Machine unlearning aims to make a model forget specific data, yet unlearned LLMs often fail to stay unlearned: brief fine-tuning can revive removed knowledge. Existing robustness predictors rely on global weight-space displacement, but distance alone can be misleading when random or destructive updates collapse performance. We argue that relearning robustness depends on update structure: robust unlearning should affect forget-critical weights while sparing retain-critical ones. We introduce the Forget-Retain Alignment Gap (FRAG), a training-free predictor that scores an update's forget-retain alignment without running a relearning attack, and separates selective from dense updates more reliably than global distance. Building on the forget-critical, retain-sparing principle, Forget-Retain Pruning (FRP) improves relearning robustness. Our results suggest that weight selectivity better explains robustness than distance alone. Code is available at https://github.com/Yi1-Chen/FRAG.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Illustration of global L2 and FRAG as attack-free predictors of relearning robustness. Large L2 can falsely suggest robustness when edits hit retain-critical weights, while small L2 can miss robust forget-critical edits. FRAG captures both cases by measuring whether updates target forget-critical while sparing retain-critical weights.
Figure 2: Curves are normalized by their own mean/std across unlearned checkpoints and noise controls. Global ℓ2 and individual cosine terms peak on utility-collapsed perturbations, while FRAG peaks on the low-ES, retain-sparing FRP checkpoint.
Global ℓ2
FRAG
all
w/o
all
w/o
1B
−0.56
−0.36
−0.92
−0.85
3B
−0.17
+0.13
−0.72
−0.71
Pooled
−0.36
−0.10
−0.78
−0.74
Table 3: Spearman ρ between each predictor and Δ ES under the forget+retain relearning attack, over healthy checkpoints only (5 methods × 3 splits × 2 models; n=30 pooled). Collapsed and noise controls are excluded. More negative is better; “w/o” drops all FRP checkpoints ( n=24 ) to rule out circularity.
Appendix figures & tables12 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Component
Setting
FRP
Sparsity
3% (MLP only)
β
0.05
Damage mode
zero out ( W′=0 )
Calibration
400 seq × 256 tok
Precision
bf16 ( ≤ 3B), fp16 (7B+)
Setup
Baselines
OpenUnlearning defaults
Appendix
Table 4: FRP and infrastructure settings used across all benchmarks. Attack and evaluation protocols are in Appendix B.2 .
lr
gold
RMU
NPO
FRP
pre-attack
.060/.593
.035/.581
.085/.568
.062/.405
5e−6
.062/.590
.047/.584
.104/.565
.095/.467
1e−5
.068/.588
.461/.587
.137/.576
.120 /.484
2e−5
.103/.582
.611/.592
.259/.590
.178 /.499
5e−5
.135/.541
.358/.550
.270/.550
.207 /.474
1e−4
.109/.446
.134/.445
.134/.442
.129 /.337
Appendix
Table 10: Relearning attack across learning rates (forget+retain attack set, 1 epoch, AdamW), as attacked ES / utility; lower ES means less recovery. Recovery is negligible at 5e−6 ; from 1e−5 to 5e−5 , FRP has lower attacked ES than NPO and RMU. At 1e−4 every method loses substantial utility.
Optimizer
gold
RMU
NPO
FRP
pre-attack
.060/.593
.035/.581
.085/.568
.062/.405
AdamW
.109/.446
.134/.445
.134/.442
.129/.337
SGD
.059/.592
.035/.581
.091/.571
.064/.416
SGD+mom.
.060/.592
.035/.574
.096/.571
.076/.439
Adafactor
.083/.297
.088/.274
.086/.280
.079/.108
Adagrad
.083/.583
.597/.590
.208/.586
.137 /.489
Appendix
Table 11: Relearning attack across optimizers (forget+retain attack set, 1 epoch, lr 1e−4 ), as attacked ES / utility. SGD recovers nothing—every method, including the retain-trained gold model, stays at its pre-attack ES—and Adafactor collapses utility for all methods, so neither probes robustness. “SGD+mom.” uses momentum 0.9. Adagrad is the only additional effective attack, and there FRP remains far less recovered than RMU and NPO.
