Harmful content in German social media does real-world damage, from calls to action to criminal defamation. The GermEval 2026 shared task scores its detection in four subtasks. The technical challenge is a severe class imbalance. The harmful classes are rare and share surface language with the dominant majority class, yet under macro-F1 they decide the score. The decisive lever is then not a stronger single model but error independence. This insight becomes a per-subtask nine-voter ensemble spanning three orthogonal axes: LLM, training method and class scope. Selected mainly on internal cross-validation, the system reaches macro-F1 of 89.56 (C2A), 71.63 (DBO), 54.84 (VIO) and 83.02 (DEF) on the hidden test set, placing first on all four subtasks.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Per-subtask ensemble: three scope branches, three voters each, plain majority decides.
Subtask
Label
Train
Prior
+Aug
Prior +aug
C2A
false
14,405
90.9%
—
90.9%
true
1,434
9.1%
—
9.1%
DBO
nothing
13,818
87.2%
—
84.3%
criticism
1,839
11.6%
—
11.2%
agitation
143
0.9%
+400
3.3%
subversive
53
0.3%
+144
1.2%
Table 1: Per-subtask label counts. Prior is the label’s share before, Prior +aug after augmentation.
Figure 2: Both modes select the subtask by its prompt (dashed); ClsHead-G adds one head per subtask.
Sub.
V
Subtask
Voter composition
F1cvens
F1test
1
6
C2A
llamB-G-cls + min-G-cls
84.93
89.17
DBO
llamB-G-cls + min-G-cls
63.56
66.89
VIO
llamB-G-cls + min-G-cls
51.56
53.43
DEF
llamB-G-cls + min-G-cls
79.25
78.61
2
9
C2A
llamB-G-cls + min-G-cls + min-S-cls
86.00
89.08
DBO
llamB-G-cls + min-G-cls + min-S-cls
68.41
67.15
Table 2: Every submission per subtask, internal F1cvens against hidden-test F1test (%). V = voters per subtask, bold = per-subtask best per column, (na) = no augmentation.
Model
Method
GPU
s/tweet
llamB
ClsHead
RTX 2080 Ti
0.42
min
ClsHead
RTX 2080 Ti
0.79
phi4
ClsHead
RTX 2080 Ti
1.63
phi4
SFT
RTX 2080 Ti
2.42
llamB
SFT
RTX 2080 Ti
2.57
mis128
SFT
H200
0.91
Table 3: Measured per-voter inference latency, median seconds per tweet.
Figure 3: Core-voter agreement per winner, darker shades = more agreement, nine-voter Krippendorff’s α on top.
Figure 4: Third-branch flips among the n contested tweets per subtask (core ≤ 4/6). Black is the total flip rate.
Appendix figures & tables6 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
SFT
ClsHead
LoRA rank
32
16
LoRA α
64
32
LoRA dropout
0.05
0.05
Learning rate
1e−4
2e−5
LR schedule
cosine
cosine
Warmup ratio
0.1
—
Appendix
Table 4: Core training hyperparameters of the 7–14B models (4-bit NF4 QLoRA, no truncation). 128B deviations in the text.
Model
Method
f0
f1
f2
f3
f4
top3
min
Prompt (S)
62.48
61.70
62.15
62.03
62.44
62.36
min
SFT (S)
83.93
84.23
84.97
84.84
85.75
85.19
min
ClsHead (S)
86.13
85.34
86.03
84.36
85.30
85.83
phi4
Prompt (S)
75.59
73.61
73.67
75.24
74.75
75.19
phi4
SFT (S)
85.75
86.24
86.35
85.79
85.39
86.12
phi4
ClsHead (G)
85.85
86.49
85.84
84.48
86.24
86.19
Appendix
Table 5: C2A: per-fold CV5 macro- F1 (%), full-label scope in parentheses, best top3 bold.
Model
Method
f0
f1
f2
f3
f4
top3
min
Prompt (S)
18.42
18.59
18.41
17.49
17.82
18.47
min
SFT (S)
67.47
66.36
62.25
68.26
66.92
67.55
min
ClsHead (S)
66.11
68.80
65.57
66.49
64.95
67.13
phi4
Prompt (S)
33.91
33.63
36.39
33.17
31.85
34.64
phi4
SFT (S)
64.15
70.87
65.20
63.46
55.30
66.74
phi4
ClsHead (S)
69.20
68.50
66.55
61.77
67.54
68.41
Appendix
Table 6: DBO: per-fold CV5 macro- F1 (%), full-label scope in parentheses, best top3 bold.
