Client-Side Probing of Deleted Ridge Statistics in Federated Unlearning

Federated learning (FL) enables collaborative model training without sharing raw data, offering a promising path toward privacy preserving artificial intelligence. However, FL models may still memorize sensitive information from participants, conflicting with the right to be forgotten (RTBF). To meet these requirements, federated unlearning has emerged as a mechanism to remove the contribution of departing clients. Existing solutions only partially address this challenge: FedEraser improves efficiency but lacks privacy protection, FedRecovery ensures differential privacy (DP) but degrades accuracy, and VeriFi enables verifiability but introduces overhead without efficiency or privacy guarantees. We present PrivEraserVerify (PEV), a unified framework that integrates efficiency, privacy, and verifiability into federated unlearning. PEV employs (i) adaptive checkpointing to retain critical historical updates for fast reconstruction, (ii) layer adaptive differentially private calibration to selectively remove client influence while minimizing accuracy loss, and (iii) fingerprint based verification, enabling participants to confirm unlearning in a decentralized and noninvasive manner. Experiments on image, handwritten character, and medical datasets show that PEV achieves up to 2 to 3 times faster unlearning than retraining, provides formal indistinguishability guarantees with reduced performance degradation, and supports scalable verification. To the best of our knowledge, PEV is the first framework to simultaneously deliver efficiency, privacy, and verifiability for federated unlearning, moving FL closer to practical and regulation compliant deployment.

Federated learning (FL) is vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where malicious clients upload manipulated updates to degrade the performance of the global model. Although detection methods can identify and remove malicious clients, the model remains affected. Retraining from scratch is effective but costly, and existing unlearning methods remain unsatisfactory in both effectiveness and efficiency. We propose Federated Adversarial Unlearning (FAUN), a lightweight framework that retains only a short window of malicious clients' updates and employs adversarial optimization on a proxy dataset to derive updates that eliminate malicious directions. Applying these updates for a few unlearning rounds, followed by benign fine-tuning, enables fast removal of malicious effects and stable recovery. Experiments on three canonical datasets show that FAUN achieves recovery comparable to retraining while requiring far fewer rounds and reduces attack success rates to near zero, confirming FAUN successfully eliminates the contributions of unlearned clients.

Federated learning (FL) increasingly needs machine unlearning to comply with privacy regulations. However, existing federated unlearning approaches may overlook the overlapping information between the unlearning and remaining data, leading to ineffective unlearning and unfairness between clients. In this work, we revisit federated unlearning through the lens of memorization. We argue that unlearning should mainly remove the unique memorized information attributable to the data to be forgotten, while preserving overlapping patterns that are also supported by the remaining data. Specifically, we propose Grouped Memorization Evaluation, an example-level metric that separates memorized knowledge from overlapping knowledge. Building on this metric, we introduce Federated Memorization Pruning (FedMemPrune), a pruning-based unlearning approach that resets redundant parameters responsible for memorization. Extensive experiments show that FedMemPrune closely matches retraining-based unlearning baselines while more effectively eliminating memorization than existing federated unlearning algorithms, yielding strong unlearning performance without sacrificing the utility of retained knowledge.