One Perturbation Is Not Enough: Identifiability and Blind Baselines for Behavioral AI Evaluation

LLM benchmark scores can be precise even when the observation protocol does not identify the behavioral property they are intended to measure. In a controlled, solver-grounded setting, we formalize a protocol-level identifiability audit over a finite behavioral policy class: given policies H, observation support O, and estimand $τ$, we test whether O separates every pair with different $τ$. The audit requires zero model calls and resolves our diagnostic case: base-only observation collapses seven frozen deterministic policies into one equivalence class; full support yields seven classes and no cross-estimand collisions; every leave-one-out support retains a constructive collision witness. Empirically, both constrained-generation variants have pair-validity 1.0, yet base accuracy and selective-response fidelity diverge - 0.620 versus 0.324 across six balanced oracle-transition directions (cluster-bootstrap 95% CI [0.600, 0.642] vs. [0.304, 0.345]) - and the gap recurs on a second deterministic source (0.646 vs. 0.331). The audit also synthesizes a minimum identifying support $O^*$ for the frozen policy class: two cells instead of the full 36-cell tensor. This case shows how evaluation-design validity can be checked structurally before model inference and why base correctness does not determine intervention-response fidelity.

Frontier language models sometimes recognize that they are under evaluation and adjust their behavior which can undermine validity of benchmark results. Yet the field studies it without a shared foundation, conflating flaws of the evaluation with capabilities of the model, and detection with behavioral response. We ground evaluation awareness in social psychology, decomposing it into an environment component and a model component that separates recognition from propensity. We operationalize the environment component through eight categorized trigger factors, such as placeholder entities and grading-style output formats, and study recognition and behavior through chain-of-thought monitoring. Across nine frontier models and four benchmarks, recognition rates depend on the specific pairing of model and benchmark. Recognition rarely associates with behavioral change, and when it does, the direction depends on the type of evaluation perceived. Models are also more sensitive to safety than capability evaluations, placing safety benchmark validity at greater risk. To study which factors each model is sensitive to and how they interact, we propose EvalAwareBench, a factor-controlled benchmark of 100 paired safety-capability tasks where each of the eight factors can be independently toggled, varying evaluative signals while holding the underlying request fixed. Through EvalAwareBench, we find that no single factor uniformly affects all models, but stacking factors progressively raises evaluation awareness across all of them. Our framework and EvalAwareBench provide the tools to measure, attribute, and mitigate evaluation awareness, building the foundation for future solutions.

Large Language Model (LLM) safety has often been evaluated at the behavior level, which provides limited evidence of internal robustness, as these evaluations target outputs rather than representation-level vulnerability under intervention. We formalize this discrepancy as the audit gap: the difference between behavioral safety and robustness under intervention. To study this gap, we construct dissociated models that preserve safe outward behavior while remaining vulnerable in the latent space. We introduce an intervention-based evaluation framework to test model robustness through soft interventions in parameter and latent spaces, including harmful fine-tuning and layer-wise latent perturbations. To formalize the evaluation, we propose the Latent Vulnerability Score (LVS) to measure how easily harmful behavior can be elicited by bounded latent perturbations. Using this evaluation framework, we show that behavioral safety metrics are insufficient measures of representation-level robustness across multiple safely and unsafely aligned state-of-the-art models. Notably, dissociated models show substantially elevated LVSs despite comparable refusal behavior under harmful intervention, with intermediate representations being the most sensitive to intervention. Our results suggest that behavioral safety evaluation alone provides an incomplete picture of model robustness, motivating representation-aware audits of latent vulnerability and observable behavior.