Model
Method
f0
f1
f2
f3
f4
top3
min
Prompt (S)
33.56
35.73
27.08
31.50
34.29
34.53
min
SFT (S)
45.75
54.93
45.26
50.31
53.01
52.75
min
ClsHead (G)
48.98
55.96
54.46
47.66
56.87
55.76
phi4
Prompt (S)
19.72
20.32
17.90
20.92
21.95
21.06
phi4
SFT (S)
48.73
55.16
43.78
41.79
61.07
54.98
phi4
ClsHead (S)
51.96
53.75
49.14
48.27
55.60
53.77
Appendix
Table 7: VIO: per-fold CV5 macro- F1 (%), full-label scope in parentheses, best top3 bold.
Model
Method
f0
f1
f2
f3
f4
top3
min
Prompt (S)
50.83
52.95
51.98
51.26
51.98
52.30
min
SFT (S)
76.09
80.61
79.12
77.57
82.34
80.69
min
ClsHead (S)
79.18
79.12
80.90
82.50
82.44
81.95
phi4
Prompt (S)
67.01
67.14
69.23
66.01
66.59
67.80
phi4
SFT (S)
79.41
78.88
80.56
81.03
82.52
81.37
phi4
ClsHead (S)
78.37
78.67
80.02
83.09
82.90
82.01
Appendix
Table 8: DEF: per-fold CV5 macro- F1 (%), full-label scope in parentheses, best top3 bold.
Figure 5: Per-subtask t-SNE of the untrained 128B last-token hidden states, with the rare positive classes overlapping off the shelf.
The rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has increased the need for reliable detection of LLM-generated text, especially in realistic Chinese scenarios involving human-written text (HWT), LLM-generated text (LGT), and LLM-refined text (HLT). This paper presents EVIL-Detect, a multi-signal ensemble framework with conflict-aware fusion for NLPCC 2026 Shared Task 6. The system integrates edit-extent regression, zero-shot likelihood-contrast signals, lexical statistics, and conservative text rules. With calibrated decision boundaries and conflict-aware integration, our system improves robustness under strong out-of-distribution shifts, achieving a macro-F1 score of 0.8888 and ranking first in the official evaluation. Our code is available at https://github.com/bbbbhrrrr/evildetect.
Hongrui Bao, Hangyu Rong, Zhuoshang Wang +2
Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China · School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
ArGuard is a shared task on harmful content detection in Arabic memes and LLM prompts. It includes two tracks: Track A focuses on multimodal hate detection in Arabic memes, while Track B addresses harmful prompt detection for Arabic LLM safety evaluation. In total, 58 teams registered, 35 participated in the final evaluation, and 27 submitted system-description papers. Participating teams explored models such as AraBERT, Jais, and Qwen3-VL. The best systems achieved macro-F1 scores of 0.823 on A1, 0.419 on A2, 0.984 on B1, and 0.790 on B2. Fine-grained meme classification in A2 was the most challenging setting, partly due to sparse labels and train-test distribution shifts.
Firoj Alam, Md. Rafiul Biswas, Mohamed Bayan Kmainasi +5
Qatar Computing Research Institute, Qatar · Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Qatar · APAVI.AI, France +1
Detecting harmful content in Arabic is challenging because of dialectal variations and the semantic overlap between different harm categories. This paper presents a two-stage approach for classifying Arabic user prompts into seven categories of harmful content. First, GLiNER is used to extract harm-related entities from each prompt. The extracted entities are then added to the original text and passed to a fine-tuned MARBERT classifier for final classification. The approach combines explicit entity information with the contextual understanding of a pretrained Arabic language model. The system was evaluated on the development set of the ArGuard 2026 shared task. The results achieved a macro-F1 score of 0.886 and an accuracy of 0.897, demonstrating promising performance in fine-grained harmful content detection. The system reported an accuracy of 0.793 and Macro-F score of 0.735 on a blind test set for subtask 1. For subtask 2, it achieved an accuracy of 0.770 and Macro-F score of 0.754. The analysis also showed that distinguishing between related categories remains challenging. These findings suggest that integrating NER with Arabic language models is a promising approach to harmful content detection.
Ahmed M. Fetouh, Mariam Labib, Nsrin Ashraf +2
Faculty of Computers and Artificial Intelligence, Benha University, Egypt · Computer Engineering, Elsewedy University of Technology, Cairo, Egypt · College of Engineering, Wadi Ad Dwaser, Prince Sattam Bin Abdulaziz University, KSA