You Really Didn't Get That? Benchmarking Social Pragmatic Inference for Indirect and Playful Chinese Online Comments

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly exhibit human-like patterns of pragmatic and social reasoning. This paper addresses two related questions: do LLMs approximate human social meaning not only qualitatively but also quantitatively, and can prompting strategies informed by pragmatic theory improve this approximation? To address the first, we introduce two calibration-focused metrics distinguishing structural fidelity from magnitude calibration: the Effect Size Ratio (ESR) and the Calibration Deviation Score (CDS). To address the second, we derive prompting conditions from two pragmatic assumptions: that social meaning arises from reasoning over linguistic alternatives, and that listeners infer speaker knowledge states and communicative motives. Applied to a case study on numerical (im)precision across three frontier LLMs, we find that all models reliably reproduce the qualitative structure of human social inferences but differ substantially in magnitude calibration. Prompting models to reason about speaker knowledge and motives most consistently reduces magnitude deviation, while prompting for alternative-awareness tends to amplify exaggeration. Combining both components is the only intervention that improves all calibration-sensitive metrics across all models, though fine-grained magnitude calibration remains only partially resolved. LLMs thus capture inferential structure while variably distorting inferential strength, and pragmatic theory provides a useful but incomplete handle for improving that approximation.

Although large language models (LLMs) have shown considerable progress in pragmatic language understanding, prior research has focused mainly on their comprehension of verbal behavior. Nonetheless, non-verbal behavior remains a fundamental component of human communication, especially when deliberately utilized in isolation to convey indirect meanings. In this work, we present the first systematic evaluation of LLMs' ability to infer pragmatic meaning in dialogue consisting solely of non-verbal responses. We explore three research questions: (1) Can LLMs recognize indirect intent conveyed through non-verbal responses? (2) When and how do LLMs fail to capture non-verbal intent? (3) How can we improve LLMs' ability to interpret non-verbal intent?. Through the evaluation, we observe that LLMs struggle to infer underlying meaning from non-verbal responses, with accuracy dropping by up to 60% points compared to verbal ones. Further extensive analysis reveals a behavioral pattern in LLMs' interpretations of non-verbal behavior and demonstrates that in-context learning facilitates pragmatic inference.

Despite strong performance on standard benchmarks, it remains unclear whether large language models (LLMs) evaluate social pragmatics in ways that align with human judgments. We evaluate LLM politeness judgments using two English-language datasets with complementary annotation formats: continuous human ratings and three-way categorical labels. Across the seven evaluated models, we find that inter-model agreement is stronger than model--human agreement. Strategy-level analyses suggest that model--human alignment is associated with explicit linguistic cues, while some rapport-building strategies occur more frequently in misaligned cases. In the categorical task, model predictions exhibit systematic neutral compression, characterized by the overproduction of Neutral labels and the underprediction of Impolite labels. This pattern persists when expert consensus is used as the reference on a diagnostic subset. Our findings highlight the need for pragmatic evaluations that go beyond aggregate agreement metrics by examining directional patterns of model--human disagreement across different human references.