Utility Under Attack: Agent Memory Poisoning and the Limits of Content Screening and Provenance Ranking

Long-term memory lets large language model(LLM) agents reuse prior preferences and work flows, but it also turns untrusted observations into persistent action context. We identify memory provenance laundering: during LLM-based memory consolidation, an external observation may be rewritten as apparent user history or workflow support, preserving an action trigger while erasing the low-trust source that should limit its authority. Existing prompt filters, content sanitizers, and tool guards do not enforce source-authority non-amplification after lossy memory consolidation. We formalize this boundary and instantiate it as Provenance-Preserving Memory Fire wall (PPMF), a lightweight memory middleware that preserves platform-maintained provenance and authorizes tool calls by matching action risk to the authority of action-relevant memories. In our schema-grounded evaluation with fixed risk policies, vulnerable consolidated memories reach up to 1.000 attack success rate(ASR); with intact platform-maintained provenance, confirmation, and risk labels, no evaluated unauthorized high-risk action passes the PPMF gate while confirmed benign actions and targeted low-risk memory use remain executable.

LLM agents increasingly maintain long-term memory of user facts across sessions. Yet such memory is usually evaluated by aggregating accuracy over question rows or episodes. Because this approach scores question rows independently, even when several questions probe the same fact, it cannot show how that fact behaves as conditions change. We introduce MemTrace, a benchmark whose unit of measurement is the knowledge point: a single typed fact about the user, rather than an individual question. MemTrace probes each fact along three controlled dimensions: memory age, defined by how many sessions ago the fact appeared in the history; question type, covering current state, earlier state, and trajectory of change; and evidence condition, covering present, missing, and contradicted-by-false-premise settings. Evaluating 13 memory-system configurations across four paradigms, we find that similar pooled accuracy hides different failures: recovering a fact's current and earlier states does not imply tracking how it changed, and safe abstention does not imply correcting a false premise. The dominant bottleneck is evidence use, not retrieval: when systems fail, the evidence was retrievable 10 times more often than it was missing. These results suggest that improving long-term memory requires better use of reachable evidence, not simply more storage or retrieval.

Long-term-memory agents can retrieve relevant information that is inadmissible for the current request because it belongs to another principal, violates policy, or reflects an incompatible lifecycle state. Recall and final-answer accuracy do not reveal this: a route can appear safe by missing required evidence, while a correct answer may follow inadmissible prompt exposure. We introduce a retrieval-admissibility verification framework that assigns each memory-query pair one of three statuses (admissible, inadmissible, or unresolved), compares routes at matched required-evidence recall with bounds for unresolved cases, and tracks memory IDs through prompt exposure while linking exposure to target-level disclosure. We evaluate its stages on separate, non-pooled populations. A post-hoc top-20 reanalysis of frozen rankings from two public long-term-memory benchmarks, RHELM and MemOps, covers 3,767 queries. All released anchors lie within trusted query namespaces; with within-namespace scores unchanged, off-namespace filtering cannot lower their ranks. Top-20 anchor recall increases from 0.432 to 0.533, 80% recall feasibility from 0.237 to 0.311, and exact similarity evaluations decrease by 98.3%. In a frozen 72-case development diagnostic, a released-metadata reference preserves required evidence, whereas neither text-only verifier detects violations under the 1% required-anchor false-denial limit. Across 1,523 paired benchmark-native cases, namespace routing is associated with judged-accuracy gains of 0.053-0.068 across three readers; recall also changes, so this comparison is observational. In 16 controlled exposure scenarios, only one of four reader-specific 95% confidence intervals excludes zero for relevant-inadmissible literal disclosure (+0.156, 95% CI [0.031, 0.312]). Results motivate separate verification of candidate support, admissibility, prompt exposure, and answer disclosure.