cs.CRSep 5, 2026

Evaluating Deep-Search Agents under Hierarchical Web Evidence Poisoning

Authors: Zhongan BiQiwen WangJianrong JiangJigang DingWenwen XiongChanghua MengXuanang GaoKepeng Lin+6 more

Organizations: Zhejiang University · Ant Group

Abstract

Search-augmented LLM agents are increasingly used for consumer decisions, making them vulnerable to Generative Engine Optimization (GEO) poisoning. Existing benchmarks largely measure whether manipulated content is retrieved or endorsed, but do not track whether an agent verifies suspicious evidence, revises adopted claims, or recovers before producing its final recommendation. We introduce HAE-GEO, a benchmark that tracks the full trajectory from exposure to recovery under progressively more persuasive Web poisoning. Agents interact via a multi-turn Search-Scrape interface across three attack levels (L1 direct assertion, L2 contextual camouflage, and L3 apparent corroboration), supported by a controlled corpus of 72,039 clean pages and 770 poisoned pages per level spanning 8 product categories and 154 brands. Evaluation combines deterministic behavioral measures with six semantic rubric dimensions. Evaluating 10 agents, we find three recurring patterns: evidence recognition degrades under the corroboration trap; agentic search improves final resistance without improving evidence recognition or utility; and defense prompting increases verification, yet rarely converts verification into recovery.

Explore similar work

Jun 15, 2026cs.CL

How Much Can We Trust LLM Search Agents? Measuring Endorsement Vulnerability to Web Content Manipulation

Large language model (LLM)-based search agents synthesize open-web content into actionable recommendations on behalf of users, creating a risk that attacker-published pages are transformed into endorsed claims. We introduce SearchGEO, a controlled evaluation framework for measuring endorsement corruption in LLM-based web-search agents, combining a web-evidence manipulation pipeline, a five-mode attack taxonomy, and multiple output-level metrics. We evaluate 13 LLM backends on 308 cases each. Results show that vulnerability patterns vary across backends: overall attack success rate (ASR) ranges from 0.0% on Claude-Sonnet-4.6 to 31.4% on Gemini-3-Flash, the strongest attack mode differs by model family, and the same deployment scaffold could amplify or decrease ASR on different backends. An auxiliary agent-skill probe, where endorsement becomes an install command, exposes a sharp split among otherwise robust backends: Claude over-rejects while GPT over-trusts. These findings argue for treating recommendation reliability under adversarial search content as a first-class dimension of backend safety evaluation.
Yimeng Chen, Zhe Ren, Firas Laakom +3
Jun 8, 2026cs.IR

SafeGEO: Understanding Generative Engine Optimization Risks in Recommendation Agents

Generative Engine Optimization (GEO) lets content owners rewrite web content to increase their visibility in generative systems. In recommendation agents, this creates a risk that seller-controlled sources make flawed products appear better supported than they are. We study this risk by asking whether recommendation agents preserve utility-aligned decisions when seller-controlled sources are rewritten for GEO. To make this question measurable, we construct SafeGEO, an evaluation suite with 22 GEO attack variants across 600 recommendation cases. We empirically show that GEO attacks can promote flawed target products. On average, they increase the rate at which such flawed products enter the recommendation set by up to 83.2%. We further study whether agent-side design choices can mitigate this risk and show that simple defenses, including defensive prompting and structured evidence checks, reduce harmful target promotion by up to 39.2%. These gains are substantial but do not restore the no-GEO performance, showing that GEO remains a serious risk despite developer-side mitigation.
Qianfeng Wen, Yifan Simon Liu, Xin Liu +4
May 13, 2026cs.IR

EcoGEO: Trajectory-Aware Evidence Ecosystems for Web-Enabled LLM Search Agents

Web-enabled LLM agents are changing how online information influences search outcomes. Existing Generative Engine Optimization (GEO) studies mainly focus on individual webpages. However, agentic web search is not a single-document setting: an agent may issue queries, crawl pages, follow links, reformulate searches, and synthesize evidence across multiple browsing steps. Influence therefore depends not only on page content, but also on how pages are organized, connected, and encountered along the agent's browsing trajectory. We study this shift through Ecosystem Generative Engine Optimization (EcoGEO), which treats GEO as an environment-level influence problem for web-enabled LLM agents. To instantiate this perspective, we propose TRACE, a Trajectory-Aware Coordinated Evidence Ecosystem. Given a recommendation query and a fictional target product, our method builds a controlled evidence environment that coordinates an agent-facing navigation entry page with heterogeneous support pages. These pages use shared terminology, internal links, and consistent product attributes to introduce, verify, and reinforce the target product. We evaluate our method on OPR-Bench, a benchmark for open-ended product recommendation. Experiments show that it consistently outperforms page-level GEO baselines in final target recommendation. Trajectory-level metrics further show increased initial target-result crawls, target-specific follow-up searches, and internal-link crawls, suggesting that the gains come from shaping the agent's evidence-acquisition process rather than merely adding more target-related content. Overall, our findings support an ecosystem research paradigm for GEO, where web-enabled LLM agents are studied in relation to the broader evidence environments that guide search, browsing, and answer synthesis.
Hengwei Ye, Jiasheng Mao, Zhenhan Guan +1