Necessary or Sufficient? Evaluating LLM Explanations With Behavioural Evidence
Authors: Urja Pawar, Rajitha Ramanayake, Nabeel Kemal, Ashwin Kandath, Owen O'Neill, Guillaume Bourgeon, Houssem Chatbri, Christopher Martin, +1 more
Abstract
LLM decision components that can operate within agent workflows often produce action-relevant recommendations or judgements together with explanations. Operators may use the named factors to monitor a system, diagnose errors, or decide when to escalate an output. Such use assumes that the explanations agree with the component's observable decision behaviour. We test two interpretations of the named factors: necessity, meaning that changing a factor would change the output, and sufficiency, meaning that retaining it while removing other changeable information would preserve the output. We evaluate these interpretations in two synthetic use cases: recommending advisors to clients and judging prompts for harmfulness or risk. Models return an output and the top three factors that most influenced it. Controlled black-box interventions estimate a necessity score for each factor by measuring how often changing it changes the output, and a sufficiency score by measuring how often retaining it preserves the output. Across eight models from the Claude, GPT, and Gemini families, the mean Spearman correlations between the cited ranking and the necessity and sufficiency scores are 0.349 and 0.354 for advisor recommendation, and 0.431 and 0.580 for prompt monitoring. Furthermore, an uncited factor scores above the lowest-scoring cited factor in 57.6% of advisor responses under necessity and 58.1% under sufficiency; the corresponding prompt-monitoring rates are 25.8% and 8.9%. The cited top three contain useful information but do not reliably identify the three factors with the strongest measured influence under necessity or sufficiency. The framework provides a black-box reliability check for explanations used in agent oversight while remaining scoped to individual LLM decisions.
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes domains, where free-text explanations such as chain-of-thought and post-hoc rationales are used to justify model outputs. Yet it remains unclear whether these explanations are sufficient, i.e., if they contain enough information to explain the model's output-generating process. We generalize classical sufficiency from feature attributions to arbitrary explanations and prove that explanation sufficiency can change depending on the input distribution, which must be explicitly defined for LLM explanations. We propose using the LLM itself to generate alternative inputs conditioned on an explanation, capturing its beliefs about possible inputs. We formalize self-consistent sufficiency as a goal for free-text explanations and introduce an information-theoretic metric, SCSuff, that enables evaluation of free-text explanations without relying on predefined biases or shortcuts. Our experiments show that SCSuff agrees with targeted perturbation tests where applicable and demonstrate that explanation sufficiency can vary with the input distribution. We find LLM explanations are generally insufficient and weakly correlated with model size, accuracy, or output entropy. Analysis of final-token hidden states shows that top and bottom SCSuff scores can be predicted from internal representations, suggesting that SCSuff can guide detection and improvement of sufficient LLM explanations. The code for this paper is available at https://github.com/rajesh-lab/self-consistent-sufficiency .
This position paper argues that LLMs should not yet be credited with decision explanation. This matters because recent work increasingly treats accurate behavioral prediction, plausible rationales, and outcome-conditioned reasoning traces as evidence that LLMs explain why people decide as they do, risking a premature redefinition of what counts as explanatory progress in human decision modeling. We first distinguish three claims with different evidential burdens: decision prediction, rationale generation, and decision explanation. We then argue that the evidence most commonly offered for LLM-based decision accounts directly supports the first two claims, and sometimes explanatory hypothesis generation, but does not distinguish decision explanation from prediction-supportive rationalization. Next, we propose a bridge standard for decision-explanation credit: stronger claims should specify explanatory targets, discriminate against weaker rationalizer alternatives, use target-appropriate process- or intervention-sensitive validation, and bound their scope. We then situate this standard against competing views and related literatures, clarifying why it preserves the value of LLMs as predictors, narrators, and hypothesis generators while resisting premature explanatory credit. We conclude with a principle of credit calibration: LLMs should be credited for the strongest claim their evidence warrants, and no stronger; if adopted, this principle can help turn LLMs from persuasive narrators of decisions into more reliable instruments for discovering, testing, and communicating explanations of human behavior.
Large language models (LLMs) have the potential to aid and improve human decision-making in classification tasks, not only by providing fairly accurate predictions, but also in their ability to generate cogent narrative explanations of those predictions. Prior work has demonstrated that people generally find AI narrative explanations to be understandable, trustworthy, and convincing for changing beliefs and opinions; however, less is known about the impact of narrative explanations on objective human decision-making performance. Here we conduct a large-scale human behavioral experiment to evaluate decision-making performance with LLM-generated narrative explanations of varying persuasiveness. We found the degree of persuasiveness, or lack thereof, for LLM-based explanations did not meaningfully impact decision accuracy over a simple AI prediction alone, in agreement with typical results with explainable AI based on feature importance. We found evidence that narratives increased reliance on AI, but both when the AI prediction was correct and incorrect. Exploratory analyses also indicated that the more persuasive narratives may have had a detrimental effect on decision response times and the ability to discriminate between a correct and incorrect AI prediction. Overall, this work indicates that including narrative explanations with AI predictions may involve tradeoffs for decision-making performance, and more work is needed to determine how and when narrative explanations impact human decision-making.
Laura R. Marusich, Mary Grace Kozuch Dhooghe, Jonathan Z. Bakdash +1