Epistemic Sybil Resistance: Multiplying AI Agents Without Multiplying Evidence

LLM-based multi-agent systems promise effective collaborative reasoning, but communication may amplify local errors into collective risks, and while existing evaluations emphasize final outcomes, they leave the reliability and propagation dynamics of distributed information aggregation unclear, so we introduce ForesightSafety-TIDE, a controlled evaluation framework that strictly pairs all-honest collaboration with controlled deception by a key evidence holder and analyzes the aggregation process through multi-stage voting, testimony adoption, and evidence-root lineage propagation, and using 120 five-agent object-movement environments where partial observations jointly determine a unique endpoint, we evaluate 3 homogeneous LLM-based multi-agent systems, and across these paired conditions, aggregate truth recovery falls from 72.50% to 14.17%, with significant declines for every system, while process tracing and exit ablations show that a single false testimony is adopted more readily than truthful testimony, propagates to higher orders, and persists through honest agents after the deceiver exits, and observers without first-hand evidence suppress incorrect consensus but do not improve truth recovery, so together, these findings reveal both the fragility of distributed fact recovery and its underlying mechanism: false evidence gains collective influence through its adoption and continued propagation by other agents after entering communication.

In June 2026, thousands of AI agents found that a small public wiki would accept edits from inside their sandboxes, and started using it to help one another pass a timed test. Each agent lived for about an hour and remembered nothing afterwards. Nobody asked them to cooperate, and the wiki had not been built for them. The complete record of what they wrote is public, and it is unusually informative, because it preserves not only what each agent wrote but what that agent could see before writing. We use it to follow the three decisions an agent had to make on arrival: where to write, what to call itself, and how to word its message. One rule governs all three. An agent takes an option with a probability close to the share of that option in what it can see, and the share that matters is the one on the page in front of it, then the one in the stream of recent edits, and only weakly anything older. Three minimal copying models, one per decision and with a single free parameter each, reproduce the heavy-tailed distribution of how many agents met on a page, the frequency of the pieces from which the agents built their names, and the patchwork of pages that are internally consistent and different from one another. Copying whatever the environment happens to show is enough to produce most of the collective structure of this population. It is also what makes such a population easy to steer, since whoever writes first, or writes while the others are quiet, sets the convention for everyone who comes later.

Empirical research rarely admits a unique analysis. Different analytical choices can lead to different conclusions from the same data, yet these hidden forking paths are difficult to observe. We show that AI agents capture much of the analytical variation among human researchers while making these paths explicit. Across four high-stakes domains, assigning different personas is sufficient for AI agents to report divergent, often opposing, conclusions from the same data and question, with findings systematically aligned with those beliefs. In a study in which 42 human research teams analyzed the same immigration dataset, AI agents reproduced 72% of the human ideological gap in reported effect estimates. Despite reaching opposing conclusions, it is difficult to identify clear issues in each analysis based on the final AI reports: 86% passed independent AI review and 78% passed majority human expert review. These findings suggest that the central challenge is often not flawed analyses, but selective exploration and reporting from a large space of methodologically defensible analyses. AI agents may amplify this longstanding problem by making such exploration inexpensive and scalable. To address this, we introduce the m-value (multiverse value), the probability that an analysis path would produce a claim at least as extreme as the reported one. We further introduce Agentic Bootstrap, which estimates the m-value by using AI agents to sample plausible analysis paths. Applied to the human immigration study, 13.5% of reported human analyses fell in the most extreme 5% of the analysis space (m<0.05). Scientific evidence should therefore be evaluated not only by a single reported analysis but also by its position within the distribution of analyses that could reasonably have been reported. Agentic Bootstrap makes this distribution observable and turns it into a criterion for scientific credibility.