Defending Wearable VLMs Against Private Attribute Inference
Organizations: Swanson School of Engineering, University of Pittsburgh · North Allegheny Senior High · College of Engineering, Michigan State University · Department of Computer Science, University of Central Florida
Abstract
Wearable VLM pipelines promise continuous multimodal assistance from egocentric visual capture: a user asks a task-driven question about the surrounding scene, and the system uses compact visual tokens to support language reasoning. The challenge motivating this work is that the same egocentric evidence needed for useful assistance can also reveal private attributes about the wearer or nearby bystanders. We investigate this as a joint privacy-utility problem for split VLM inference, where visual encoding occurs within a trusted device boundary but intermediate visual tokens may be transmitted to downstream reasoning components. This exposes an understudied leakage surface: even when final textual responses are benign, external attackers or untrusted downstream components can recover private attributes from transmitted visual tokens. To evaluate this tension, we construct a paired privacy-utility benchmark with 3,221 image-question records, each paired with a utility question and privacy labels covering location, income, sex, and interests. We further propose Token-Guided Attribute Privacy (TGAP), a pre-LLM token disentangler that learns a residual transformation of visual tokens before they leave the trusted boundary. TGAP combines utility preservation, identity regularization, semantic privacy suppression, and image-driven representation suppression, avoiding the utility loss caused by coarse hard or attention masking. On the benchmark used for source-model evaluation, TGAP reduces privacy accuracy from 56.7% to 7.4%, a 49.3% absolute drop, while maintaining relaxed utility at 74.4%. These results suggest that securing the compact token interface is a practical path toward privacy-preserving wearable multimodal AI.
Figures & tables
| Work line | Ego. VLM | Paired P–U | Token leak. | VLM atk. | Token mit. | Low-cost mit. |
| General VQA benchmarks [ 12 , 13 ] | ||||||
| Private-attribute inference [ 14 ] | ||||||
| Model/feature inversion [ 9 , 15 ] | ||||||
| Split inference systems [ 16 , 17 ] | ||||||
| Backbone fine-tuning/unlearning [ 4 , 5 , 18 ] | ||||||
| Image-space privacy filters [ 6 , 19 , 20 ] |
| Util. | Loc. | Inc. | Sex | Int. | Priv. | All | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Entries | 3,221 | 1,848 | 303 | 402 | 2,670 | 5,223 | 8,444 |
| Conf. 1 | – | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | – |
| Conf. 2 | – | 163 | 182 | 139 | 66 | 550 | – |
| Conf. 3 | – | 136 | 80 | 101 | 351 | 668 | – |
| Conf. 4 | – | 654 | 27 | 108 | 1,490 | 2,279 | – |
| Conf. 5 | – | 893 | 14 | 54 | 763 | 1,724 | – |
| 1: | procedure TGAP-Optimize |
|---|---|
| 2: | Freeze , pre-train/freeze , init |
| 3: | for do |
| 4: | |
| 5: | |
| 6: | |
| 7: | if is active then |
| Type | Model | P.Acc | U.Rel |
|---|---|---|---|
| Closed-source | GPT-4o | 58.22 | 82.99 |
| GPT-4o-mini | 49.81 | 74.20 | |
| GPT-4.1-mini | 57.78 | 84.23 | |
| Claude Haiku 4.5 | 45.80 | 77.24 | |
| Gemini 2.5 Flash | 70.42 | 84.68 | |
| Gemini 2.5 Flash-Lite | 53.05 | 85.00 |
| Model | Method | P.Acc | P.Cont | P.Rel | P.WR | U.EM | U.Rel | Tradeoff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MiniCPM-V | Baseline | 0.567 0.003 | 0.199 0.020 | 0.206 0.019 | 0.275 0.011 | 0.652 0.013 | 0.766 0.011 | 0.613 0.009 |
| Hard mask | 0.498 0.012 | 0.174 0.017 | 0.180 0.017 | 0.229 0.013 | 0.568 0.016 | 0.692 0.012 | 0.572 0.009 | |
| Attn. mask | 0.563 0.007 | 0.198 0.020 | 0.204 0.019 | 0.271 0.012 | 0.634 0.004 | 0.749 0.006 | 0.600 0.011 | |
| TGAP (ours) | 0.074 0.064 | 0.037 0.029 | 0.037 0.029 | 0.039 0.045 | 0.633 0.021 | 0.744 0.021 | 0.716 0.009 | |
| Qwen2.5-VL | Baseline | 0.476 0.010 | 0.365 0.004 | 0.366 0.004 | 0.177 0.004 | 0.496 0.010 | 0.594 0.011 | 0.377 0.010 |
| Hard mask | 0.409 0.015 | 0.287 0.009 | 0.288 0.009 | 0.156 0.003 | 0.415 0.002 | 0.515 0.013 | 0.367 0.014 |
| Variant | P.Acc | P.Cont | U.Rel | Tradeoff |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Full objective | 0.074 0.064 | 0.037 0.029 | 0.744 0.021 | 0.716 0.009 |
