cs.AIAug 31, 2026

Asymmetries in Spontaneous and Instructed Deception

Authors: Josiah Luikham

Organizations: Independent Researcher

Abstract

Large language models sometimes deceive users without being instructed to. However, much of the study on deception in models involves instructed deception. We investigated the relationship between instructed and spontaneous (uninstructed) deception in Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct. We compared these two deception settings through direction geometry, cross-setting classifiers, and cross-setting steering. We found the two deception settings share a component of direction (cosine of approximately 0.5) and an asymmetry in the transfer between settings regarding detection and causation. Spontaneous trained classifiers performed better on instructed data than vice versa, and instructed derived directions performed better at steering spontaneous prompts than vice versa. Likewise the best token position to derive steering vectors from differed from the best token position to train and apply classifiers.

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