Attack set
gold
RMU
NPO
FRP
pre-attack
.060/.593
.035/.581
.085/.568
.062/.405
retain only
.059/.594
.039/.598
.097/.585
.099/.485
forget only
.066/.573
.038/.576
.093/.535
.090/.437
forget+retain
.068/.588
.461/.587
.137/.576
.120 /.484
paraphrase
.065/.572
.037/.576
.084/.520
.075/.425
50/50 mix
.067/.568
.087/.567
.111/.544
.101/.452
Appendix
Table 12: Relearning attack across attack-data mixtures (1 epoch, lr 1e−5 , AdamW), as attacked ES / utility. Single-source and indirect mixtures recover little; “paraphrase” rewrites the forget set and “50/50 mix” balances forget and retain; forget+retain is the strongest attack, and it is there that FRP shows the lowest attacked ES among the unlearned models.
Horizon
gold
RMU
NPO
FRP
pre-attack
.060/.593
.035/.581
.085/.568
.062/.405
1 ep
.068/.588
.461/.587
.137/.576
.120 /.484
2 ep
.084/.588
.649/.594
.200/.584
.161 /.496
3 ep
.097/.586
.792/.596
.255/.584
.203 /.502
5 ep
.126/.585
.936/.596
.404/.585
.318 /.508
10 ep
.365/.575
.999/.587
.820/.566
.752 /.504
Appendix
Table 13: Relearning attack across fine-tuning horizons (forget+retain attack set, lr 1e−5 , AdamW), as attacked ES / utility. FRP stays less recovered than NPO and RMU at every horizon; after 10 epochs RMU reaches .999 and NPO .820 while FRP remains at .752.
forget01
forget05
forget10
utility ≈0.52
RMU
.486
.279
.304
FRP
.101
.086
.156
utility ≈0.45
RMU
—
.263
.228
FRP
.052
.056
.075
Appendix
Table 14: Δ ES at matched utility (TOFU-1B, forget+retain attack, 1 epoch). Each method’s strength knob is swept—steering coefficient for RMU, sparsity for FRP—and checkpoints are grouped into utility bands; “—” marks a band with no RMU checkpoint. Within every band where both methods appear, utilities differ by at most 0.01 or FRP’s is higher, and FRP recovers 1.9 – 4.9× less.
Method
pre-ES
pre-utility
Δ ES
Retain (gold)
0.060
0.593
+0.008
RMU
0.056
0.577
+0.644
GradDiff
0.082
0.442
+0.430
NPO
0.096
0.402
+0.300
SP
0.131
0.499
+0.144
FRP
0.062
0.408
+0.059
Appendix
Table 15: Forgetting strength on forget10 , compared against the gold pre-attack ES (0.060). FRP lands closest to the gold level (0.062) and still recovers the least; RMU forgets even more deeply (0.056) yet recovers about ten times as much.
Budget
Method
pre-ES
pre-utility
Δ ES
2.5%
SP
0.274
0.539
+0.173
2.5%
FRP
0.068
0.434
+0.067
5%
SP
0.131
0.499
+0.144
5%
FRP
0.050
0.315
+0.043
Appendix
Table 16: Matched sparsity: FRP and SP remove the same fraction of MLP weights. At equal budget FRP reaches 2.6 – 4.0× lower pre-attack ES and 2.6 – 3.3× lower Δ ES. Its lower utility at the same budget reflects a stronger intervention, which is why we also report the matched-utility comparison in Table 14 .
Edit
∥ΔW∥2
pre-ES
pre-utility
Δ ES
SP 2.5%
86.3
0.274
0.539
+0.173
FRP 1.5%
89.1
0.090
0.483
+0.079
SP 5%
120.1
0.131
0.499
+0.144
FRP 4%
122.8
0.054
0.366
+0.049
Appendix
Table 17: Matched update norm: FRP and SP compared at near-identical ℓ2 update magnitudes (gaps ≤3% ). FRP reaches 2.4 – 3.0× lower pre-attack ES and 2.2 – 2.9× lower Δ ES, so displacement magnitude alone does not explain the gain.
Importance term
Requires
ρ
Fisher g2
backward
+0.57
Influence surrogate
backward
+0.25
Hessian HjjW2 (OBD)
backward
−0.79
Integrated grad. ∣Wgˉ∣
backward
−0.84
Activation ∣W∣∣Xf∣ (FRAG)
forward
−0.92
Appendix
Table 18: Replacing only FRAG’s importance term, evaluated on the same 15 TOFU-1B checkpoints and attack as Table 3 . Negative is the correct sign. Fisher and the influence surrogate get the sign wrong; the Hessian and integrated-gradient variants are weaker and need backward passes. The activation-based term is both the strongest and the only forward-only choice.
