cs.CRSep 6, 2026

A Novel Semantic Manifold Alignment Attack against Embedding-to-Embedding Obfuscation in Privacy-Preserving LLMs

Authors: Sicong Li, Lingfeng Yao, Xingke Yang, Ke Tu, Chenhao Wu, Hao Wang, Jiang Liu, Phone Lin, 

Organizations: University of Houston · The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen · Waseda University · Stevens Institute of Technology · 

Abstract

With the widespread applications of large language models (LLMs), privacy-preserving inference has become increasingly essential for sensitive queries. To balance privacy and utility, a series of lightweight obfuscation approaches has recently been proposed, where users locally transform plaintext embeddings into the fixed ciphertext ones. While such Embedding-to-Embedding Obfuscation (E2EO) schemes demonstrate considerable resilience against traditional token frequency and embedding inversion attacks, the core mechanism behind remains to be the large-scale one-to-one substitution, which provides no cryptographic guarantees. In this paper, we propose Proxy Manifold Alignment (PMA), a novel attack against E2EO in privacy-preserving LLMs. Our key observation is that E2EO schemes keep the original semantic structure, so that the obfuscated vector stream can be regarded as an unknown tokenizer-language whose symbols are the vectors themselves. Therefore, the proposed ciphertext to plaintext reconstruction attack can be formulated as a translation task from the unknown tokenizer-language to plaintext. Specifically, by only accessing the obfuscated vector stream, the target tokenizer and a public corpus, the PMA attack first employs Word2Vec to model the co-occurrence patterns within the obfuscated stream and the public corpus independently, and constructs two proxy vector embeddings. Then, the attack aligns the underlying manifolds of these two embeddings based on structural similarity. Finally, it maps the obfuscated vectors back to plaintext. Experimental results demonstrate that PMA consistently achieves higher plaintext recovery than other state-of-the-art attack methods.

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