TRACE: An Evidence-Grounded Benchmark for Safety Evaluation of Large Reasoning Models

Large reasoning models (LRMs) produce complex, multi-step reasoning traces, yet safety evaluation remains focused on final outputs, overlooking how harm emerges during reasoning. When jailbroken, harm does not appear instantaneously but unfolds through distinct behavioral steps such as suppressing refusal, rationalizing compliance, decomposing harmful tasks, and concealing risk. However, no existing benchmark captures this process at sentence-level granularity within reasoning traces -- a key step toward reliable safety monitoring, interventions, and systematic failure diagnosis. To address this gap, we introduce HarmThoughts, a benchmark for step-wise safety evaluation of reasoning traces. \ourdataset is built on our proposed harm taxonomy of 16 harmful reasoning behaviors across four functional groups that characterize how harm propagates rather than what harm is produced. The dataset consists of 56,931 sentences from 1,018 reasoning traces generated by four model families, each annotated with fine-grained sentence-level behavioral labels. Using HarmThoughts, we analyze harm propagation patterns across reasoning traces, identifying common behavioral trajectories and drift points where reasoning transitions from safe to unsafe. Finally, we systematically compare white-box and black-box detectors on the task of identifying harmful reasoning behaviours on HarmThoughts. Our results show that existing detectors struggle with fine-grained behavior detection in reasoning traces, particularly for nuanced categories within harm emergence and execution, highlighting a critical gap in process-level safety monitoring. HarmThoughts is available publicly at: https://huggingface.co/datasets/ishitakakkar-10/HarmThoughts

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) leverage explicit reasoning traces, known as Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning, to decompose complex problems into intermediate steps before deriving final answers. However, these reasoning traces introduce unique safety challenges: harmful content can be embedded in intermediate steps even when final answers appear benign. Our study reveals that existing state-of-the-art moderation tools experience significant performance degradation on CoT moderation, with F1 scores dropping by up to 35.2% compared to traditional answer moderation. To address these challenges, we present ReasoningShield, a comprehensive benchmark and a suite of strong lightweight models for CoT safety moderation. Our benchmark includes 9.2K annotated (Query, CoT) pairs with structured stepwise risk analysis, consisting of a 7K-sample training set and a 2.2K human-annotated test set, spanning 10 risk categories, 3 safety levels, and 8 LRMs with diverse reasoning paradigms. To further demonstrate the utility of the benchmark, we develop lightweight models with 1B/3B parameters using a two-stage training strategy. Our models achieve 91.8% F1 on our benchmark, substantially outperforming leading tools such as LlamaGuard-4 by 35.6% and commercial models such as GPT-4o by 15.8%, while generalizing effectively across diverse reasoning paradigms and unseen scenarios. Resources are publicly available: Project Page: https://cosmosyi.github.io/ReasoningShield/, Code: https://github.com/CosmosYi/ReasoningShield, Models: https://huggingface.co/ReasoningShield/models, and Dataset: https://huggingface.co/datasets/ReasoningShield/ReasoningShield-Dataset.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) increasingly expose chain-of-thought-like reasoning for transparency, verification, and deliberate problem solving. This creates a safety blind spot: harmful or policy-violating content may appear in reasoning traces even when final answers appear safe. We test whether final-answer safety is a sufficient proxy for the full reasoning-answer trajectory by scoring both stages under a unified twenty-principle safety rubric. Using prompts from seven public harmfulness and jailbreak sources, plus four out-of-distribution (OOD) sources, we evaluate 15 open-weight and API-based LRMs across 41K prompts per model. Reasoning traces consistently reveal additional safety risks beyond final answers, especially in high-severity stage-wise failures: leak cases, where unsafe reasoning precedes a safe-looking answer, and escape cases, where benign-looking reasoning precedes an unsafe final response. Principle-level analysis shows that risk concentrates in misinformation, legal compliance, discrimination, physical harm, and psychological harm. We further propose adaptive multi-principle steering, a white-box test-time mitigation that learns one unsafe-to-safe activation direction per safety principle and activates only directions whose current hidden state is closer to the unsafe than safe centroid. On three steerable open reasoning models, adaptive steering reduces unsafe counts in both reasoning traces and final answers on held-out and OOD benchmarks. DeepSeek-R1-Qwen-7B achieves a 40.8% average unsafe-count reduction while retaining 97.7% macro-averaged accuracy on BBH, GSM8K, and MMLU. These results suggest that LRM safety should be evaluated and mitigated over the full exposed reasoning-answer trajectory, not only at the final-answer stage.