Toward Sub-1 kB Identity-Preserving Face Compression: A Benchmark of Codecs, a Custom Learned Codec, and Studies of Resolution, Demographic Fairness, Recompression, and Adversarial Robustness

ICAO-compliant machine readable travel documents enable automated biometric face verification. The biometric reference is stored on an RFID chip included in form of a JPEG or JPEG 2000 compressed facial image. In contrast, temporary travel documents lack of machine readability, which excludes the owner from such automated processes. This disadvantage could be solved by equipping such documents with 2D barcodes. This technology offers a resource-saving alternative to expensive RFID chips, while still offering machine readability and fast issuing processes. However, this solution introduces the challenge of storing the face images at significantly smaller storage capacities, creating the need for reducing the file size of the included facial image to a maximum of 1024 bytes. This study examines preprocessing steps and compression configurations, using JPEG, JPEG 2000, JPEG XL, JPEG AI, HEIF, AVIF, and WebP for image compression to this target size, while still preserving as much face recognition performance as possible. While the reference sample must always comply with ICAO specifications, the individual samples may or may not meet these requirements, depending on the application. This work optimizes compression steps for both of these prerequisites. It is shown that the recently standardised JPEG AI, when using optimized settings, provides the best face recognition performance, in particular when the comparison includes only images with high face image quality. AVIF and WebP also provide good results. The losses caused by the strong lossy compression are comparatively small. For the comparison of ICAO-compliant face images only, converting the images to grayscale proves to be a helpful preprocessing step, whereas for comparisons involving less suitable samples, preserving color is preferable. In addition, smoothing and resizing the images beforehand also turns out to be beneficial.

Frozen visual embeddings (e.g., CLIP, DINOv2/v3, SSCD) power retrieval and integrity systems, yet their use on face-containing data is constrained by unmeasured identity leakage and a lack of deployable mitigations. We take an attacker-aware view and contribute: (i) a benchmark of visual embeddings that reports open-set verification at low false-accept rates, a calibrated diffusion-based template inversion check, and face-context attribution with equal-area perturbations; and (ii) propose a one-shot linear projector that removes an estimated identity subspace while preserving the complementary space needed for utility, which for brevity we denote as the identity sanitization projection ISP. Across CelebA-20 and VGGFace2, we show that these encoders are robust under open-set linear probes, with CLIP exhibiting relatively higher leakage than DINOv2/v3 and SSCD, robust to template inversion, and are context-dominant. In addition, we show that ISP drives linear access to near-chance while retaining high non-biometric utility, and transfers across datasets with minor degradation. Our results establish the first attacker-calibrated facial privacy audit of non-FR encoders and demonstrate that linear subspace removal achieves strong privacy guarantees while preserving utility for visual search and retrieval.

Frequency features and compression-invariant representation learning are widely assumed to be key to deepfake detection that survives video compression. We test this with CAFRL - block-DCT and FFT-phase streams, compression-level-conditioned band attention, and adversarial (gradient-reversal) compression invariance - and report a controlled negative. Under a pre-registered protocol with capacity- and augmentation-matched controls, a plain EfficientNet-B0 on multi-quality data beat CAFRL as specified at every compression level on the FaceForensics++ test split, by 3.66 AUC points at CRF 40 (paired, single seed). A self-audit of our own negative found four defects biased against the frequency hypothesis, and pre-specified re-tests repairing all four showed the deficit to be a recipe artifact, not an architecture failure: the baseline recipe recovered 3.96 points over the matching shipped-recipe variant. The frequency path made no detectable difference: discriminative alone (standalone validation AUC 0.91-0.98 late in training) but of no marginal value under this fusion, at two feature widths of one 4.0 M trunk, every seed-pooled interval for the intra-dataset compression contrasts including zero; on the single held-out manipulation tested, the fair variants sat below the plain backbone. The adversarial branch, as specified, added nothing and degraded its own conditioning estimator; at the fair recipe it is untested. Robustness under single-pass H.264 re-encoding came instead from data diversity: real constant-rate-factor variants beat synthetic JPEG augmentation by 7.3 points (single runs, non-overlapping intervals). The evidence is FaceForensics++-family, GAN-era and single-codec. Match controls on training recipe as well as capacity, and buy compression robustness with codec diversity before architecture.