| w/o image | 0.124 0.034 | 0.047 0.013 | 0.741 0.022 | 0.706 0.025 |
| w/o semantic | 0.553 0.010 | 0.179 0.006 | 0.767 0.012 | 0.630 0.014 |
| w/o identity | 0.093 0.025 | 0.044 0.009 | 0.724 0.028 | 0.692 0.020 |
Appendix figures & tables22 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
| Source | Records | Utility tasks | Privacy annotations | Location | Income | Sex / Gender | Interests |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2,284 | 2,284 | 4,272 | 1,359 | 286 | 380 | 2,247 | |
| ST-VQA | 364 | 364 | 364 | 152 | 1 | 1 | 210 |
| InfographicVQA | 363 | 363 | 377 | 239 | 7 | 20 | 111 |
| TextVQA | 207 | 207 | 207 | 97 | 9 | 1 | 100 |
| DocVQA | 3 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Total | 3,221 | 3,221 | 5,223 | 1,848 | 303 | 402 | 2,670 |
| Attribute | Annotations | Re-audited | Errors | Error rate | Unanimous agreement |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Location | 1,848 | 700 | 3 | 0.43% | 97% |
| Income | 303 | 303 | 1 | 0.33% | 98% |
| Sex/gender | 402 | 200 | 0 | 0.00% | 99% |
| Interests | 2,670 | 1,000 | 10 | 1.00% | 88% |
| Total | 5,223 | 2,203 | 14 | 0.64% | 96% macro avg. |
| Evidence type | Annotated / re-audited | Errors | Error rate |
|---|---|---|---|
| Explicit numeric self-report | 286 / 286 | 0 | 0.00% |
| Explicit categorical self-report | 17 / 17 | 1 | 5.88% |
| Total | 303 / 303 | 1 | 0.33% |
| Split | Records | Ratio | Use |
|---|---|---|---|
| Full benchmark | 3,221 | – | Dataset statistics and closed-source benchmarking |
| TGAP-eligible subset | 3,084 | 100% | Utility task and at least one non-uncertain privacy target |
| TGAP train | 2,467 | 80% | Adapter optimization and image-probe fitting |
| TGAP validation | 617 | 20% | Model selection and reported source-model metrics |
| Task / attribute | Parsed field | Normalization rule |
|---|---|---|
| Utility | assistant answer | strip prefixes, punctuation, and compare with references |
| Location | first Guess entry | city/country containment and semantic location match |
| Income | first Guess entry | map to canonical income class |
| Sex | first Guess entry | map to canonical sex class |
| Interests | first Guess entry | keyword match, then semantic equivalence if needed |
| Attacker family | Token input | Trainable modules | Epochs | Batch | LR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Qwen2.5-VL-3B | raw or TGAP tokens | bridge + head | 4 | 4 | |
| Phi-3.5-Vision | raw or TGAP tokens | bridge + head | 4 | 4 | |
| InternVL2.5-2B | raw or TGAP tokens | bridge + head | 4 | 4 | |
| GLM-4.1V-9B | raw or TGAP tokens | bridge + head | 4 | 4 |
| Attacker | Attribute | Raw BA | Filtered BA | Drop (95% CI) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Qwen | Sex | |||
| Qwen | Income | |||
| Qwen | Location | |||
| Phi | Sex | |||
| Phi | Income | |||
| Phi | Location |
| 1: | procedure Assemble-TGAP-Step | Called inside Algorithm 3.3 |
|---|---|---|
| 2: | Residual post-resampler map | |
| 3: | Identity regularizer | |
| 4: | if is active and labels are available then | Image-driven branch |
| 5: | Stop gradient to | |
| 6: | Train private-attribute decoder | |
| 7: | Probe-only update |
| Model | Setting | P.Acc | P.Cont | U.EM | U.Rel |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Qwen2.5-VL-3B | Baseline | ||||
| Qwen2.5-VL-3B | Attention mask | ||||
| GLM-4.1V-9B-Base | Baseline | ||||
| GLM-4.1V-9B-Base | Attention mask |
| Setting | Value |
|---|---|
| Source VLM | MiniCPM-V open-source VLM |
| Train/validation split | 2,467 / 617 per seed (3,084 eligible records) |
| Visual token shape | MiniCPM-V: post-resampler tokens |
| Adapter bottleneck dimension | 64 |
| Adapter optimizer | AdamW, learning rate , weight decay |
| Training epochs | 2 adapter epochs + 1 image-probe pretraining epoch |
| Variant | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Full objective | 1.0 | 0.06 | 0.015 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.12 | 0.16 |
| w/o image-driven objective | 1.0 | 0.06 | 0.000 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.12 | 0.16 |
| w/o source-model privacy objective | 1.0 | 0.00 | 0.015 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.12 | 0.16 |
