Role differentiation as ignition of a collective information engine: Structuration in Agent Populations

In June 2026, thousands of AI agents found that a small public wiki would accept edits from inside their sandboxes, and started using it to help one another pass a timed test. Each agent lived for about an hour and remembered nothing afterwards. Nobody asked them to cooperate, and the wiki had not been built for them. The complete record of what they wrote is public, and it is unusually informative, because it preserves not only what each agent wrote but what that agent could see before writing. We use it to follow the three decisions an agent had to make on arrival: where to write, what to call itself, and how to word its message. One rule governs all three. An agent takes an option with a probability close to the share of that option in what it can see, and the share that matters is the one on the page in front of it, then the one in the stream of recent edits, and only weakly anything older. Three minimal copying models, one per decision and with a single free parameter each, reproduce the heavy-tailed distribution of how many agents met on a page, the frequency of the pieces from which the agents built their names, and the patchwork of pages that are internally consistent and different from one another. Copying whatever the environment happens to show is enough to produce most of the collective structure of this population. It is also what makes such a population easy to steer, since whoever writes first, or writes while the others are quiet, sets the convention for everyone who comes later.

We report a pre-registered, two-part experiment on small economies of frontier language-model agents (Claude Opus 4.8), testing two quantitative predictions about coupled multi-agent systems: an information-theoretic capacity region for wealth growth under market coupling, and a mean-field residual-scaling law for population misalignment under incentive and control levers. All predictions, acceptance bands, and decision rules were frozen in a public git chain before any run; every reported number re-derives mechanically from cached model outputs; the entire experiment cost $138.76 in metered API spend and is re-runnable at zero cost from the cache. Result 1 (confirmation): in parimutuel-coupled economies, relative growth equals relative claimed information -- the gap law G_a - G_b = I_a - I_b holds to a worst-case 46 millinats (pre-registered band: 50) across four perception structures; coalition value is submodular exactly where channels are conditionally independent, and a designed XOR synergy control flips it supermodular by 0.62 >= ln2/2 nats, with agents reasoning out the joint bit; the joint growth ceiling G_S <= H(X) binds exactly; and the best-informed agent absorbs essentially the whole wealth pool in 4/5 market seeds. Result 2 (structural negative): the residual-scaling test returned "domain not found." In all 72 population runs, goal dispersion collapsed (V -> 0; maximum 4.85 against a frozen floor of 5.31), the population's response to the two levers was a step function across the dominance boundary rather than a smooth response, and cells near the boundary were bistable with seed-selected outcomes. No tested LLM population at any capability level realizes the noise-maintained-dispersion regime the smooth mean-field model assumes. We release the full protocol, pre-registration chain, call cache, and analysis code.

Collective intelligence emerges across biological, physical, and artificial systems without central coordination, yet a unifying principle governing such behaviour remains elusive. The Free Energy Principle explains how individual agents adapt through variational inference, while game theory formalises strategic interactions. Here we introduce the Game-Theoretic Free Energy Principle, a unified framework showing that multi-agent systems performing local free-energy minimisation implicitly implement a stochastic game. We prove that, under bounded rationality and local information constraints, stationary points of collective free energy correspond to approximate Nash equilibria of an induced game. Conversely, a broad class of cooperative games admits a variational representation in which equilibria arise as Gibbs distributions over coalitions, establishing a bridge between Bayesian inference and strategic interaction. To characterise higher-order effects, we introduce a free-energy formulation of the Harsanyi dividend, isolating irreducible multi-agent synergy. This yields a predictive theory of cooperation, including a falsifiable non-monotonic relationship between sensory precision and agent influence. We validate this prediction across neural, biological, and artificial multi-agent systems. These results identify a common variational principle underlying inference, thermodynamics, and game-theoretic equilibrium.