Revisiting Face Recognition for Monozygotic Twins: The Celeb Twins Test Set
Authors: Michael Zang, Haiyu Wu, Mrinal Sharma, Kevin W. Bowyer
Organizations: Department of Computer Science & Engineering University of Notre Dame
Abstract
Past literature on face recognition for monozygotic (("identical") twins points to facial marks and mirror asymmetry as possible directions for improved accuracy of twins recognition. The Celeb Twins Test Set (CTTS) contains web-scraped image pairs for 80 sets of celebrity twins. It is the only twins test set with meta-data for twins with distinguishing skin marks and possible mirror asymmetry. CTTS is organized in the manner of face verification test sets such as LFW, CALFW, CPLFW, CFP-FP, and AgeDB-30. Current deep CNN matchers can achieve over 76% accuracy in classifying CTTS same-person / different-person image pairs. We show that current matchers do not make use of skin marks, or asymmetry, and discuss reasons for this. Finally, we discuss the feasibility of using generative AI tools such as Grok, ChatGPT and Gemini to create images of imagined monozygotic twins as a means to increase representation of twins in face recognition training sets.
Recent advances in generative Artificial Intelligence have made synthetic face images increasingly realistic, creating new challenges for multimedia forensics. Source attribution methods should not only identify the generator of an image when the source is known, but also handle samples produced by previously unseen models. However, most existing approaches address synthetic face attribution in a closed-set setting, where all possible generators are available during training. This assumption does not hold in real-world scenarios, where new generators continuously appear and rejected samples should be organized rather than simply discarded. In this work we propose a pipeline for open-set synthetic face source attribution that combines known generator classification, energy-based OOD rejection, and unknown generator discovery. A classifier is trained on known generators using frozen I-JEPA embeddings, while rejected samples are represented by combining projected I-JEPA features with Forensic Self-Descriptors and then clustered to discover groups of unknown generators. We also extend the discovery stage to an incremental scenario, where rejected samples arrive over time. Experiments on the WILD dataset show that the proposed method achieves 96.73% closed-set attribution accuracy. In the open-set setting, energy-based rejection reaches 71.25% balanced accuracy, while rejected samples are clustered into meaningful unknown-generator groups, obtaining an ARI of 0.81, an NMI of 0.90, and an overall clustering purity of 87.74%. In the incremental setting, the discovered generator space is progressively extended while maintaining a final purity of 99.23%. Cross-dataset experiments suggest that the pipeline can operate beyond the original dataset distribution, although post-processing remains challenging.
The release of GPT-image-2 by OpenAI marks a watershed moment in AI-generated imagery: the boundary between photographic reality and synthetic content has never been more difficult to discern. We introduce the GPT-Image-2 Twitter Dataset, the first published dataset of GPT-image-2 generated images, sourced from publicly available Twitter/X posts in the immediate aftermath of the model's April 21, 2026 release. Leveraging the Twitter API v2 and a multi-stage curation pipeline spanning multilingual text heuristics (English, Japanese, and Chinese), browser-automated Twitter "Made with AI" badge verification, and model name variant matching, we curate 10,217 confirmed GPT-image-2 images from 27,662 collected records over a six-day window. We characterize the dataset across four analyses: CLIP-based zero-shot subject taxonomy, OCR text legibility (82.0% of images contain detectable text), face detection (59.2% of images, 22,583 total faces), and semantic clustering (137 CLIP ViT-L/14 clusters). A key negative result is that C2PA content credentials are systematically stripped by Twitter's CDN on upload, rendering cryptographic provenance verification infeasible for social-media-sourced AI images. The dataset and all curation code are released publicly.
In operational 1:N face identification, a crucial question arises for each probe: is this person enrolled in the gallery or not? The stakes are high and asymmetric. Rejecting a mate-present (MP) probe loses a valid lead; accepting a mate-absent (MA) probe makes every returned candidate a false identification, at worst a wrongful arrest. Most approaches threshold match scores, but scores shift substantially with image quality and gallery size and composition, making thresholds fixed before deployment brittle under realistic conditions. Our prior work introduced 1-consistency, the only method based on rank consensus across multiple independently trained matchers: a probe is labeled MP if all matchers return the same rank-1 identity. This work stress-tests 1-consistency across 36 (gallery, probe quality) scenarios spanning four quality levels and two structural axes: images per identity and total enrolled identities. We benchmark against two score-thresholding methods that bracket what any deployed threshold could achieve. Fixed Score-Thresholding (FST), calibrated once on baseline conditions, collapses asymmetrically as quality degrades: MP recall falls below 2% while MA recall holds near 100%. Oracle Score-Thresholding (OST), re-tuned per scenario, is the best any threshold could theoretically do, yet for degraded probes 1-consistency matches it with zero tuning. The two differ mainly in error type (OST favors MP recall, 1-consistency favors MA recall), but on one axis 1-consistency does not merely match the oracle: when it labels a probe MP, it returns the correct mate 97-100% of the time versus OST's 66-84% under severe degradation. In short, 1-consistency delivers oracle-level accuracy without the impossible requirement: it sets no threshold, so it needs no advance knowledge of the conditions a probe will arrive in, which is what makes it usable.
Gabriella Pangelinan, Aman Bhatta, Michael C. King +1