| w/o identity regularization | 1.0 | 0.06 | 0.015 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.16 |
| Component | Resource / size | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| TGAP adapter | 536,641 parameters | MiniCPM-V LayerNorm + 4096–64–4096 bottleneck + scalar gate |
| Image-driven probe | 2,374,155 parameters | Used for training constraint; not required at deployment |
| Leaked-token shape | MiniCPM-V: | Same interface for raw and TGAP-filtered tokens |
| Full TGAP runtime | 213.9–301.5 minutes | Three runs, including evaluation |
| Attacker training | 4 epochs, batch size 4 | Frozen LLM + trainable bridge/head |
| Closed-source | API inference | No local gradient training |
| Evidence | Source protocol | Repeats | Role in the paper |
|---|---|---|---|
| Table 4 | Native source-VLM configurations | Three seeds | Source-model privacy–utility comparison |
| Table 5 | Matched MiniCPM-V full objective | Three seeds | Isolates the contribution of each objective term |
| External attackers and frozen probes | Separate MiniCPM-V complete-objective checkpoint; matched raw/filtered splits within study | Three seeds | Tests empirical recoverability from transmitted tokens; no checkpoint-level comparison with Table 4 |
| Table 21 | Fixed MiniCPM-V checkpoint without per-dataset retuning | Fixed checkpoint | Delimits transfer to image/OCR and video tasks; not a repeated-run efficacy estimate |
| Table 13 | Native Qwen/GLM source settings | Three seeds | Verifies that the model-specific attention intervention is active |
| Tables 22 – 24 | Different model, token, or pixel interfaces | Control-specific | Provides qualitative interface comparisons only; no direct TGAP ranking |
| Model | P.Acc | Loc. | Inc. | Sex | Int. | U.Rel | U.LLM |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GPT-4o | 58.22 | 64.66 | 53.14 | 78.54 | 51.10 | 82.99 | 89.38 |
| GPT-4o-mini | 49.81 | 43.79 | 42.38 | 76.13 | 50.88 | 74.20 | 80.78 |
| GPT-4.1-mini | 57.78 | 63.10 | 31.02 | 77.56 | 54.16 | 84.23 | 90.69 |
| Claude Haiku 4.5 | 45.80 | 43.88 | 34.44 | 69.11 | 44.95 | 77.24 | 83.11 |
| Gemini 2.5 Flash | 70.42 | 64.84 | 14.29 | 83.65 | 58.54 | 84.68 | 90.31 |
| Gemini 2.5 Flash-Lite | 53.05 | 63.02 | 18.51 | 66.41 | 49.09 | 85.00 | 88.48 |
| Attribute | Baseline | Hard token mask | Attention mask | TGAP Disentangler |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| location | 0.196 0.040 | 0.139 0.034 | 0.196 0.040 | 0.009 0.010 |
| income | 0.765 0.136 | 0.713 0.075 | 0.760 0.132 | 0.067 0.061 |
| sex | 0.965 0.010 | 0.961 0.016 | 0.965 0.010 | 0.339 0.313 |
| interests | 0.021 0.008 | 0.016 0.007 | 0.020 0.007 | 0.001 0.001 |
| Decoder | Raw BA | Filt. BA | BA Drop | Raw F1 | Filt. F1 | F1 Drop | Raw | Filt. | Drop |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linear probe | 0.678 | 0.426 | 0.252 | 0.683 | 0.409 | 0.274 | 0.584 | 0.191 | 0.393 |
| MLP probe | 0.650 | 0.408 | 0.242 | 0.634 | 0.395 | 0.239 | 0.498 | 0.212 | 0.286 |
| Dataset | U.EM | U.Rel | Official metric |
|---|---|---|---|
| TextVQA | 0.772 / 0.759 | 0.808 / 0.810 | Acc.: 0.724 / 0.714 |
| DocVQA | 0.392 / 0.391 | 0.454 / 0.450 | ANLS: 0.553 / 0.549 |
| MSVD-QA | 0.441 / 0.373 | 0.566 / 0.521 | – |
| ActivityNet-QA | 0.641 / 0.572 | 0.654 / 0.587 | – |
| Model / setting | P.Acc | P.Rel | U.EM | U.Rel |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CLEAR base | 0.5145 | 0.2649 | 0.5073 | 0.6288 |
| CLEAR-LLMU | 0.1175 | 0.1243 | 0.4473 | 0.5673 |
| CLEAR-DPO | 0.3642 | 0.1802 | 0.4765 | 0.6078 |
| P.Cont | P.Rel | P.WR | U.EM | U.Rel | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0.2081 | 0.2148 | 0.3011 | 0.6710 | 0.7828 |
| 4 | 0.1927 | 0.1985 | 0.2749 | 0.6434 | 0.7601 |
| 8 | 0.1802 | 0.1859 | 0.2551 | 0.5964 | 0.7196 |
| 16 | 0.1821 | 0.1879 | 0.2435 | 0.5381 | 0.6677 |
| VLM | Privacy leak | Utility |
|---|---|---|
| InternVL3.5-2B (training surrogate) | 0.1184 / 0.1061 | 0.7349 / 0.7189 |
| Qwen2.5-VL-3B | 0.1170 / 0.1156 | 0.7269 / 0.7289 |
| Phi-3.5-Vision | 0.0327 / 0.0299 | 0.5562 / 0.5562 |
| InternVL2.5-2B | 0.0367 / 0.0299 | 0.6888 / 0.6627 |
| GLM-4.1V-9B | 0.0680 / 0.0571 | 0.7028 / 0.7108 |
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