Capacity Overflow: A Blind Spot for Backdoor Attacks in Vision MoE
Organizations: Northeastern University, Boston MA 02115, USA · Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge LA 70802, USA
Abstract
Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) has become a prevalent paradigm for scaling Vision Transformers efficiently. To ensure computational scalability and prevent expert overload, Vision MoE architectures employ a capacity-bounded token dispatch mechanism, where each expert's processing budget depends on the inference batch size. This work identifies this batch-dependent behavior as an overlooked attack surface, and proposes a stealthy supply-chain backdoor attack that exploits this property through a three-phase framework. First, we inject a backdoor into an early MoE layer. Second, we train a neutralizer in a deeper MoE layer that suppresses the backdoor under normal capacity. Third, we configure a batch-adaptive capacity factor that preserves high capacity for small batches while reducing it for large batches, naturally disabling the neutralizer via token overflow at deployment-scale batch sizes. The attack remains in dormant mode during small-batch security audits and enters activation mode during large-batch deployment. Experiments on V-MoE and Swin-MoE across ImageNet-100 and GTSRB demonstrate activation-mode attack success rates of 76-87% with dormant-mode ASR below 9%, while evading Neural Cleanse, STRIP, Fine-Pruning, and Activation Clustering. Our findings reveal a fundamental security risk arising from batch-dependent execution in scalable Vision MoE architectures.
Figures & tables
| Model | Dataset | BD Layer | Neut. Layer | Train | Deploy |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V-MoE | ImageNet-100 | layer_1 | layer_5 | 1.05 | (0.30, 0.80) |
| V-MoE | GTSRB | layer_1 | layer_5 | 1.05 | (0.30, 0.80) |
| Swin-MoE | ImageNet-100 | s2_b3 | s2_b5 | 1.05 | (0.30, 0.80) |
| Swin-MoE | GTSRB | s2_b3 | s2_b5 | 1.05 | (0.20, 0.80) |
| Model | Dataset | Baseline | Clean Acc | Dormant ASR | Activation ASR | Drop |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V-MoE | IN-100 | 76.0% | 74.7% | 8.9% | 87.0% | 1.3pp |
| V-MoE | GTSRB | 88.3% | 87.6% | 8.4% | 81.6% | 0.7pp |
| Swin | IN-100 | 83.3% | 82.3% | 3.1% | 83.6% | 1.0pp |
| Swin | GTSRB | 95.6% | 95.0% | 8.5% | 76.1% | 0.6pp |
| Config | NC (AI) | STRIP (%) | Fine-Pruning | Act.Clustering (sil./purity) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| V-MoE + IN100 | ✓ 1.94 | ✓ 4.5 | ✓ | ✓ 0.124/0.748 |
| V-MoE + GTSRB | 2.05 | ✓ 3.5 | ✓ | ✓ 0.133/0.771 |
| Swin + IN100 | ✓ 1.37 | ✓ 9.0 | ✓ | ✓ 0.166/0.736 |
| Swin + GTSRB | 2.62 | ✓ 4.0 | ✓ | ✓ 0.258/0.722 |
| V-MoE | Swin-MoE | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Std. | Asc. | Std. | Asc. | |||
| 0.10 | 93.8 | 97.2 | +3.4 | 81.3 | 96.8 | +15.5 |
| 0.20 | 83.8 | 94.2 | +10.4 | 58.8 | 90.9 | +32.1 |
| 0.30 | 69.4 | 87.0 | +17.6 | 42.0 | 83.6 | +41.6 |
| 0.50 | 36.8 | 55.3 | +18.4 | 16.6 | 63.0 | +46.4 |
| 0.80 | 8.9 | 14.8 | +5.9 | 3.1 | 34.3 | +31.2 |
Backdoor Attacks
Backdoor attacks implant hidden, trigger-dependent behaviors in models while aiming to preserve normal performance.
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