Family
Checkpoints
Bf
Dense methods and FRP
42
0.000
SP ( 2.5 – 15% )
4
0.076 – 0.387
Appendix
Table 19: Linear mode connectivity barrier Bf between θ0 and the unlearned model, ported from Siddiqui et al. (2025) to TOFU-1B. Dense methods are GradDiff, NPO and RMU. For every healthy non-SP checkpoint the loss curve shows no upward bump at all, so there is nothing to rank by; only SP produces nonzero barriers, and there FRAG gives the same ordering.
Method
Utility ↑
pre-ES ↓
Δ ES ↓
GradDiff
0.048
0.008
+0.313
RMU
0.496
0.084
+0.205
SP
0.432
0.085
+0.072
FRP
0.379
0.059
+0.067
Appendix
Table 20: Cross-benchmark check on MUSE-News (LLaMA-2-7B, retain-ROUGE utility, gold =0.557 ; retain-only relearning attack, 1 epoch). GradDiff collapses in utility; among the utility-preserving methods FRP has the lowest Δ ES.
Making large language models (LLMs) deeply forget specific knowledge and values without sacrificing general capabilities remains a central challenge in unlearning. Current methods are easily reversed by fine-tuning or few-shot prompting, suggesting their forgetting is only shallow. We identify the root cause. Existing methods target representations shared with both the retain set and the subspace recovered by a fine-tuning attacker, making unlearning both disruptive to general capabilities and easy to reverse. We propose RepSelect (Representation Selectivity), which isolates forget-set-specific representations by collapsing top principal components of weight gradients before each update, leaving general capabilities intact while limiting what fine-tuning can recover. We evaluate across two forget categories, biohazardous knowledge and abusive tendencies, and four model families spanning dense and Mixture-of-Experts architectures (Llama 3, Qwen 3.5, Gemma 4 E4B, DeepSeek V2 Lite). Compared to five popular baselines (GradDiff, NPO, SimNPO, RMU, UNDIAL), RepSelect achieves a 4-50x larger reduction in post-relearning answer accuracy than the strongest baseline, and is near-perfectly robust to few-shot prompting attacks. Targeting selective representations is thus an important step towards deep and robust LLM forgetting.
Large Language Model (LLM) unlearning is often evaluated primarily by target suppression and clean retain utility. These metrics can miss a local failure mode: a model may perform well on standard retain prompts, yet degrade on benign reasoning when prompts lie near the forgotten domain. This phenomenon is termed forget-adjacent utility loss. A fundamental question is: where should forget representations go after they leave the removed behavior? Successful unlearning depends not only on whether forget-conditioned representations depart from the harmful computation, but also on the direction in which they are redirected afterward. We propose RA2 (Retain-Anchored Attraction), a latent-space unlearning method that redirects forget-token states toward nearby retain-supported representations while preserving higher-layer behavior on retain data. On WMDP and MUSE, RA2 yields higher forget-adjacent utility than strong unlearning baselines at similar broad-utility levels. These results show that the migration direction of forget representations materially affects benign behavior near the forget boundary. Our code is available at https://github.com/ZacLing/retain_anchored_attraction.
Zinan Ling, Yang Xiao, Ruimeng Ye +2
The University of Tulsa · Michigan State University
Unlearning aims to remove selected knowledge from large language models to mitigate privacy and safety risks while preserving useful capabilities. For models that continue to be fine-tuned after release, this goal is insufficient: they must also resist relearning the deleted knowledge while preserving plasticity, the ability to learn new tasks. Existing defenses train against simulated relearning while trying to preserve useful capabilities, but low relearning alone cannot distinguish selective resistance from a general loss of plasticity. Evaluating preservation after an update requires deciding what the updated model should remain close to. A pre-update reference penalizes useful changes induced by the update simply because they depart from earlier outputs. We therefore formulate the reference-timing hypothesis that, at comparable target suppression, an update-matched reference better preserves plasticity than a pre-update one. To test and address this hypothesis, we propose Update-Matched Unlearning (UMU), which applies the same simulated relearning update to the defended model and to an undefended reference initialized from the same unlearned model, and uses new-task learning to guide model selection. Extensive experiments on TOFU and FaithUn with Llama and Qwen models show that UMU improves both relearning resistance and plasticity across all three base unlearning methods, lowering harmful and benign relearning by 30.4 and 9.9 points on average while raising new-task accuracy by 3.5 points. When the reference does not receive the update, relearning remains similarly low but new-task accuracy falls below the base method, supporting the reference-timing hypothesis and showing that robust unlearning should prevent recovery selectively without suppressing learning itself.
Jie Li, Youming Tao, Bowei He +1
University of Massachusetts Boston · Technische Universität Berlin · Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence