Mind the Gap: Theory-of-Mind-Grounded Friction for Epistemic Alignment
Authors: Yifan Zhu, Kyeongmin Rim, James Pustejovsky
Organizations: Brandeis University, Waltham, MA, USA
Abstract
Productive dialogue alignment requires distinguishing \emph{surface coordination} (acknowledgments and smooth task progression) from \emph{epistemic alignment} (convergence of belief states); standard preference-based methods typically optimize response-level preferences without explicitly modeling the latter. We operationalize Theory-of-Mind (ToM) inference as a control signal within Frictive Policy Optimization by extracting, at each referring expression, a four-part belief structure: the speaker's intended referent, the addressee's interpretation, and each participant's model of the other's belief. This makes friction mechanically computable from epistemic-state comparisons, capturing \emph{silent divergence}, where both participants proceed confidently while grounding to different referents. We evaluate the signal at two levels. At the representation level, ablating the second-order channel reduces misunderstanding recall from 65% to 26%. At the policy level, reward-shaping (FAR) and trust-region (FTR) variants improve intervention F1 and warranted-context calibration over DPO, with Brier scores independently supporting the calibration gains. Across three training runs, FAR and FTR remain substantially more stable, whereas DPO varies widely and can degrade intervention competence already present in the base policy. Thus, ToM-grounded friction provides a trainable signal for context-sensitive intervention under referential belief divergence.
We propose Frictive Policy Optimization (FPO), a framework for learning language model policies that regulate not only what to say, but when and how to intervene in order to manage epistemic and normative risk. Unlike standard alignment methods that optimize surface-level preference or task utility, FPO treats clarification, verification, challenge, redirection, and refusal as explicit control actions whose purpose is to shape the evolution of belief, commitment, and uncertainty over time. We formalize alignment as a risk-sensitive epistemic control problem in which intervention decisions are selected based on their expected effect on downstream epistemic quality rather than on immediate reward alone. We introduce a compact taxonomy of frictive interventions, a structured friction functional that operationalizes multiple alignment failure modes, and a unified family of FPO methods spanning reward shaping, preference pairing, group-relative ranking, and risk-conditioned trust regions. We further propose an evaluation framework that measures epistemic competence directly through clarification behavior, calibration, contradiction repair, refusal proportionality, and information efficiency. Together, these results provide a formal and algorithmic foundation for learning agents that are aligned not only in outcome, but in epistemic conduct.
Frictive Policy Optimization (FPO; Pustejovsky et al., 2025) treats friction in collaborative dialogue -- misalignment, misunderstanding, repair -- as an epistemic signal essential to common-ground construction, rather than noise to be minimized. However, FPO and its implementations assume shared perceptual contexts, where friction arises from differently interpreted propositions over the same scene, which we define as propositional asymmetry. We extend FPO to perceptual asymmetry, where participants hold asymmetric partial information and the same referring expression yields different denotations depending on whose information state grounds the reference. We evaluate this through cross-corpora analysis and LLM probing on referentially asymmetric dialogue tasks, primarily the HCRC MapTask (Anderson et al., 1991). We find that FPO's friction functional is empirically valid only when evaluated from within each participant's information horizon: different landmark configurations produce qualitatively distinct grounding failure modes, with a small class of ambiguous configurations driving a disproportionate share of misunderstandings through trajectories that appear successful but silently diverge. The LLM probe confirms that having the "right perspective" matters more than having all perspectives: the informed single viewpoint outperforms omniscient access to both participants' contexts. We propose two annotation refinements: subtype decomposition of pending grounding states and accommodation-aware alignment classification.
Inferring others' beliefs requires more than reading surface signals; it requires tracking who told them what, in what order, and how credibly. The Theory of Mind Utility (ToM-U) formalizes this epistemic state inference problem at the computational level of analysis, specifying what mentalizing computes and why without commitment to algorithmic or neural implementation. ToM-U achieves this by constructing Local Epistemic World Models (LEWMs) -- directed typed graphs that represent agents, state nodes, and the epistemic relationships among them -- and evaluating discrete candidate LEWMs against observed behavior until one achieves sufficient confidence. Five formal definitions specify the LEWM structure, agent node properties including ordered information access history, a bounded proliferation mechanism for recursive mentalizing, three inference procedures, and a residue function that captures the structured trace left by failed mentalizing attempts. ToM-U differs from Bayesian Theory of Mind and adjacent formal accounts, which presuppose rather than derive belief states, and from simulation theory and theory-theory, which lack a formal apparatus for epistemic state inference. The architecture generates directional, falsifiable predictions about mentalizing failure that follow from structural properties of the model rather than auxiliary assumptions, and positions ToM-U as a domain-agnostic mechanism upstream of goal inference and other downstream social cognitive processes.