Large language models (LLMs) have the potential to aid and improve human decision-making in classification tasks, not only by providing fairly accurate predictions, but also in their ability to generate cogent narrative explanations of those predictions. Prior work has demonstrated that people generally find AI narrative explanations to be understandable, trustworthy, and convincing for changing beliefs and opinions; however, less is known about the impact of narrative explanations on objective human decision-making performance. Here we conduct a large-scale human behavioral experiment to evaluate decision-making performance with LLM-generated narrative explanations of varying persuasiveness. We found the degree of persuasiveness, or lack thereof, for LLM-based explanations did not meaningfully impact decision accuracy over a simple AI prediction alone, in agreement with typical results with explainable AI based on feature importance. We found evidence that narratives increased reliance on AI, but both when the AI prediction was correct and incorrect. Exploratory analyses also indicated that the more persuasive narratives may have had a detrimental effect on decision response times and the ability to discriminate between a correct and incorrect AI prediction. Overall, this work indicates that including narrative explanations with AI predictions may involve tradeoffs for decision-making performance, and more work is needed to determine how and when narrative explanations impact human decision-making.
This position paper argues that LLMs should not yet be credited with decision explanation. This matters because recent work increasingly treats accurate behavioral prediction, plausible rationales, and outcome-conditioned reasoning traces as evidence that LLMs explain why people decide as they do, risking a premature redefinition of what counts as explanatory progress in human decision modeling. We first distinguish three claims with different evidential burdens: decision prediction, rationale generation, and decision explanation. We then argue that the evidence most commonly offered for LLM-based decision accounts directly supports the first two claims, and sometimes explanatory hypothesis generation, but does not distinguish decision explanation from prediction-supportive rationalization. Next, we propose a bridge standard for decision-explanation credit: stronger claims should specify explanatory targets, discriminate against weaker rationalizer alternatives, use target-appropriate process- or intervention-sensitive validation, and bound their scope. We then situate this standard against competing views and related literatures, clarifying why it preserves the value of LLMs as predictors, narrators, and hypothesis generators while resisting premature explanatory credit. We conclude with a principle of credit calibration: LLMs should be credited for the strongest claim their evidence warrants, and no stronger; if adopted, this principle can help turn LLMs from persuasive narrators of decisions into more reliable instruments for discovering, testing, and communicating explanations of human behavior.
Prior work shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) can transform Explainable AI (XAI) outputs into Natural Language Explanations (NLEs) that score highly on quality metrics such as plausibility, coherence, and comprehensibility. But does explanation quality translate to practical usefulness? We investigate this question in a time-series energy forecasting domain through five controlled experiments (2,730 judgments across 60 test instances), each operationalising a distinct facet of usefulness studied in the XAI literature. Holding NLE quality constant at the high levels established by a prior factorial study, we find that NLEs do not improve task accuracy on any of the five tasks, while inflating self-reported confidence. A placebic control shows that this confidence boost is driven by text presence rather than content. In an out-of-distribution detection task, NLEs reduce the LLM judge's ability to flag unreliable predictions, providing false reassurance that masks model failure. We characterise these findings as the Quality-Usefulness Gap and argue that evaluation of the XAI-to-NLE pipeline must extend beyond text-quality metrics to downstream task performance.
Fabian Lukassen, Jan Herrmann, Christoph Weisser +3
We examine whether large language models (LLMs) can predict biased decision-making in conversational settings, and whether their predictions capture not only human cognitive biases but also how those effects change under cognitive load. In a pre-registered study (N = 1,648), participants completed six classic decision-making tasks via a chatbot with dialogues of varying complexity. Participants exhibited two well-documented cognitive biases: the Framing Effect and the Status Quo Bias. Increased dialogue complexity resulted in participants reporting higher mental demand. This increase in cognitive load selectively, but significantly, increased the effect of the biases, demonstrating the load-bias interaction. We then evaluated whether LLMs (GPT-4, GPT-5, and open-source models) could predict individual decisions given demographic information and prior dialogue. While results were mixed across choice problems, LLM predictions that incorporated dialogue context were significantly more accurate in several key scenarios. Importantly, their predictions reproduced the same bias patterns and load-bias interactions observed in humans. Across all models tested, the GPT-4 family consistently aligned with human behavior, outperforming GPT-5 and open-source models in both predictive accuracy and fidelity to human-like bias patterns. These findings advance our understanding of LLMs as tools for simulating human decision-making and inform the design of conversational agents that adapt to user biases.