.5-7B
DP
[64.81, 83.43]
[1.84, 2.85]
[64.85, 83.46]
[70.18, 81.08]
[2.50, 3.68]
[70.24, 81.14]
[37.55, 45.47]
[5.86, 7.67]
[38.15, 45.97]
[52.57, 65.08]
[3.84, 5.26]
[52.76, 65.23]
Appendix
Table 16: 95% confidence intervals for accuracy computed via non-parametric bootstrap over test instances.
Table 17: Full specification of the Privacy-Max policy.
Table 18: Full specification of the Contact-Open policy.
Table 19: Full specification of the Health-Open policy.
Table 20: Full specification of the Preference-Open policy.
AI agents acting on behalf of users are constantly making decisions, and for users to trust their agents, those decisions must align with what they actually want. Privacy is an important alignment problem for agents: every message, post, or tool call an agent makes is a contextual judgment about what is appropriate to share, with whom, and under which conditions. Because such judgments depend on social expectations and norms, human judgment does not merely label privacy violations but also helps define them. While existing work relies on unreliable proxies for both training and evaluation, we place human judgment at the center of agentic privacy alignment. We introduce PrivacyAlign, a dataset of 1,350 samples with 3,516 detailed annotations from 599 unique annotators across diverse scenarios where current LLMs actually leak, and use it to ground both alignment training and automated evaluation in human privacy norms. Building on these annotations, we first show that conditioning LLM judges on human annotations and explanations for reference responses to the same prompt makes their judgments more reliable. We then introduce annotation-conditioned reward modeling, which uses these annotations to score new responses during RL, and show that small open-weight agents trained with this reward better align with human privacy norms, with strong gains on PrivacyAlign and existing privacy benchmarks for agents.
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in privacy-critical and personalization-oriented scenarios, yet the role of context length in shaping privacy leakage and personalization effectiveness remains largely unexplored. We introduce a large-scale benchmark, PAPerBench, to systematically study how increasing context length influences both personalization quality and privacy protection in LLMs. The benchmark comprises approximately 29,000 instances with context lengths ranging from 1K to 256K tokens, yielding a total of 377K evaluation questions. It jointly evaluates personalization performance and privacy risks across diverse scenarios, enabling controlled analysis of long-context model behavior. Extensive evaluations across state-of-the-art LLMs reveal consistent performance degradation in both personalization and privacy as context length increases. We further provide a theoretical analysis of attention dilution under context scaling, explaining this behavior as an inherent limitation of soft attention in fixed-capacity Transformers. The empirical and theoretical findings together suggest a general scaling gap in current models -- long context, less focus. We release the benchmark to support reproducible evaluation and future research on scalable privacy and personalization. Code and data are available at https://github.com/SafeRL-Lab/PAPerBench
With the widespread deployment of public large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT, protecting user prompt privacy has become an increasingly critical issue. Existing privacy-preserving inference methods sacrifice either utility or efficiency, and often require model-specific modifications that limit their compatibility. In this paper, we propose SharedRequest, a model-agnostic framework for privacy-preserving LLM inference that reformulates privacy protection at the batch level rather than the individual-prompt level. The key idea is to obscure sensitive information by mixing original prompts with noisy variants, while grouping semantically equivalent instructions to amortize the inference cost over a large batch of queries with minimal impact on LLM response quality. This design is independent of the LLM architecture, requiring no access to model parameters or architectural modification. Empirical results demonstrate that SharedRequest achieves over 20% higher utility compared to prior differential privacy baselines, and its shared-prompt mechanism reduces query cost by up to 5× compared to non-batched inference.
Peihua Mai, Xuanrong Gao, Youlong Ding +3
1National University of Singapore (Chongqing) Research Institute · 2Chongqing Key Laboratory of Trusted Perception and Interaction Technology for Intelligent and Connected Vehicles, Chongqing, China · 3National University of Singapore +3